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Preface
This book has emerged in the context of four key developments occurring
over the past decade or so in the broad field of ‘the history of disasters.’
These are, first, the growing recognition that natural conditions and
events likely had an important role to play in determining historical
outcomes; second, the increasing use of non-documentary sources –
including DNA, tree rings, and ice-cores – and the related quest for
linking the natural and social sciences; third, the establishment of very
large digital databases of information; and fourth, the gradual dominance
of an explanatory framework for disasters that emphasizes resilience, and,
more specifically, adaptation. One of the goals of this book is to trace
these developments and how they have recently shaped our understand-
ing of the interaction between disasters and history. More significantly,
however, we also offer some critique. Indeed, as a team of historians co-
writing with an emphasis on social history, we suggest through the course
of the book that although interaction with geneticists, climatologists,
statisticians, and so on has brought many new advantages to our study
of disasters in the past, we also need to continue to pay heed to ‘trad-
itional’ historical skills – in particular the assessment of new data with
regard to source critique and contextualization of evidence. Perhaps even
more explicitly, however, given the emphasis on social history, we also put
forward a view that we should not forget the significance of social relations
and of disparities in advantages, opportunities, and access to resources
between social groups. Indeed, history shows that while economic, insti-
tutional, agricultural, and ecological systems often remained resilient in
the face of significant hazards –many of which led to disaster – significant
social groups within those very same systems were often vulnerable, and
suffered many hardships. We should be careful not to push these dimen-
sions out of view.
The authors offer thanks to the editor,MichaelWatson, and the staff of
Cambridge University Press, and the three anonymous referees for their
suggestions and comments on the first proposal for this volume.
Similarly, we thank Bin Wong (UCLA) and Eleonora Rohland
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(Bielefeld) for their comments on the first draft, and Heli Huhtamaa
(Bern/Heidelberg), Joris Roosen (Utrecht) and Franz Mauelshagen
(IASS Potsdam/Essen) for their comments and the extensive discussion
we had at a workshop in Utrecht. Bram Hilkens (Erasmus University
Rotterdam) and Constant van der Putten (Utrecht University) helped
greatly with the technical editing, while Constant also took care of the
illustrations, and Eileen Power helped us by checking the language. We
are grateful to all of the people involved in this collective effort.
x Preface
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1 Introduction: Disasters and History
1.1 The Key Themes of the Book
This monograph provides an overview of research into disasters from
a historical perspective, making two new contributions. First, it intro-
duces the field of ‘disaster studies’ to history, showing how we can use
history to better understand how societies deal with shocks and hazards
and their potentially disastrous outcomes. Despite growing recognition of
the importance of historical depth by scholars investigating disasters, the
temporal dimensions of disasters have been underexploited up to now.
Moreover, the historical record sometimes enables us to make a long-
term reconstruction of the social, economic, and cultural effects of haz-
ards and shocks that is simply not possible in contemporary disaster
studies material. We can therefore use ‘the past’ as a laboratory to test
hypotheses of relevance to the present in a careful way. History lends itself
to this end because of the opportunity it offers to identify distinct and
divergent social and environmental patterns and trajectories. We can
compare the drivers and constraints of societal responses with shocks
spatially and chronologically, and therefore enrich our understanding of
responses to stress today.
Second, we introduce historians to the topic of disasters and the field of
disaster studies, and explicitly show the relevance of studying past disas-
ters to better understand the social, economic, and political functioning
of past societies. Disasters often reveal features of society which in normal
situations remain hidden from the view of the historian, for example, the
entrenched vulnerability of particular groups within society or the mani-
festation of uneven power relations. People sometimes behaved in differ-
ent ways during periods of pressure when compared with ‘normal’ times.
Studying disasters thus allows historians to bridge the gap between ‘event’
and ‘structure.’ In particular, we show, through the lens of history and
disasters, how the past can be used to carry out systematic spatiotemporal
1
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comparison and to empirically test hypotheses developed in the social and
natural sciences. In this sense, the book looks to enrich approaches in the
contemporary study of disasters, but also approaches and methodologies
employed in the discipline of history.
The shocks and hazards on which this book concentrates are biophys-
ical ones, including seismic activity, droughts, high water tables, and
epidemics. Political and economic crises, war, and other human-made
shocks may figure in the text, not per se, but as factors sharpening the
effects of natural hazards or interacting with them. The broad objective of
the book is to show how history can be used to demonstrate how these
biophysical shocks and hazards, sometimes leading to disasters, push
societies in different directions – creating a diversity of possible social
and economic outcomes. Further, in this book we aim to identify the
patterns and mechanisms involved in producing these outcomes.
This diversity of outcome is produced in three phases (see Figure 1.1).
First, we show that the nature of the initial shocks to societies was often
very different – some killing people but leaving capital untouched (such as
the Black Death), others destroying capital and infrastructure but
1. Hazard
Exogenous
Endogenous
Societal restructuring
7. Societal restructuring
2. Impact 3. Disaster
Disaster
No disaster
Impact
No adaptation
No adaptation
Adaptation
6. Adaptation 5. Recovery
Recovery
No recovery
4. Mitigation
Mitigation
No mitigation
Institutionally induced
response
Institutional
change
Societal preconditions
Figure 1.1 Diversity of outcomes through hazards, disasters, and adaptation,
illustrating the framework used throughout this book. Drawn by Jasmin
Palamar, Utrecht University.
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inflicting only modest casualties (such as most floods), and others des-
troying both at the same time (such as the most severe earthquakes, or
epidemics occurring together with military activity). Put simply, the
effects that different shocks had on production factors and the demands
on infrastructure were not always the same. Even for the same type of
shock there was great diversity: not all epidemics, for example, had
universal features. Instead, they exhibited differences in epidemiologic
characteristics on the grounds of severity, pervasiveness, longevity, sea-
sonality, selectivity, and so on.
Second, we show that even when hazards and shocks had similar
features, their outcomes often varied as a result of interacting with very
different social, economic, political, and cultural settings, whereby dis-
similar levels of pre-existing vulnerability acted as a ‘filter’ for the shock
itself. Of course, famines and floods posed challenges very different from
those of earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, but even societies interacting
with the very same hazard were not always impacted in an identical way,
nor did they alwaysmove in the same direction. Pre-existing vulnerability,
a lack of preparedness, or ill-functioning institutions could turn a modest
shock into a true disaster, while well-prepared and less vulnerable soci-
eties could withstand much bigger hazards and threats and even prevent
them from turning into a disaster. Numerous kinds of institutional
responses were formed at a variety of scales – some stronger on a supra-
level through the state or long-distance markets, some stronger on
a meso-level through collectives – such as guilds, community associ-
ations, organizations for the management of common-pool resources,
insurance systems, and so on – and others stronger on a micro-level as
households, families, and neighbors became the most dominant form of
welfare, assistance. and protection. The arrangement and combination of
these different scales of response helped create a diversity of outcomes.
Third, we show that even two different societies facing the same hazard
with the same kinds of institutional responses still did not always produce
the same post-hazard trajectories. As a major element to the book, we aim
to demonstrate that althoughmany historical societies shared a number of
ways of dealing with the same shocks and hazards on the surface, for
example in the form of poor relief institutions, flood management infra-
structure, or commonly managed resources, the outcomes could still be
quite different. In order to explain these differences, we look at the social
actors behind the institutional responses themselves, showing that rather
than being ‘rational’ responses offering the greatest amount of protection
or welfare by way of institutional adaptation, these responses were the
products of different social actors with goals not always equivalent to the
‘common good.’ Accordingly, we illustrate how shocks and hazards, and
1.1 The Key Themes of the Book 3
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the disasters that ensued, could have very diverse consequences and
outcomes, not only between societies, but also within the same societies,
between social groups, and across wealth, ethnic, and gender lines, and
we try to find patterns and mechanisms in order to better understand
these diverse outcomes.
As well as focusing on diversity of outcomes, this book also addresses
a number of key themes in disasters and history. An important one is that
of anticipation, preparedness and memory. Hazards, and the disasters
sometimes produced, are often not unexpected. Every region continu-
ously had to cope with recurring sets of hazards and threats. Coastal
zones, for instance, were constantly confronted by the threat of storm
surges and floods, and therefore often formed a ‘region of risk.’1 This
book addresses past societies’ levels of preparedness, anticipation, and
memory of hazards which emerge over the long term. Some societies were
not only aware of the environmental threats but anticipated hazards and
built a society that could cope with hazard reoccurrence.2 Others, how-
ever, did not or could not anticipate and were therefore more vulnerable
to unexpected environmental shocks. By looking into different cultural or
social barriers, institutional flaws, and political constellations, we explain
why certain societies were able to develop ‘subcultures’ of coping and
introduced successful protection measures, while in others an effective
response and level of preparedness was lacking. For example, some
historians and historical geographers have suggested that ‘cultural mem-
ory’ of past hazards and disasters may have been important, helping
initiate technological and infrastructure-based reorganization. Yet at the
same time, memories of past events were sometimes manipulated by
authorities – in the case of plague, for example, to act as a cautionary
warning to citizens on how to behave.3 Furthermore, mere knowledge of
and experience with previous or repeat occurrences of hazards was not
enough to stimulate adaptive practice in every case. That is to say, these
responses were not always rational and effective reactions to protect the
common good, but were sometimes used to promote the interests of
select groups within society. Barriers could emerge to prevent successful
adaptation regardless of knowledge and experience: in Southern
Nyasaland (Malawi) after the 1949 famine, for example, peasants were
largely prevented from using traditional ecological knowledge such as
switching from maize to the more drought-resistant sorghum and from
intensification of riverbank cultivation, by government policies that
1 Bankoff, ‘The “English Lowlands”’; Mauelshagen, ‘Flood Disasters and Political
Culture.’
2 Bankoff, ‘Cultures of Disaster.’ 3 Carmichael, ‘The Last Past Plague,’ 159.
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prioritized the development of colonial cash crops at the expense of
reducing sensitivity to drought.4 Accordingly, copingmechanisms cannot
be understood in isolation, but must be viewed in the wider context of
societal organization and the associated institutional framework: that is,
in relation to institutions not necessarily geared towards coping with
hazards but serving very different goals.
Another key theme is that of disaster impacts. What are these diverse
outcomes that we are able to reconstruct? Mortality is an obvious
variable,5 even though for some historical disasters precise data on the
number and social profile of victims are lacking. Recent literature has
shown how epidemics had different scales of severity and territorial reach
not just between outbreaks, but also for the same outbreak across
localities.6 Likewise, it has been shown that neither periods of extreme
weather nor periods of high prices in food products inevitably led to the
same mortality effect.7 Recent work on flooding has shown considerable
regional differences in the disruption of livelihoods, the numbers of
casualties produced, and the socio-economic profile of the victims.8
Mortality is not necessarily the optimal variable for all types of disas-
ters, however. Some disasters did not cause high mortality but were
disastrous on a different level. Floods or erosion could have devastating
effects without killing a single person. For example, virtually nobody was
killed ‘directly’ because of the sand storms during the American Dust
Bowl in the 1930s. Nevertheless, this development has been labeled “one
of the three worst ecological disasters in history,”9 because of the loss of
productive land that crippled the Midwestern economy indefinitely, with
recent research showing significant medium- and long-term effects for
human capital formation and for later-life health and income.10 As
a result, different variables could be applicable according to the type of
disaster, such as capital destruction (in the form of land, labor, or finan-
cial capital), falling yields, or erosion of societal stability potentially
leading to scapegoating or trauma. For historical disasters, capital
destruction and changing yields or land use can be traced, as they left at
least some marks in the written documentary sources, even if this is not
always methodologically straightforward. A more complicated and less
4 Vaughan, ‘Famine Analysis.’ 5 Sen, ‘Mortality.’
6 Alfani, ‘Plague in Seventeenth-Century Europe’; Curtis, ‘Was Plague an Exclusively
Urban Phenomenon?’
7 Curtis & Dijkman, ‘The Escape from Famine,’ 235–236; Ó Gráda & Chevet, ‘Famine
and Market,’ 714, 728.
8 Rheinheimer, ‘Mythos Sturmflut’; Elliott & Pais, ‘Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina’;
Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’
9 Quote from Borgström,World Food Resources, via Worster, Dust Bowl, 4.
10 Arthi, “The Dust Was Long in Settling.”
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objective measure is whether a society experienced a societal shift out of
its ‘stability domain.’ This is derived from the field of environmental
studies, where a disaster is measured by the magnitude of disturbance
that a system can absorb before it changes from one stability domain or
ecosystem into another stable domain.11 It could be that these forms of
ecological resilience can be used for societies as well.12 A hazard or shock
could be labeled a disaster when a society is pushed out of its former
stability domain into a new one. Returning to the American Dust Bowl,
this is illustrated by the permanent shift that some regions made from
being grain-producing regions towards cattle breeding in the places where
the loss of productive soil was most severe.
Shocks and hazards could also stimulate different levels of social
unrest. Although a clichéd view used to be that epidemics inevitably
pushed all societies into disorder and disarray, perhaps even creating
scapegoats, informed by a Foucauldian narrative of top-down repression,
more recent work has tended to show oppositional tendencies too, as
epidemics became forums for welfare reform, encouraged community
cohesion, and provided a vehicle for those at the bottom of society to
autonomously vent their frustrations and concerns towards those at the
top.13 Similarly, during periods of famine, it used to be seen as inevitable
that the kinds of pressure generated thereby would break the bonds of
society, leading to heightened levels of criminality such as thievery and
violence, and yet other works in more recent years have shown how
communal bonds of trust could continue and be strengthened even in
some of the worst famines.14
Over the long term, we also find diversity in economic and demo-
graphic outcomes. Some of these were aggregate outcomes such as differ-
ences in overall extent and speed of population recovery after a disaster.
Demographic development after the Black Death was not the same in the
Low Countries as it was in England, Spain, or Egypt,15 for example, and
differed on a regional level too within these countries.16 Differences were
even seen on a city-by-city level: post-epidemic migration allowed some
cities to recover within a matter of years, even exceeding previous popu-
lations, while others nearby saw complete contractions.17 We look at how
these differences were established through the various ‘tools’ for
11 Gunderson, ‘Ecological Resilience,’ 427. 12 Adger, ‘Social Vulnerability.’
13 Cohn, Epidemics; Curtis, ‘Preserving the Ordinary.’
14 Slavin, ‘Market Failure’; Vanhaute & Lambrecht, ‘Famine’; van Onacker, ‘Social
Vulnerability.’
15 Van Bavel & van Zanden, ‘The Jump-Start’; Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy;
Borsch, The Black Death.
16 Lewis, ‘Disaster Recovery,’ 792–793; van Bavel, ‘People and Land,’ 6–8.
17 For post-Black Death Tuscany: Herlihy & Klapisch-Zuber, Les Toscans et leurs familles.
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demographic recovery that societies had at their disposal – nuptiality,
fertility, migration, welfare safety-nets, and grip over economic resources
and opportunities.
Many of the long-term differences in economic outcomes we discuss,
however, were redistributive. Hazards and shocks helped redistribute
economic resources between social groups, therefore making societies
more or less unequal. Indeed, scholars such as Branko Milanovic have
suggested that “epidemics and wars alone can explain most of the swings
in [pre-modern] inequality,” while Walter Scheidel believes that the only
time socio-economic inequalities leveled themselves out throughout his-
tory was during episodes of mass violence, destruction, or mortality.18 By
its very nature, this kind of redistribution creates diverse outcomes –
giving to some while taking away from others within the same society –
but the level of post-shock redistribution also differed from context to
context. In some cases, a lasting equitable effect was seen – the Black
Death and recurring plagues in Northern and Central Italy, for example,
decreasing inequality for the next century or more, whereas yet other
epidemics, such as the 1629–30 outbreak in Northern Italy, had only very
brief and short-run equitable effects that quickly disappeared or were
negated by certain institutions being employed to maintain the ‘status
quo’.19 In contrast to the ‘leveling hypothesis,’ other shocks, however,
pushed redistributive outcomes in the opposite direction, as certain
groups ‘instrumentalized’ the hazard to their advantage – elites buffering
destructive shocks to capital goods in times of floods or hoarding and
speculating in times of famine.
Hazards and shocks also helped redistribute resources and opportun-
ities between social groups in the same community. Disasters did not
mean the same things for the very young or the very old as they did for
working-age adults, or for ‘native’ inhabitants when compared with the
experiences of ‘recent’ migrants, or for rural dwellers compared with
those of the cities. Studies on contemporary disasters tend to emphasize,
for example, how women are more susceptible than men to various
negative outcomes from disasters – and yet historical work on the subject
tends to find differential trajectories, dependent on shock and context.
A long debate has ensued over the role of the Black Death in improving
women’s economic fortunes,20 and yet it is clear that post-plague oppor-
tunities for women differed between regions, if we are to use indicators
such as access to property, participation in economic roles outside the
household, access to the marriage market, and access to care and
18 Milanovic, Global Inequality, 62, 69; Scheidel, The Great Leveler, passim.
19 See Section 5.3.2. 20 Rigby, ‘Gendering the Black Death.’ See Section 5.3.2.
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support.21 The same holds for famines. While development economics
tends to assert negative aspects for women emanating out of intra-
household hierarchies dictating access to food or potential for abandon-
ment, pre-modern famine history tends to show more diversity in
outcomes – in some cases women experiencing a ‘female mortality advan-
tage’ vis-à-vis men, or benefiting from their status as creditors with
surplus capital or their control over food production, or reaping the
benefits of poor relief systems structurally set up for women over men.
In discussing these themes, the book will not be comprehensive in its
spatial coverage. Unfortunately, many parts of the globe can hardly be
discussed because of the lack of sources or relevant studies. Things are
changing for the better, however, with a growing number of studies
appearing on the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, and China, for
instance. We hope this book will constitute an invitation to scholars
working there. This will also enable us to see to what extent the concepts,
definitions, and mechanisms presented in this book also apply to other
parts of the globe. To be sure, in choosing cases to be discussed, this book
does not attempt to be exhaustive. Rather, we feel that touching briefly on
a very large number of cases could lead to superficiality and not be in line
with one of the core arguments of the book, that is, that hazards and
disasters can be understood and explained only by placing them in their
social, economic, political, and cultural context. Therefore, we opted to
somewhat limit the number of examples to be mentioned and also chose
some well-investigated cases to return to throughout the book. Most
notably, these cases are the Black Death of 1348 in Europe and the
Middle East, the North Sea floods of the late-medieval and early-
modern period, the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, the American Dust
Bowl of the 1930s, the sub-Saharan Africa famines of the twentieth
century, and the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan leading to the
Fukushima disaster. These cases relate to different types of hazards and
offer different time scales (event versus long-run process), and they are
relatively well documented and investigated, thus enabling us to highlight
the various aspects of each disaster and its wider context.
This book does not limit itself to the modern period, as it takes a long-
term perspective and tries to employ the whole of the historical record.
Not all periods can be equally rigorously discussed, since there are limi-
tations in terms of the sources and works available, but more attention
than often is the case will be paid to the pre-industrial period. This reflects
in part the academic background of the authors, but also the fact that this
period knew a wide diversity of social, economic, cultural, and political
21 See Section 6.1.1.
8 Introduction: Disasters and History
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
constellations, often found in close proximity to each other, and thus
offers a very rich testing ground replete with opportunities to test ideas
and hypotheses and find contrasting experiences that allow us to perform
a comparative analysis.22 Moreover, despite acknowledging that the
Industrial Revolution brought momentous changes, we do not consider
it to have formed a fundamental rift making the mechanisms at play in the
pre-industrial period fundamentally different and therefore useless for
understanding the challenges we are facing now; rather, many of the
underlying mechanisms are essentially similar.
Linking up with this, the book explicitly inquires whether the present
can be regarded as an ‘Age ofDisaster.’Higher vulnerability to disasters is
often seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of the Anthropocene,
the new geological epoch in which humanity influences the basic condi-
tions of the planetary ecosystem directly.23 In the Anthropocene, humans
are co-producing nature – just as nature co-produces humans – but at the
same time humans have to abandon the ambition to control nature, which
had been one of the fundamental premises of ‘modernity.’24 The
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution ‘modernized’ the disaster
experience, as disasters were deemed to be both produced by the techno-
logical endeavors of men and controlled through technology. Since the
late twentieth century, however, it has been argued by some scholars25
that control is no longer possible, but risk reduction and adaptation are
more crucial than ever, since the extreme events are there, we do not
control them, and we cannot escape them.
While the scale and intensity of resource exploitation and technological
transformation of the Earth undoubtedly accelerated hugely from the
Industrial Revolution onwards, and became even more articulated after
World War II, this book nevertheless questions whether pre-modern
disasters were indeed very different from ‘modern’ or ‘Anthropocentric’
ones. At least they are not different in a fundamental way. First, modern
advances did not free us from the risk of disaster. Seen from a long-term
world-historical perspective, one could say that “every gain in precision in
the coordination of human activity and every heightening of efficiency in
production were matched by a new vulnerability to breakdown.”26
Second, and even more clearly, the social, political, cultural, and eco-
nomic settings of societies, and the coordination systems they used –
a main cause of the divergences in the effects of hazards and disasters
22 Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’
23 Ebert, ‘The Age of Catastrophe’.
24 Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History.’ See Section 7.1.
25 Beck, Lash & Wynne, Risk Society.
26 McNeill, The Global Condition, 148; Mauelshagen, ‘Defining Catastrophes.’
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we highlight throughout the book – do not show a linear progression
throughout history. Systems of competitive markets, and their domin-
ance, for instance, can rise and decline, without an inevitable march
forward to modernity.27 This book thus seeks to replace a linear proces-
sional narrative on the modernization of disasters with a more analytical
approach that focuses on continuities, disruption, and change in their
production, interpretation, and (technological) control. In so doing, we
question, for instance, the importance of technology in the production of
and resilience to disasters long before the Industrial Revolution, and
show the profound regional and social divergences in vulnerability and
resilience characterizing ‘traditional,’ ‘modern,’ and ‘Anthropocenic’
societies.
The present experiences show that it is relevant, perhaps even more
than ever, to use the historical record to increase our understanding of
disasters. Societies all over the globe are confronted with rising water
tables and ensuing floods, severe drought, or epidemics, including the
COVID-19 pandemic. While the medium- and long-term consequences
of these recent disasters will not be known to us for some time, we feel that
the concepts, frameworks, and angles of analysis discussed in this book
exploring the links between disasters and historical development, and the
insights offered by historical analysis, may be fruitfully applied by other
future scholars who will want to focus more explicitly on the fallout of
present disasters. At the very least, the COVID-19 pandemic shows again
how both over-emphasis on ‘inevitable’ mechanistic frameworks and
processional narratives about progress and technology are unfounded
and obscure the real effects on people, more particularly the different
effects on different groups of people. This requires a better, deeper
understanding of the causes of resilience and vulnerability of societies in
the face of natural hazards, to which this book, with analysis based on the
historical record, hopes to contribute.
1.2 Disaster Studies and Disaster History: Connected Fields?
The rise of interest in hazards and disasters as objects of scientific analysis
is closely intertwined with the specifics of the Cold War period, when
the US government and army became increasingly interested in how the
American population would react if a (nuclear) attack occurred. In the
1950s the first research on how people reacted under extreme circum-
stances, where disasters such as fires, cyclones, and earthquakes were
seen as a proxy for war, was conducted mainly by sociologists, looking at
27 See for markets: van Bavel, The Invisible Hand?
10 Introduction: Disasters and History
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
the social effects of disasters. This continued in the 1960s when the
Disaster Research Center (DRC) was founded by three disaster sociolo-
gists: Quarantelli, Dynes, and Haas.28 At the same time, geographical
interest in ‘natural hazards’ sparked, with a focus on building and land
development.29 Gilbert White’s ground-breaking work on floodplain
management famously stated: “Floods are an act of God, but flood losses
are largely an act of man.”30
Still, these early roots of disaster studies created a field that was mainly
interested in the aftermath of disaster and focused on practical knowledge
for disaster management. Disasters were seen as an event – as a short
rupture of normalcy. In the 1990s, this was famously challenged by the
work ofWisner and Blaikie, whose ‘At Risk’ argued that “although events
such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes serve as triggers for disasters,
disasters themselves originate in social conditions and processes that may
be far removed from events themselves.”31 Anthropologists also devel-
oped a keen interest in disasters, often focusing on the bottom-up disaster
experience of the ‘subaltern,’ adding new class, gender, and race perspec-
tives to a field that had long been dominated by affluent white men.32
These developments heavily nuanced the long-standing belief in the
naturalness of disasters and the emphasis on the effects of disasters that
had long dominated the field.
As climate change rose in importance on the political agenda, disaster
studies increasingly concerned itself with anthropogenic climate
change using the established concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and
adaptation.33 The UN call for the International Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) during the 1990s and early 2000s played
a part in this. Also very decisive was the 2004 ‘Reducing Disaster Risk’
report by the UNDP. As climate change disproportionally impacted the
developing world, the need for resilience and adaptation took center
stage. This led to an increased interest in these topics in the social
sciences, which trickled down to the field of history – albeit slowly.
Historians were relatively late to become involved.34 Of course, indi-
vidual cataclysms like the Black Death or the Lisbon Earthquake had
always been of interest to economic, political, and cultural historians. In
many ancient and pre-industrial cultures, the systematic recording and
28 Quarantelli, ‘Disaster Studies.’ 29 Tierney, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream?’
30 White, ‘Human Adjustment to Floods,’ 2.
31 Tierney, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream?,’ 509.
32 Oliver-Smith, ‘Anthropological Research.’
33 Steinberg, Acts of God; Groh, Kempe & Mauelshagen, Naturkatastrophen; Jakubowski-
Tiessen & Lehmann, Um Himmels Willen.
34 Steinberg, Acts of God; Groh, Kempe & Mauelshagen, Naturkatastrophen; Jakubowski-
Tiessen & Lehmann, Um Himmels Willen.
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interpretation of calamitous events even constituted an important part of
the ‘profession’ of historians. In imperial China for instance, the official
history of each dynasty included a subsection labeled ‘the Five Phases’ or
‘Five Elements,’ listing weather anomalies and disasters from floods via
locusts to the appearance of dragons.35 Dismissed as part of a ‘positivist,’
descriptive tradition, post-World War II historiography originally paid
little attention to disastrous events, with some notable exceptions. In the
1970smounting environmental concerns guided some historians to ques-
tion more systematically the historical interaction between humans and
nature, including the many moments when this interaction turned vio-
lent. For environmental history, as the new discipline was labeled in the
United States, ‘natural disasters’were an important subject from the very
beginning. The ground-breaking work of Donald Worster on the
AmericanDust Bowl, for instance, was one of the first studies to highlight
the historical intertwinement of environment and economy, by showing
how capitalist policies led to an aggressive exploitation of the Great
Plains, paving the way for disaster.36 In their attention to specific kinds
of natural hazards and disasters, environmental historians often show
‘national’ preoccupations in line with the ‘primary trauma’ of their region:
while environmental historians of the Low Countries automatically con-
centrated onwater and floods,German historians were focusing on ‘wood
shortage’ and the decline of forests, ‘Waldsterben.’ For most non-
European historians, the primary trauma was colonization, and both in
Latin America and in India, a lot of historical literature on disasters aimed
to reveal the ‘colonial roots.’37
Historical climatology also paid ample attention to disasters induced by
extreme weather conditions and/or climatic variability. However, while
climate history today is very much concerned with the ‘impact’ of climate
on society,38 not all pioneers in the field initially were convinced of an
intimate climate–society nexus. In the 1960s Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie
still considered climate history “history without human beings.”39 In his
1971 Times of Feast, Times of Famine he hence concluded that “in the long
term the human consequences of climate seem to be slight, perhaps
negligible, and certainly difficult to detect.” A similar tone was later
taken by Jan de Vries, who suggested that “short-term climatic crises
stand in relation to economic history as bank robberies to the history of
35 Brook, The Troubled Empire, 52. 36 Worster, Dust Bowl.
37 Radkau, Nature and Power, 10. For the association with colonialism, see for instance
Oliver-Smith, ‘Peru’s Five-Hundred-Year Earthquake.’
38 Mauelshagen, ‘Redefining Historical Climatology.’
39 Le Roy Ladurie,Histoire du climat; Le Roy Ladurie, Times of Feast. See alsoMauelshagen
& Pfister, ‘Vom Klima zur Gesellschaft.’
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banking.”40 In contrast to Le Roy Ladurie, British climatologists Gordon
Manley and Hubert Lamb made greater allowance for the influence of
climate on human cultures, while being critical of the problems that
characterized earlier determinist writings.41 The work of Lamb and
other researchers at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) saw the formal-
ization of historical climatology into a discipline that addressed “climate
reconstruction, the identification and measurement of impact, and adap-
tation and perception.”42During the 1980s, however, the emphasis of the
research at the CRUwould shift from climate impact to statistical climat-
ology and climate modeling.
Only in the last couple of decades has historical climatology once again
placed the climate–society nexus at the center of its work, with Christian
Pfister – one of the few historians to contribute to both climate recon-
struction and climate impact studies – identifying the vulnerability of past
societies to climatic variation as a new focus for historical climatology in
2010.43 During the past few years, climate history has boomed as never
before. Periods of extreme ‘climate stress’ – pronounced stretches of
extreme weather, or even shifts in the global climate system – are increas-
ingly singled out as ‘historical drivers’ of major societal changes. Climate
histories have been written for regions and societies outside of the trad-
itional hotbed of central and western Europe, while increasing numbers
of high-profile studies written by economic, social, and political historians
have appeared on the environmental drivers of the decline of the Roman
Empire, dynastic changes in Imperial China, or the spread of the Black
Death in the fourteenth century.44
Apart from climate history, there is yet another historical subdiscipline
which traditionally paid great attention to crisis and disaster. For socio-
economic historians, rising grain prices, food shortages, and famine have
been a long-standing topic of interest.45 The recurrence of ‘subsistence
crises’ – as they were labeled by Meuvret – was considered an intrinsic
feature of any pre-twentieth-century economy which only industrializa-
tion and the modernization of agricultural production could overcome.46
Indeed, famine had always been high on the research agenda of economic
historians, though it was a development economist, Amartya Sen, who
40 De Vries, ‘Measuring the Impact of Climate on History,’ 603.
41 Manley, Climate and the British Scene; Lamb, Climate: Past, Present and Future; Lamb,
Climate, History.
42 Ingram, Underhill & Wigley, ‘Historical Climatology’; Wigley, Ingram & Farmer,
Climate and History; Rotberg & Rabb, Climate and History.
43 Pfister, ‘The Vulnerability of Past Societies.’
44 Harper, The Fate of Rome; Parker, The Global Crisis; Campbell, The Great Transition.
45 To cite but one example: Beveridge, ‘Wheat Prices and Rainfall’ was published in 1922.
46 Meuvret, ‘Les oscillations des prix.’
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forcefully demonstrated the potential of historical famines – in his case the
1943 Bengal Famine – to improve our understanding of present-day
hunger. Sen’s interpretation of famine as allocation or entitlement crises
sparked a renewed interest in historical famines, lasting until today.47
Epidemics – and especially the Black Death – and their economic conse-
quences have also received a lot of attention, again often linked to the
history of prices and wages. Whether the strong demographic contraction
after the Black Death and the changing land–labor ratio led to a ‘Golden
Age of Labour’ has been part of a historiographical debate ever since the
nineteenth century (the term itself was coined in 1884), referring to the
spike in wages and drop in prices observed by the first price and wage data
collectors.48 Debates on the same issue continue today.49 The conse-
quences of the Black Death not only inspired economic historians, but
also attracted attention to cultural aspects, such as its impact on religion,
the scapegoating of vulnerable groups, and the evolution of medical
thinking.50
Moreover, we should keep inmind that the study of past disasters is not
the fief of historians alone. In recent years archaeologists, anthropologists,
geographers, and climate scientists have all enthusiastically embraced the
potential of ‘natural archives’ – from sediments to ice cores – to recon-
struct, date, and interpret the role of both extreme events and long-term
changes in the rise and decline of communities, societies, and empires in
the past. It has been argued, for instance, that the giant Laacher See
volcanic eruption (in the Eifel region between Bonn and Koblenz)
13,000 years ago might explain the sudden disintegration of the homoge-
neous ‘Federmesser’ culture of hunter–gatherer communities in many
parts of Northern andWestern Europe.51 In similar ways, a large volcanic
eruption inMarch 536AD is now thought to be responsible for disrupting
climatic conditions, setting the scene for the outbreak of the Justinianic
plague, ravaging the Byzantine Empire, and marking the beginning of
a ‘Late Antique Little Ice Age.’52
But perhaps the potential of disaster history might be situated not so
much in formulating or rebutting this kind of grand narrative on the rise
and fall of civilizations, but rather in revealing the causal mechanisms
47 Sen, Poverty and Famines; Appleby, ‘Grain Prices’; Ó Gráda & Chevet, ‘Famine and
Market’; Vanhaute & Lambrecht, ‘Famine.’
48 Rodgers, Six Centuries, 326.
49 For an overview: Hatcher, ‘Unreal Wages’; Hatcher & Bailey,Modelling the Middle Ages.
50 Herlihy, The Black Death; Cohn, The Black Death Transformed; Cohn, Cultures of Plague;
Cohn, Epidemics.
51 Riede et al., ‘A Laacher See-Eruption Supplement’; Riede, ‘Towards a Science of Past
Disasters.’
52 Büntgen et al., ‘Cooling and Societal Change.’
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which explain why particular disasters did somuch harm in some contexts
and were countered in others. Over the past decade, this approach has
been refined and tested by a group of historians in the Low Countries,
including the authors of the present volume. For a wide array of hazards
and disasters, from floods to epidemics and epizootics, from famine to
sand drifts, the often highly contrasting regional experiences have been
analyzed in depth. Such a comparative approach allowed us to question
the relative impact of natural variability and exogenous shocks, but also of
different coordination systems, state interventions, solidarity mechan-
isms, economic inequality, and so on.Understanding the changes in land-
use which made a region vulnerable to devastating sand drifts53, the
marginalization processes which exposed certain regions or households
to flood risk,54 or the different recovery rates of cities after epidemics55
turns disaster history into a useful empirical ‘laboratory’ to improve our
knowledge of disasters in the past,56 and, at the same time, sheds new
light on the functioning of past societies.57
1.3 Interpretative Frameworks in Historical Research
Long before the history of disasters and its vocabulary of risk, vulnerability,
resilience, and adaptation became fashionable, historians investigated
major societal ‘shocks’ and developed interpretations on how to explain
the origins and impact of these shocks, and regional variations in their
frequency or intensity. From a cultural angle, for example, the inflexibility
of cultural practices has been presented as one of the explanations for the
failure of some societies to adapt to changing ecological circumstances.58
Another line of thought has identified the nature of political regimes –
democratic or dictatorial – and the accompanying ‘inclusive’ or ‘extractive’
institutions as the main determinants of success or failure.59 While we
acknowledge the importance of these approaches in cultural and political
history, and will use them throughout the book, we will expand here on
those developed within economic and social history, where perhaps the
earliest attempts were made to arrive at overarching interpretations, which
often hold direct relevance to the issues of vulnerability and resilience to
hazards and shocks. In these fields, a number of interpretative schemes,
theories, or models have emerged, aiming to explain not only economic
53 De Keyzer & Bateman, ‘Late Holocene Landscape Instability.’
54 Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’
55 Curtis, ‘Was Plague an Exclusively Urban Phenomenon?’
56 Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’
57 Curtis, van Bavel & Soens, ‘History and the Social Sciences.’
58 Krüger et al., Cultures and Disasters. 59 Acemoglu & Robinson,Why Nations Fail.
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growth and prosperity, but also the opposite: crisis and collapse. In par-
ticular, these approaches have been applied and tested on the BlackDeath,
which may have killed half or more of the populations that it affected in
Eurasia and parts of Africa in the middle of the fourteenth century. Over
the past century, debates on the causes and consequences of the ‘late-
medieval crisis’ and its possible connection to the Black Death have been
structured along the lines of fourmajor explanatory frameworks, which still
influence, albeit often implicitly, the thinking about hazards and disasters
in history more generally.60 These frameworks center respectively around
(i) population and resources, (ii) the social distribution of power and
property, (iii) commercialization and markets, and (iv) institutions.
The first framework is often termed a ‘Malthusian’ approach, whereby
hazards and shocks are the ‘positive checks’ that stem from the pressure
between growing populations in a world with finite resources (Figure 1.2).
These increased populations become faced with increasing food prices and
rents, while labor at the same time becomes cheaper – thus real income
declines. Either populations adapt to these conditions (by reducing the birth
rate and hence population growth), forming a preventive check, or they face
malnutrition and become vulnerable to epidemic diseases, which forms the
positive check that adjusts populations to the available resources. For Sir
Michael Postan, for example, the tension between population and resources
was at the heart of the so-called late-medieval crisis. In famine analysis, this
is translated into the tension between the availability of food and the
population which needs to be fed. As long as the productivity of land
remained inherently limited, the periodic recurrence of food shortage was
seemingly inevitable. Examples of these limitations, with all the associated
vulnerabilities, are found not only in thirteenth-century Europe. Late-
Imperial China is also mentioned as a classic example of a technological–-
environmental ‘lock-in,’ where the perfection of available technologies and
knowledge had pushed the productivity of the soil (and hence population
density) far beyond what was ‘sustainable,’ necessitating ever higher invest-
ments to maintain the ‘equilibrium’ (or postpone the collapse). The inher-
ent tension between population and resources made the region increasingly
vulnerable to climatic variability, and led to hazards such as floods and
harvest failures.61
That is not to say that every climate-centered analysis of disaster
accords with a Malthusian framework. For medieval historians like
60 Hatcher & Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages, resumes the debate and its development.
Literature on the different approaches framing the Black Death is extensive, see
Campbell, The Great Transition, for the most recent synthesis.
61 Elvin, The Retreat of the Elephants, esp. Chapter 1; Elvin, ‘Three Thousand Years of
Unsustainable Growth.’
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Bruce Campbell and David Herlihy, the thirteenth century “status quo of
a maximum population subsisting with minimum living standards” could
have continued almost indefinitely, had it not been brutally disrupted by
the climatic and epidemic upheavals of the fourteenth century.62 Put
simply, climate- and epidemic-related shocks can also be seen as entirely
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Figure 1.2 The basicMalthusianmodel, based on themodel of JohnHatcher and
Mark Bailey. Hatcher and Bailey,Modelling the Middle Ages.
62 Campbell, ‘Nature as Historical Protagonist,’ 287–288; quoting Herlihy, The Black
Death, 38.
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‘exogenous’ to the people–resources framework rather than having any
causal relationship to it.
The main challenge to Malthusian interpretations of the late-medieval
crisis, however, was offered by the Marxist analyses of class struggle and
the allocation of the means of production between different groups in
society. In this second approach, crises did not occur through a lack of
resources, but instead because the political economy prevented social
groups getting enough access to food or resources. As E. A. Kosminsky
stated in 1956 on the late-medieval population crisis in England:
“Probably, even given the level of productive forces then prevailing,
England could easily have supported a much larger population, if the
feudal lords, the feudal church and the feudal state had not sucked the
labouring classes dry.”63 Depending on the historical context, the
‘bad guys’ were rent-extracting feudal lords or urban elite governments,
profit-seeking factory owners, or ‘enlightened’ state officials seeking to
rationalize economic production, even if we see cases of tenant-on-tenant
extortion within the peasantry too.64 In Marxist studies, economic crises
are an inevitable consequence of elite extraction, but so too are environ-
mental crises. For example, in the 1840s, when Friedrich Engels walked
through the streets of Manchester – the ‘shock city’ of the First Industrial
Revolution – he was appalled not only by “the barbarous exploitation of
the workers,” but also by the “foul air” in the streets and in the cotton-
and flax-spinning mills where fibrous dust caused “blood-spitting, hard,
noisy breathing, pains in the chest, coughs, sleeplessness,” the lack of
cleanliness and comfort in the houses, and the “narrow, coal-black foul-
smelling”River Irk.65What Engels described was the unfolding of a ‘slow
disaster’ – the gradual deterioration of living conditions which put people
at risk of early death through chronic illnesses, andmade them vulnerable
to ‘fast disasters,’ which in the industrializing cities of the nineteenth
century took the form of cholera and tuberculosis epidemics, toxic
leaks, and mining catastrophes.66 Some of these deteriorating urban
conditions even predated the Industrial Revolution – becoming more of
a problem through proletarianization and migration in the early-modern
period.67
The rural counterpart of this approach is found in the long tradition in
peasant history of investigating processes of land grabbing, expropriation,
and the privatization of formerly common resources and the way they
63 Kosminsky, Studies in the Agrarian History of England.
64 For this nuanced view: Campbell, ‘The Agrarian Problem.’
65 Engels, The Condition of the Working Class; quotations by Clark & Foster, ‘The
Environmental Conditions of the Working Class.’
66 Platt, Shock Cities. 67 Van Oosten, ‘The Dutch Great Stink.’
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eroded the sustainability of the peasants’ livelihoods. For Ramachandra
Guha, the clash between the shifting forest cultivation – jhum – practiced
by peasant communities in the Northeast of India and the commercial
forestry advocated by the British Imperial Forestry department was not
only a clash between fundamentally opposed ideas on how to use forest
resources, but also a “struggle for existence” between villagers and the
Forest Department, and between subsistence and the market. The pro-
gressive erosion of the jhum turned many villagers into landless laborers
said to be more vulnerable than before.68 Since Immanuel Wallerstein’s
work on economic world-systems, conflicting social relations are no
longer situated solely between different classes within society, but also
between regions at the core and periphery of the gradually emerging
capitalist world-economy.69 The shifting frontiers of the world-
economy are often thought to have been particularly vulnerable to disas-
ters, as the never-ending search for cheap labor and cheap natural
resources often abruptly and radically transformed localized societies
and environments, leading to over-exploitation of land and resources,
and massive delocalization of people.70 Recently, Marxist historians have
developed an even more environmental approach by focusing on the
‘metabolic rift,’ a concept introduced by Karl Marx. In this literature,
a capitalist mode of production, with a focus on relentless economic
growth and strict division of labor, inevitably leads to environmental
problems, that may result in true disasters. At the heart is a societal
blueprint creating social vulnerabilities such as inequality, precarious-
ness, weak entitlements, and monoculture, which exacerbate the effects
of hazards and shocks.71
A third main approach to understanding crises and disasters, and their
prevention or mitigation, is market dynamics – also labeled the Smithian
ormodernization approach. This framework focuses on economic growth
through commercialization and markets, whereby expanding markets
gave producers incentives to specialize, and the growing division of
labor allowed economies of scale and productivity gains. These product-
ivity gains in turn allowed living standards to grow in parallel with popu-
lation, in contrast to Malthusian predictions, potentially postponing or
even preventing crisis.72 Furthermore, productivity growth offered
68 Guha, The Unquiet Woods; Guha & Gadgil, ‘State Forestry and Social Conflict.’
69 Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I.
70 Moore, ‘The Capitalocene.’ See Section 7.1.2.
71 Foster, ‘Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift’; Moore, ‘Environmental Crises and the
Metabolic Rift.’
72 For medieval Europe, see for instance Britnell, The Commercialisation of English Society.
See also Section 6.1.3.
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surpluses that could be reinvested to reduce pollution or develop protect-
ive technologies. Similar arguments have been extended to factor mar-
kets: clearly delimited and legally sanctioned private property rights,
backed up by the enforcing powers of the state, have been judged by
some to stimulate economic development and reduce exposure to
disasters.
Of course, there is a reverse side to this kind of explanatory framework
since many of these developments such as commercialization and market
orientation also gave rise to knock-on developments such as social polar-
ization, proletarianization, inequality, displacement, and so on – essential
features guiding heightened vulnerability that have been discussed in the
above-mentioned property-rights approach. Put simply, surpluses may
have been produced, but in whose hands did they fall? Many of the
investments in production often came hand-in-handwith restrictive regu-
lations – forcing producers to cultivate certain types of crop or enter into
inequitable credit agreements leading to debt bondage.73 While markets
could mitigate food shortages, they could also lead to speculation and
hoarding – thus conversely making shocks such as harvest failures more
severe.74 Accordingly, whether market expansion, economic growth, and
‘modern’ clear property rights increased vulnerability to shocks, or
whether they were the key behind an ‘escape from disaster,’ is a much
debated subject which is explicitly dealt with elsewhere in this volume.75
In this context it is important to note that markets differ widely in their
institutional organization, and this leads us to the fourth main approach
to explaining crises and disasters, which focuses on the rules of human
interaction: the institutions. Over the past decade, many innovative con-
tributions to this issue, both in economics and in economic history, have
been situated in the field of (New)-Institutional Economics. Institutional
approaches often focus on the role of property rights and on the role of the
state as third-party enforcer of clear and secure property rights, offering
stability and stimuli for investment and potentially enhancing the resili-
ence of societies to shocks and disasters76 The state, however, may also be
part of the problem instead of its solution: when rulers or governments
extract part of the productive surplus for their own profit, or allow privil-
eged groups in society to do so, they may constrain the potential for
growth and increase vulnerability.77 Also, even though institutional
approaches often tend to highlight private property rights, alternative
property regimes have also been considered. The recognition of the
73 Van Bavel, The Invisible Hand?, 114–119. 74 Galloway, ‘Basic Patterns,’ 277.
75 See Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3.
76 See the important works by Douglass North in particular.
77 Acemoglu & Robinson,Why Nations Fail, esp. Chapter 5.
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importance of common property regimes inmanaging hazards and avoid-
ing disasters has increased significantly over the past decades, not least
thanks to the work of Elinor Ostrom, who argued that well-managed and
well-delimited commons could well prevent a presumably inevitable
Tragedy of the Commons.78
Institutional arrangements might be the key to understand why the
same hazard turned into a full-blown disaster in one case, but not in
others. The differential impact of the Black Death is once again a case
in point. Comparing the opposing outcomes of the plague in Egypt and
England, Stuart Borsch has argued that the causes of Egypt’s economic
decline, as opposed to England’s recovery, are to be found in two con-
trasting systems of landholding.Whereas English landlords, holding their
land as hereditary fiefs, were usually closely involved in the management
of their estates and sufficiently interested in reviving their profitability in
the changed post-Plague world to bargain with peasants and tenants, the
short-term and non-hereditary landholding structure in Egypt stimulated
a different attitude. Mamluk and amir landholders were not in direct
contact with the peasants on their scattered estates but relied on an
extensive bureaucracy supplemented by collective military expeditions
in cases of social unrest. Those mechanisms, however, no longer func-
tioned after the Plague as they had done earlier, since labor became scarce
and intra-elite coherence crumbled. Vital irrigation systems were no
longer maintained, agrarian productivity plummeted and rural depopu-
lation set in.79 The comparison between Egypt and England illustrates
a general point this book wants to make: when analyzing and explaining
how, and whether, hazards turn into disasters, we should not limit the
analysis to institutional arrangements directly related to the governance of
a particular hazard, but should include the whole arrangement of econ-
omy and society.
78 Ostrom,Governing theCommons;DeMoor,TheDilemmaof theCommoners.See section4.3.2.
79 Borsch, The Black Death in Egypt and England, 26–27, 32–33, 40–41, 55–56.
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2 Classifications and Concepts
2.1 A Taxonomy of Disasters
Given that there is a wide range of causes and consequences of disasters, it
is unsurprising that there are also numerous forms of disaster classifica-
tion. A classic categorization, focusing on the causes of disasters, is the
distinction between what is natural and what is human-made. For more
than one reason the validity of such a simple dichotomy is questionable.
Indeed, scholarship onHurricane Katrina has already claimed that “there
is no such thing as a natural disaster.”1 Even though the initial shock was
a natural event, the catastrophic outcome was ultimately the result of
human intervention – or the lack of it. Put simply, without existing
societal vulnerability, the chances of a hazard turning into a disaster are
small.2 Sometimes, the hazard or shock itself is also partly human-
induced. For example, in the Limbe region in Cameroon, landslides are
triggered by intense rainfall together with deforestation of steep slopes,
soil excavation, and unregulated building activities.3 The difficulty with
this kind of classification system then is the blurred line between what
might be considered ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous,’ with both features
frequently present.
Another classic typology, also starting from causes, is a distinction
based on the type of event that triggered the disaster, and is commonly
used in contemporary disaster management. Leaving aside human con-
flict and industrial and transport-related accidents, three broad categories
can be identified: disasters triggered by geological events (such as earth-
quakes, volcanic eruptions, and landslides), biological events (such as
epidemics and epizootics) and meteorological–hydrological events (such
as storms, floods, and droughts).4 Sub-divisions and variations are
1 As reads the title of an edited volume: Hartman & Squires (eds.), There Is No Such Thing.
2 Blaikie et al., At Risk, 45. 3 Che et al., ‘Systematic Documentation.’
4 Eshghi & Larson, ‘Disasters.’
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possible. Famines, for instance, are often distinguished as a separate
category – perhaps as a result of the complexities involved in explaining
them.5 There is, however, a tendency for crossovers and combinations:
meteorological–hydrological events such as storms may lead to harvest
failure and to famine, and they in turn may lead to biological events such
as epidemics.
A different approach focuses on the time it takes for the triggering event
to build up and the disaster to actually unfold, distinguishing between
‘rapid onset’ disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, and ‘slow
onset’ or insidious disasters, which include various types of environmen-
tal degradation such as desertification, sand drifts, and sea-level rise.6
This categorization only partially overlaps with a typology based on
triggering events. While many geological hazards – particularly earth-
quakes – are of the rapid onset type, meteorological–hydrological hazards
can fall into either of the two categories: temporally, a hurricane is very
different from rising sea levels. Biological hazards, moreover, fall some-
where in between: the unfolding of an epidemic can take months or years
rather than minutes, but with differing stages of intensity. Rapid onset
disasters, taking people by surprise, aremore likely to lead to high levels of
physical destruction, mortality, and displacement of survivors. The
Lisbon earthquake of 1755, for instance, destroyed the city almost com-
pletely. Recent estimates arrive at a death toll of 20,000 to 30,000 (from
a population of 160,000 to 200,000) with a similar number of survivors
leaving the city.7 Slow onset disasters are more insidious and therefore
rarely cause immediate death; they aremore likely to impact livelihoods in
the long run. Over the long term, hazards such as erosion, climate change,
and pollution can cause serious health problems, fertility reduction,
outward migration, and capital destruction – increasing vulnerability
when working in tandem with other kinds of sudden hazards. The
major problem with classifying these types of disasters is that the impact
of the hazard or shock can be difficult to isolate from other factors
contributing to the same outcome.8
We can also establish a taxonomy based primarily on the consequences
of disasters. Just like triggering events, consequences can be ranked
according to their nature; for instance by distinguishing between demo-
graphic effects (raised mortality or reduced fertility), physical effects
(destruction of land, buildings, infrastructure, andmachinery), economic
effects (directly as a result of physical destruction or indirectly due to
5 Blaikie et al., At Risk, 75. 6 Renaud et al., ‘A Decision Framework.’
7 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 469–472.
8 Renaud et al., ‘A Decision Framework’, e20–e21.
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erosion of livelihoods or redistribution in the long run), and social and
political effects (social polarization, unrest, or upheaval). Some of the
classification systems even try to form categories that incorporate two
dimensions, such as the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale, which, unlike
the Richter scale, incorporates human impact and building damage as
well as the magnitude of a seismic shock.9 Categories, and their relation-
ship to disasters, are not always clear-cut, however. Demographic conse-
quences, for instance, are obviously highly relevant in the case of
epidemics, and mortality has been cited as one of the essential ways of
distinguishing subsistence crises or dearth from famine.10 However, mor-
tality can also be prominent in geological disasters such as large earth-
quakes or tsunamis, or in meteorological ones. For example, the 2010
earthquake inHaiti created conditions conducive to the spread of diseases
such as cholera.
The fact that disasters show such variety, both in their causes and in
their consequences, raises a question vital to the core of this book: if this is
the case, is it at all possible to analyze disasters using a general conceptual
framework? Does it make sense to compare epidemics and earthquakes,
or tsunamis and sand drifts? Overall, we believe so. While in the practice
of disaster management the exact measures to mitigate the impact of
a hazard or prevent its recurrence vary depending on the nature of the
trigger, on a higher level of abstraction significant similarities can still be
demonstrated. The ways in which individuals, groups, and societies cope
with shocks – or fail to do so – often share characteristics – and this is
something particularly brought to the fore when viewed in a historical
perspective.
Indeed, two crucial concepts here are vulnerability and resilience.11
Determinants of vulnerability, although situationally specific, often
incorporate various aspects of distribution of wealth, resources, support,
and opportunity, while resilience is determined to a significant extent by
social, economic, and political institutions and the context in which they
function.12 Similarities of this type allow us to compare disasters that at
first sight appear very different. For example, ‘entitlement theory,’ ori-
ginally developed by Amartya Sen to explain vulnerabilities to twentieth-
century famines in the developing world, has recently been used as
a concept to assess vulnerabilities during large-scale flooding of coastal
regions in the pre-industrial North Sea area and to analyze the
9 Wood & Neumann, ‘Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale.’
10 Alfani & Ó Gráda (eds.), Famine; Ó Gráda, Famine, 5. See also the next section.
11 For these concepts, see Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. These concepts are employed through-
out Chapters 3 and 4 in particular.
12 Wisner, ‘Disaster Vulnerability’; Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’
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opportunities of specific groups to organize protection against flooding
and restrictions on their ability to do so. Just as weather-induced harvest
failures lost their central role in explaining famines, the entitlement
approach explains floods as a result of declining entitlement to flood
protection by specific groups rather than by looking at storminess or
climatic factors.13
2.2 Scale and Scope of Disasters
The scale and scope of disasters is something that continues to help them
appeal to the popular imagination. By scope, we refer to the range of
different facets of everyday life a disaster can touch; by scale, we refer to
the intensity, magnitude, or territorial spread of effect for each of these
facets touched. The diversity in scope and scale of disasters makes them
a suitable subject for all kinds of popular rankings, many of which are
found on easily accessible resources such as Wikipedia.
Historical research into the scale of disasters has quite a long tradition
of focusing predominantly on the death toll –mortality being an import-
ant measurement for historical demographers of the 1960s and 1970s,
who defined ‘crisis severity’ through death rates using various kinds of
debated methodologies.14 However, as disaster research has become
a topic in its own right, new parameters have been added, mainly focus-
ing on material losses, as these were highly relevant in dealing with the
outcome of a disaster. Foster’s calamity magnitude scale, developed in
the 1970s, took into account the number of fatalities, the number of
seriously injured, infrastructural stress, and the total population
affected. According to this scale, the Black Death emerged as the largest
‘natural’ disaster, after the ‘human-made’ shocks of the World Wars.15
The logarithmic Bradford disaster scale, developed for disaster preven-
tion and management, combines fatalities, damage costs, evacuation
numbers, and injuries.16 Nowadays, physical damage is seen as essential
to call an event a disaster, “because that is the perspective of institutions
charged with their management.”17 Government agencies and insurers
are most interested inmaterial losses, as this is the exact aspect they have
to resolve. The 1995 Chicago heat wave, for example, which killed
approximately 140 people, was not formally identified as a disaster by
the US government, even though the death toll was higher there than in
previous years’ Californian earthquakes, which were labeled as
13 Soens, ‘Flood Security.’
14 An elucidation of the major early work by Goubert, ‘Historical Demography.’
15 Foster, ‘Assessing Disaster Magnitude,’ 245. 16 Keller et al., ‘Analysis of Fatality.’
17 Tierney, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream?,’ 508.
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disasters.18 Accordingly, the definition of a term such as disaster always
remains fluid and flexible and can diverge across social interest groups,
even for the same event.
Although the scope of disasters can be wide, then – affecting very
different aspects of social life – the main way of classifying disaster
damage has still tended to revolve around casualties andmaterial damage.
And it is not always a given that the scale of effect in one dimension will be
the same in the other. In some cases, a shock destroys capital but leaves
people untouched, and on other occasions a shock kills people, but leaves
much of the infrastructure and goods intact – the BlackDeath of 1347–52
being the classic example. Sometimes both occur together. Certain haz-
ards such as floods have rarely killed large numbers of people throughout
history – those that do are exceptional.19 Other hazards such as earth-
quakes cause fatalities, but those deaths are then further supplemented by
events occurring in the aftermath – see the already-mentioned example of
cholera in post-earthquake Haiti in 2010 and 2011.
Famines and epidemics are the best example of disasters with a high
death rate, and even famine mortality tends to be created mainly by
conditions conducive to the spread of diseases rather than starvation
per se – at least prior to the twentieth century. Classic famine-related
diseases include tuberculosis, dysentery, typhoid fever, and typhus, which
are linked to acute malnutrition, eating foods not normally fit for human
consumption, a decline in the attention paid to hygiene, and increasing
amounts of displacement andmigration.20 Plague is not said to be a disease
of malnutrition, which may account for the lack of association between
grain prices and plaguemortality in certain early-modern studies,21 but still
may have been indirectly stimulated by breakdowns in infrastructure, poor
hygiene, and heightened migration during food crises.22 The scale of these
mortality effectswas not always the same, however – evenwith regard to the
same type of disease, and to the same outbreak.
Even within the same disease, the severity and pervasiveness of out-
breaks could differ significantly. The plague epidemic in 1629–30 in
Northern Italy, for example, was much more severe than the plague
outbreaks of the sixteenth century in the same area, and more severe
than the same 1629–30 outbreak that had occurred in parts of Central
Italy.23 Many diseases killed large numbers of people in a restricted
18 Tierney, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream?,’ 508.
19 Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’
20 Ó Gráda & Mokyr, ‘What Do People Die of during Famines.’
21 Curtis & Dijkman, ‘The Escape from Famine.’
22 Alfani, Calamities and the Economy.
23 Alfani, ‘Plague in Seventeenth-Century Europe.’
26 Classifications and Concepts
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
number of localities, but few combined the key facets of death rate and
territorial spread to be truly large-scale killers. Understanding the diverse
scale of the death toll is often difficult in a historical context because (a) it
requires large amounts of epidemiologic data easily comparable over long
periods of time and large areas – something we do not always have,
particularly before the early-modern period, and (b) the causes are
immeasurably complex, bringing together interrelated factors on envir-
onment, climate, natural and acquired immunity, proximity to vectors
and points of contagion, pathogen adaptation, and human patterns of
warfare, migration, trade, commerce, and institutional control of the
disease.
The scale of material damage stemming from disasters can also differ
hugely. For some disasters it was decidedly limited: many famines, for
example, had only a limited impact on capital goods, if they were not
twinned with warfare.24 Earthquakes, however, could do much more
material damage, as the one that hit Lisbon in 1755 illustrates. The
earthquake and the tsunami and fire that followed in its wake made two-
thirds of the city uninhabitable, and destroyed 86 percent of all church
buildings.25 Yet it was not only the type of disaster, but also the society it
struck that determined the scale of material damage. As an example, the
indigenous Filipino way of building nipa’s – palm and bamboo huts –was
seen as completely backward by the Spanish colonial powers, but these
structures had the advantage of being easily rebuilt after earthquakes. In
contrast, the seventeenth-century Spanish baroque stone buildings were
reduced to ruins by an earthquake in 1645, creating much greater mater-
ial damage.26 It is telling that between 1977 and 1997 the number of
deaths from ‘natural’ disasters remained more or less constant (even as
the world population increased), but the cost of disasters increased
significantly.27 Our highly technological societies of today have become
more vulnerable in terms of the specific category of material damage.28
The assessment of casualties and material damage is, however,
a complex undertaking and historians and social scientists should note
the difficulties that often arise – particularly in light of ‘popular’ interest in
these kinds of facets of disasters. This issue can be demonstrated by
looking more closely at some of the ‘rankings’ that often appear on the
Internet – for example, the ranking of ‘death tolls’ from ‘natural disasters’
taken from Wikipedia and presented in Table 2.1. These lists, like many
24 Gutmann,War and Rural Life, 3, 8.
25 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 473–477. See also Section 6.1.2.
26 Bankoff, ‘Cultures of Disaster,’ 266–267.
27 Alexander, ‘The Study of Natural Disasters,’ 285.
28 See also Sections 4.2.2 and 6.1.1.
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other related ones on the Internet, tend to exaggerate the death rate for
historical floods and earthquakes, sometimes even producing estimates
that exceeded the total population count of the day, which then run the
risk of producing sensationalist stories and narratives. What are the
reasons for this? A significant problem is that many of the estimates
made by contemporary observers are taken at face value, when several
will have been exaggerated for a particular agenda (tax concessions, for
example) or a moralizing standpoint or rhetorical effect.29 Sometimes the
guesses of contemporaries were simply that – guesses. Even in the late
eighteenth century, when statistical material becamemore important and
more prevalent in disaster-reporting in newspapers, numbers were by no
means exact. Numbers are also not necessarily neutral, since they
“incorporate the values of the people who create them, and data
collection begins with the collector’s interests or concerns.”30 Chinese
victims in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and Aboriginals in twenti-
eth-century Australian cyclones were simply not counted – which is
problematic, given that in both cases they represented numerically large
proportions of the population.31 During the Lisbon earthquake of 1755
both Protestant and Catholic commentators strongly inflated the number
of dead, to fit in with their respective narrative of divine retribution for the
city’s godlessness. The Marquis of Pombal, the Portuguese prime minis-
ter and personification of Enlightenment and ‘godlessness,’was dismayed
by this and ordered his own ‘official’ damage report, one of the first of its
Table 2.1 Ranked list of natural disasters by death toll onWikipedia, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_natural_disasters_by_death_toll
Rank Estimated death toll Disaster Location
1 1,000,000–4,000,000 1931 China floods China
2 900,000–2,000,000 1887 Yellow River flood China
3 830,000 1556 Shaanxi earthquake China
4 ≥500,000 1970 Bhola cyclone East Pakistan
5 316,000 2010 Haiti earthquake Haiti
6 300,000 1839 India cyclone India
7 273,400 1920 Haiyuan earthquake China
8 250,000–300,000 526 Antioch earthquake Byzantine Empire
9 242,769–655,000 1976 Tangshan earthquake China
29 Concern over this issue in Squatriti, ‘The Floods of 589,’ 820; Rheinheimer, ‘Mythos
Sturmflut,’ 30.
30 Aguirre, ‘Better Disaster Statistics,’ 29–30. See also Section 3.1.1.
31 Aguirre, ‘Better Disaster Statistics,’ 29.
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kind.32 Measuring the impact of disaster is thus not as easy as Wikipedia
may have us believe.
This should not be seen as merely a problem of ‘popularizing’ media
sources either. This is because, as a result of the recent trend towards
increased use of historical data by scholars working in the natural and
social sciences (i.e. not trained historians), a number of papers published
in high-ranking science journals are now being accepted that use figures
and data taken from the Internet or historical papers, without taking into
account all the methodological issues or lacunae in data collection. For
a discussion on this trend, see Section 3.1.3 on source criticism and big
data.
2.3 Concepts
Having explored variations in the types, scale, and scope of disasters, this
section provides a critical introduction to key concepts used to study
disasters – primarily those used in the disaster studies literature, but
also in cognate fields such as the ecological sciences and development
economics. It makes particular reference to vulnerability, resilience, and
their temporal dimensions, while acknowledging that use of these con-
cepts is inconsistent and occasionally ambiguous between disciplines and
contexts.33 Whereas in ecology, for instance, resilience is increasingly
seen as the adaptive ability to transform to a different state, development
economists often use a more limited definition that highlights a society’s
ability to return to its pre-existing state.34
2.3.1 Disaster and Hazard
One point of contention in the disasters literature lies in the term
‘disaster’ itself, and how it should be defined – and distinguished from
other terms such as ‘catastrophe’ and ‘shock.’35 Certainly there is
a tendency towards separating qualifiers such as ‘natural’ from the
term ‘disaster.’ Although the term ‘natural disaster’ has fairly wide-
spread use as a convenience term in the mainstream media and some
popularizing literature, few scholars now argue that disasters are simply
‘natural events,’ regardless of whether they are working in the natural
sciences, social sciences, or humanities. Indeed, it is clear that although
hurricanes, for example, are fundamentally natural phenomena, the
32 Aguirre, ‘Better Disaster Statistics,’ 33.
33 Kelman et al., ‘Learning from the History.’ 34 Sudmeier-Rieux, ‘Resilience.’
35 The origins and etymology in a historical perspective are described at length in
Mauelshagen, ‘Defining Catastrophes’.
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root cause of disastrous effects emerging from hurricanes can usually be
put down to poor building construction or weak institutional infra-
structure rather than the occurrence of extreme winds or storm surges
per se. Indeed, the past few decades of disaster studies research have
consistently shown that it are social processes that shape disasters and
those most at risk. These include technological, political, and cultural
factors that determine human capacity to prepare for, cope with, and
recover from sources of potential harm,36 as well as gender, ethnicity,
and age – each of which has little to do with the natural environment.37
The emphasis on the naturalness of disaster that comes with the term
‘natural disaster’ focuses attention on physical processes and their
destructive power, rather than what makes people vulnerable to these
processes, and can distract attention from human responsibility for the
causes of disasters.38
Attention in the disasters literature has instead turned to terms such as
environmental ‘hazards,’ or sometimes ‘shocks.’The word ‘shock,’with
its inbuilt element of surprise, does not hold the same breadth of applic-
ability as hazard, as it implies that the event or process was unexpected.
This may be the case in an area suffering a severe tsunami triggered by
a distant high-magnitude earthquake, but the same may not be said for
a river bursting its banks onto a floodplain. Still, the words ‘shock’ and
‘hazard’ more aptly describe an environmental event or process itself,
whereas ‘disaster,’ or perhaps ‘nature-induced disaster,’ refers specific-
ally to the severe impact of an event.39 As we have seen, hazards can be
both natural and technological, and both can lead to disasters. But
before we examine the factors that might turn a hazard into a disaster,
how do we distinguish a disaster from a hazard in the first place? This
question has been the subject of much debate in disaster studies.40
Previously we showed the complexities of classifying disasters on the
basis of characteristics such asmagnitude, duration, impact, potential of
occurrence, and ability to control impact,41 as well as consequences
such as economic losses and mortality.42 In reality, any such distinction
or threshold is an inherently anthropocentric valuation, and any metric
is open to criticisms of generalization.What is clear, though, is that there
is a qualitative difference between disasters and hazardous events:
36 Such factors could include where people live and work, and their wealth, health, and
access to information: Pelling, The Vulnerability of Cities.
37 Wisner et al., At Risk. 38 Ribot, ‘Cause and Response.’
39 Cohen & Werker, ‘The Political Economy.’
40 Perry & Quarantelli,What Is a Disaster?; Quarantelli (ed.),What Is a Disaster?
41 Berren, Beigel & Barker, ‘A Typology.’
42 Foster, ‘Assessing Disaster Magnitude’; Keller, Wilson & Al-Madhari, ‘Proposed
Disaster Scale.’
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disasters severely disrupt normal activity, often cause damage or casual-
ties because coping capacities are exceeded, and require large responses
in terms of resources and organization which often necessitate external
support.
If an extreme geophysical or meteorological event is not simply
a synonym of a disaster, and disaster risk is produced by a combination
of factors, it becomes imperative to understand the determinants of
different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people and how
societies tried to manage hazardous events.
2.3.2 The Disaster Management Cycle
Some disasters have also been classified according to how they are
managed, and this approach is seen nowhere more clearly than in the
disaster management cycle – a framework to understand the processes
and stages through which disasters evolve. This framework has been
used, further developed, and modified in a variety of disciplines includ-
ing sociology, geography, psychology, civil defense, and development
studies. The initial idea to develop a framework to understand disasters
via how societies cope with their effects dates back to the 1930s.
Practitioners and policy makers distinguished between different phases
of the unfolding disaster to respondmore effectively in future situations.
Initially, three stages were identified: a preliminary stage where the
hazard and problems built up, followed by the disaster stage in which
the actual event took place, and finally the readjustment or reorganiza-
tion stage.43
In the 1970s the idea of a cycle was developed because of the often-
recurrent nature of hazards and the disasters that can ensue. Seldom is
a society hit by a completely unforeseen hazard or disaster, such as
ameteorite or sudden earthquake in low-tectonic-risk zones. A series of
disasters occurring during that decade urged practitioners and policy
makers to look for more than simply disaster relief measures: societies
had to become more receptive to prevention. Therefore, the disaster
management cycle was developed, comprised of four phases including
mitigation after a previous disaster, the development of preparedness,
the response after another triggering event, and recovery.44
Since then different disciplines and scholars have proposed several
models with more or fewer stages. Here we present the disaster cycle as
recently reformulated by John Singleton as an analytical tool for
43 Coetzee & van Niekerk, ‘Tracking the Evolution.’
44 Singleton, ‘Using the Disaster Cycle.’
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historical research (Figure 2.1), which includes more psychological and
social processes than the 1970s framework.We use this disaster cycle as
an illustrative example precisely because it fits within our framework for
two reasons. First of all, the model acknowledges that hazards do not
happen out of the blue but interact with societies that have a long
prehistory with similar hazards, and therefore former mitigation and
adaptation measures affect the outcome of a disaster. Second, the cycle
moves beyond the short-term disaster effects and mitigation stages, and
urges scholars to look at the long-term effects and adaptation measures.
Therefore, this model is conveniently set up to address the temporal
components of historical disasters. In this framework, decision-making
is one of the most crucial stages between the occurrence of hazard and
potential disastrous consequences, and thereby a driver of high or low
7.
Recovery
8.
Mitigation and
adaptation
1.
Warnings
2.
Triggering
event
6.
Apportioning
blame
5.
Relief
4.
Unfolding of
disaster
3.
Decision-
making
Figure 2.1 The disaster cycle, based on the model of John Singleton.
Singleton, ‘Using the Disaster Cycle.’
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disaster impact. Those intermediate response and decisions stages have
also been described as ‘sensemaking’ points.45
Although providing a more ‘complete’ overview of how disasters can
unfold from early warning signs and triggers, to adaptive responses, and
then the aftermath of recovery, there are also some limitations to classifying
and conceptualizing disasters in a full cycle. It must be remembered that this
is a disaster management cycle, not a disaster cycle; and, furthermore, it is
definitively a cycle and thus connected to cyclical processes only. Many
disaster ‘cycles’donot reach those later stages at all, and it is unclearwhether
all stages are actually intrinsic parts of the disaster experience. For example,
according to Singleton’s framework, almost all disasters lead to the appor-
tioning of blame, and yet recent historical research has shown that even
some of the most severe epidemics did not necessarily lead to scapegoating
or social unrest,46 but instead gave rise to cohesive or even compassionate
responses, and some of the most severe famines did not necessarily bring
about the collapse of collective solidaritymechanisms.47Does the absence of
blame then preclude a whole host of crisis conditions from being labeled as
disasters? A cycle such as this one also has no room for divergence. We are
told that intermediate decision-making processes remain vital to disaster
impact, but there is no possibility of measuring the effectiveness of these
decisions and relief phases. Accordingly, the disaster management cycle
approach to disaster classification and conceptualization offers a step for-
ward in outlining a ‘textbook case’ of how a disaster unfolds over a period of
time, but we need more flexible frameworks if we want to conceptualize
disaster experiences that diverge from the ‘norm.’ For that we must turn to
other concepts such as vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity.
2.3.3 Vulnerability
It is easy to associate disasters with ‘nature’ when we consider that
earthquakes are caused by shifting tectonic plates, floods by storm surges,
and plague by biological pathogens. Nevertheless, the naturalness of
natural disasters was already questioned in the 1970s in a seminal article
in Nature, where it was stated that “the time is ripe for some form of
precautionary planning which considers vulnerability of the population as
the real cause of disaster – a vulnerability which is induced by socio-
economic conditions.”48 Without denying that an initial hazard is often
required for a disaster, this approach emphasizes that the root cause of
45 Weick, ‘The Collapse of Sensemaking.’ 46 Cohn, Epidemics.
47 Slavin, ‘Market Failure.’ See also Section 6.1.4.
48 O’Keefe, Westgate & Wisner, ‘Taking the Naturalness,’ 567.
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a disaster is social, and that people have to be already vulnerable to
hazards in order for a disaster to arise: that is to say, all vulnerability is
social vulnerability.49 Through this lens, the most important questions
are therefore twofold: who suffers from disasters, and why does society
create these precarious circumstances that expose people to suffering?
Before addressing those questions, however, a more essential question is
what do we mean by vulnerability? According to one influential work from
the 1980s, vulnerability was meant to represent “the exposure to contin-
gencies and stress and difficulties coping with them,” and is comprised of
two sides: an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual,
household, or community is subject, and an internal side concerning a lack
of means to cope.50 According to this kind of definition, the concept then
rests on three distinct facets: (1) a risk of exposure; (2) a risk of inadequate
capacities to cope; and (3) the attendant risks connected to poverty.51These
facets of vulnerability can be found within individuals, but also on the
collective level of social groups, communities, and whole societies.
The above-mentioned definitions and general approach to vulnerability
were at their most dominant in the 1970s. On the basis of critiques of
Western development plans for the Global South, this movement stated
that vulnerabilities arose from political choices rather than from natural
inevitabilities. Its popularity, however, waned in the decades thereafter.
Driven by increasing insight into climate change and its human compo-
nents, systemic approaches began to gain ground (focusing on ecosystems,
for example), in which the ability of systems to absorb, adapt, and transform
when confronted with disasters was considered pivotal. In particular, much
of the focus connected to climate change shifted from different and diverse
social groups to either the ‘system’ as a whole or the individual, and hence
fromvulnerability to resilience (see the next section). Social relations and the
application of power were no longer central to many of the hazards and
disasters narratives, as attention moved from causality to response.52 In the
process, as the ‘social’ aspect of disasters became increasingly obscured, so
too did the structural inequalities in wealth, resources, and power that shape
how disasters impact societies and people differentially. This is why several
authors linked this shift and the new focus on resilience and adaptation to
the hegemony of neoliberal ideologies.53
49 Most famously argued in Blaikie et al., At Risk, 7, 9.
50 Original definition in Chambers, ‘Vulnerability, Coping and Policy,’ 1.
51 Watts & Bohle, ‘The Space of Vulnerability,’ 45.
52 Ribot, ‘Cause and Response,’ 669.
53 Cannon & Müller-Mahn, ‘Vulnerability, Resilience and Development Discourses’;
MacKinnon & Driscoll Derickson, ‘From Resilience to Resourcefulness’; Sudmeier-
Rieux, ‘Resilience.’
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Nevertheless, recent work has argued for disaster research to once
again return to vulnerability as a core organizing concept. This argument
centers on the potential of vulnerability to put the ‘social’ back into
disaster analysis, focusing on elements that run the risk of being neglected
in more instrumentalist or technocratic approaches to disasters. Indeed,
by placing particular attention on the root causes that make people
vulnerable, we are able to shine more light on different aspects that
become apparent only over long periods of time, and by moving beyond
directly disaster-related issues.54 For those looking to use history as a tool
for understanding more about different dimensions of disasters, this
inherent temporal aspect of the vulnerability approach becomes invalu-
able – whether working across years, decades, or centuries – since the
vulnerability of individuals, groups, and communities varies over time,
and we need the frameworks to analyze and understand these changes.
2.3.4 Resilience
While disaster studies scholars from the 1970s to the 1990s were pre-
occupied with vulnerability and its root causes, resilience became the
buzzword of disaster studies at the start of the twenty-first century. The
origins of resilience – from the Latin resilire meaning more literally to
‘jump back’ – can be traced back to the 1940s and 1950s when the
concept was used both in psychology (‘lives lived well despite adversity’)
and in engineering (the capacity of materials to absorb shocks and still
persist). Yet it was from ecosystem analysis that the concept migrated to
disaster studies. As defined by Buzz Holling in 1973, resilience refers to
either the ‘buffer capacity’ of an ecosystem (its ability to absorb perturb-
ation), the magnitude of the disturbance that can be absorbed before
structural change occurs, or alternatively the time it takes to recover from
disturbance.55 Later, the concept was transferred to the social sciences.
W. N. Adger defines it as “the ability of communities to withstand exter-
nal shocks to their social infrastructure” and sees a direct link between
‘ecological’ and ‘social’ resilience – particularly in societies highly
dependent on a single resource or a single ecosystem.56 Over time,
fostering resilience became the official mantra of international disaster
relief and prevention, with the overarching idea that if we can strengthen
the capacity of households and communities in risk-prone areas
to counter hazards, for instance by improving alert systems and
54 Bankoff, ‘Remaking the World.’
55 The pioneering article was Holling, ‘Resilience and Stability’; see also Adger et al., ‘Are
There Social Limits,’ 349.
56 Adger et al., ‘Are There Social Limits,’ 361.
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solidarity networks, organizing micro-credit, or removing institutional
constraints to food markets, then we can accommodate recurrent
hazards.
While the initial focus of social science research into resilience was
about ‘bouncing back’ after disasters, things became complicated with
the realization that change following a shock is not necessarily something
that can be viewed negatively, since it can also stimulate changes for the
better. In disaster studies, older ‘conservative’ definitions of resilience –
measuring the restoration of the previous equilibrium – became replaced
by more ‘progressive’ ones, seeing adaptation of the system in more
positive terms.57 When we look to the past, there are some examples of
that too. In the fourteenth century, climatic cooling and epidemic dis-
eases may have resulted in the retreat of settlement and arable cultivation
in upland England or Scandinavia – on the surface a ‘negative’ outcome –
and yet this could also be interpreted as simply rearranging farming and
habitation into more fertile areas, or a complete shift in production from
arable to pastoral.58 Apart from material or demographic changes, insti-
tutions could be transformed as well to suit the new environmental and
societal structures that develop after a shock.
By stretching this idea too far, however, new problems can be created: if
the complete make-over of a society after a major disaster is qualified as
a ‘resilient’ outcome, then only total breakdown or collapse remains as
counter-evidence for a failure in resilience. And although popular books
have beenwritten on the subject of collapse of societies and civilizations in
the past,59 from a historical perspective we are also aware that total
breakdown and collapse has been exceptionally rare – certainly over the
period for which written documents survive. Accordingly, it might also be
the case that most studies on past hazards and disasters reach the same
conclusion as Georgina Endfield in her thought-provoking discussion of
extreme drought and floods in colonial Mexico: society did not collapse,
but proved ‘remarkably resilient’ to such problems.60 If hardly anything
can counter the resilience outcome – and history proves that to be the case
more often than not – then the term begins to lose much of its utility.
As noted towards the end of the previous section, further critiques of
resilience include the subordinate role given to power relationships,
agency, values, and knowledge. Some authors even see resilience as the
handmaid of neoliberalism, strengthening its discourse on personal
responsibility, but this is a “responsibility without power.”61 This is
57 Endfield, ‘The Resilience and Adaptive Capacity,’ 3677.
58 Dyer, Standards of Living, 259–260. 59 Diamond, Collapse.
60 Endfield, ‘The Resilience and Adaptive Capacity,’ 3677. See also Section 5.2.
61 MacKinnon & Driscoll Derickson, ‘From Resilience to Resourcefulness,’ 255.
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particularly problematic given that systems that may be classified as
highly resilient can contain, or even derive some of their resilience from,
vulnerability within certain groups or communities.62 Ultimately in this
book, we accept the more recent definition of resilience as something
systemic, where adaptation can lead to a new post-hazard or post-disaster
‘state of things’ (see the next section on adaptation), but we also more
explicitly demonstrate our criticisms of the concept by employing histor-
ical examples in Chapters 5 and 6. In the end, while a certain level of
resilience becomes the outcome from most historical disasters, vulner-
ability outcomes are much more diverse and unpredictable.
2.3.5 Adaptation, Transformation, and Transition
Adaptation generally refers to “the adjustments that populations take in
response to current or predicted change,” and is related to each of the
frameworks introduced above.63 Emphasis on adaptation was long
shunned within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) in favor of the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, whereas
acceptance of a widespread need for adaptation was seen as accommo-
dating (or even embracing) the inevitability of disaster.64 Over time,
however, the term adaptation or adaptive capacity did gain currency –
particularly from the early 2000s – and in close parallel with the domin-
ance of more resilience-focused research that accepted more flexible
definitions of resilience outcomes. This was initially very prominent in
climate change research, where models within the natural sciences pre-
scribed technological ‘fixes’ for issues such as declines in agricultural
productivity.65 Only later did social science approaches refocus research
into adaptation onto areas such as indigenous knowledge – but also
cultural limits to adaptation and even the potential negative conse-
quences of adaptive action, which became known as ‘maladaptation.’66
Thus, we came to learn that hazards and disasters often led to adaptation,
with adaptive capacity and resilience closely linked,67 and this has had the
knock-on effect of allowing us to exchange gloomy interpretations of
disasters for more ‘positive’ ones, stressing the opportunities for change
62 Cannon & Müller-Mahn, ‘Vulnerability, Resilience and Development Discourses.’
63 Nelson, Adger & Brown, ‘Adaptation to Environmental Change.’
64 Pielke Jr. et al., ‘Climate change 2007,’ 445, 597–598; Kaika, ‘Don’t Call Me Resilient
Again!’; O’Connor et al., ‘Living with Insecurity’; Reid, ‘The Disastrous and Politically
Debased Subject.’
65 Noble et al., ‘Adaptation Needs and Options.’ See also Pelling, Adaptation to Climate
Change.
66 Barnett & O’Neill, ‘Maladaptation’; Adger et al., ‘Are There Social Limits’.
67 Engle, ‘Adaptive Capacity.’
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created by the disaster.68 In more recent times, historians have argued for
cases where climate-related pressures, leading to hazards, did indeed
create new incentives for adaptation, since risks and hazards could func-
tion as constructive triggers for innovations. See for example the eco-
nomic and cultural flourishing of the Dutch Golden Age of the
seventeenth century being tied to successful adaptive capacity during
the worst phases of the so-called Little Ice Age.69
However, at the same time,we have also come to learn that adaptation did
not always occur post-hazard or post-disaster, and equally that not all of the
adaptation that did occur can be considered in ‘positive’ terms. Elements
such as social capital, networks, trust, and coordination are often cited as
factors promoting adaptation,70 yet elements hampering adaptation have
been cited, such as mismatches in scale between environmental and social
dynamics, asymmetries in power, and inequality.71 Much of this is further
complicated by the intricacies of scale: hazards that lead to disastrous
disruption at the level of single-village communities may be perfectly
absorbed on a regional or macro-level, for example. Adaptation, and the
form it takes then, is never inevitable – and a path forward for understanding
how societies respond to hazards and the disasters that ensue is surely
connected to better understanding why certain systems and societies adapt
and why some do not, and, moreover, why some adaptations are effective,
while others are less so. As Eleonora Rohland has noted, this perspective is
seemingly at odds with definitions of adaptation that include notions of
“moderating harm” or “exploiting beneficial opportunities” – both of
which depend on time, place, conflicting interests, and power relations72
We suggest that this is an area in which historians can offer the greatest
insights and contribution, since an important element for explaining adap-
tation is incorporating chronology and developments across time.
Indeed, influential models for adaptation of social systems or ecosys-
tems – such as the ‘Adaptive Cycle’ of Gunderson and Holling – pay
explicit attention to temporal aspects and the different phases in which
adaptation can take place, but stress that this adaptivity has its limits when
confronted with hazards that are too numerous or too extensive.73
68 For disasters as opportunity, see Section 5.3.1. 69 Degroot, The Frigid Golden Age.
70 Adger, ‘Social Capital’; Barnes et al., ‘The Social Structural Foundations’; Bodin,
‘Collaborative Environmental Governance.’
71 Cumming, Cumming & Redman, ‘Scale Mismatches’; Crona & Bodin, ‘Power
Asymmetries’; Van Bavel, Curtis & Soens, ‘Economic Inequality’; Cumming & Collier,
‘Change and Identity in Complex Systems.’
72 Rohland, ‘Adapting to Hurricanes.’ These terms are included in the IPCC definition of
adaptation.
73 Gunderson & Holling, Panarchy, esp. 34; see also Scheffer, Critical Transitions; Folke
et al., ‘Resilience Thinking.’
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According to this framework, adaptation within socio-ecological systems
accommodates external disruption as easily as internal dysfunction, but
over time the system becomes more rigid and difficult to adapt – leading
to a lack of flexibility and ‘rigidity traps’ – which in turn creates a kind of
tipping point or threshold that can lead to implosion from even the
smallest of shocks or slightest disruption. Historians have indeed
shown – for example in the case of success or failure in adapting to
hurricanes – that rigid configurations of technologies or institutions can
be difficult to transform, even in the wake of severe hazards.74 More
broadly speaking, recently support has gathered for historically informed
approaches towards climate change adaptation, with greater attention
paid to long-standing or even path-dependent norms and processes that
drive or constrain successful or unsuccessful adaptation in particular
social contexts.75
Therefore, through a lens with more attention paid to temporality,
historians can fundamentally complement and alter the current focus
on adaptation. For one, historical research may help to redefine practices
that on the surface appear ‘maladaptive.’ For example, it has been shown
that the migration of pastoralists in times of drought should not be
conceived negatively but instead offers long-standing and effective ways
of sustaining livelihoods in the face of climate-related hazards.76
Conversely, historical research may dampen current optimism about
the possibility for adaptation. While ecosystems can perhaps indefinitely
and automatically adapt, historians by investigating adaptation processes
in the long term can show how human societies do not have the same
logic. Some did adapt, while othersmaintained a rigid, ineffective, or even
destructive institutional framework. By examining how adaptation and
the problems to which we are adapting emerge over time, it also becomes
possible to identify the level of action needed to reduce pre-existing
vulnerabilities – whether this concerns incremental changes over
extended periods or transformational change in the face of deep-rooted
and recurring problems.77
2.3.6 Risk
So far we have focused on physical exposure to natural hazards, andmore
significantly issues with societal organization that lead to pre-existing
vulnerabilities of certain populations, yet another fundamental element
74 Rohland, ‘Adapting to Hurricanes.’
75 Adamson, Rohland & Hannaford, ‘Re-thinking the Present.’
76 Agrawal & Perrin, ‘Climate Adaptation.’ 77 Pelling, Adaptation to Climate Change.
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for understanding the occurrence and impact of disasters is ‘risk.’ Risk
relates to human agency and perception, which guide the strategies
deployed by individuals or groups to manage and calculate the potential
occurrence of harm. The calculation of risk is often based on weighing up
the possibilities, likelihood, and consequences of a number of outcomes,
and preference for an outcome differs from context to context depending
on the values of the parties involved – that is to say, it is highly subjective.
So, in many pre-industrial contexts, for example, societies had to weigh
up the risks of living in a particular environment. Some agricultural
workers lived in agglomerated settlements – even when they were poor,
cramped, and far from their fields – because to live isolated next to their
lands exposed them to the risks of violence.78 But this also depended on
the weight of knowledge. Some people in late-medieval and early-modern
Europemoved to cities – to findwork and have access to urban amenities –
but at the same time heightened risks of death through disease outbreaks –
the so-called ‘urban penalty,’ yet, of course, ordinary people did not have
equal knowledge about the likelihood of either outcome.
Time is also an important aspect of risk. According to Ulrich Beck, for
example, risk has taken on whole new dimensions and meaning from
the second half of the twentieth century – and is thus not directly com-
parable to earlier risks. Indeed, the increasing number of ‘technological’
disasters (from the Bhopal gas tragedy to the nuclear disaster in
Chernobyl), and the obvious failure to predict and control natural vari-
ability and climate change, has apparently introduced a new kind of ‘risk
society,’where perfect control has been abandoned, but the management
and accommodation of uncertainty remain center-stage.79 This shift in
risk perception is reflected in the evolution of private insurance schemes
related to climatic risks: expanding during the twentieth century, but
declining again at the dawn of the twenty-first, as the potential losses
were increasingly deemed impossible to cover by private insurance
schemes.80
Risk used in this way can also be critiqued in two ways. First, some
works have argued that risk is not a neutral concept, but that its use is
determined by inequitable power relations. According to disaster scholars
such as Greg Bankoff, the so-called Third World has been significantly
‘othered’ throughout time by its repeated associations with risk. During
colonial times, colonized countries were seen as disease-ridden and in
need of a civilization offensive. After the World War II, focus was put on
remedying poverty, but during the 1990s attention shifted to the
78 For example in Southern Italy: Curtis, ‘Is There an Agro-town Model.’
79 Beck, Lash & Wynne, Risk Society. 80 Andersson & Keskitalo, ‘Insurance Models.’
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‘disaster-proneness’ of non-Western countries, which were labeled as
risky environments and areas of disaster. In a way, our labeling of these
regions as hazardous and risky also demonstrates a clash between two
different types of risk societies: the one where risk as a frequent life
experience has led to adaptation (as in several non-Western cases) and
the one where risk was seen as needing to be controlled and latermanaged
(as in the Western world).81
Second, it is our view also that the perception of modern risk being
inherently or intrinsically different from that of the pre-modern era is
perhaps overstated slightly. Although perfect control may have been
abandoned as a disaster philosophy in recent times – with the accommo-
dation of uncertainty now more acceptable – it is clear that very few pre-
industrial societies believed they could completely eradicate the possibil-
ity of experiencing both hazards and disasters. For many of them, the
constant threat of certain hazards, and the management of their preven-
tion and impact, was a central preoccupation, with the acceptance of
natural hazards as ‘frequent life experience’ and continuous attempts to
adapt both landscape and society to accommodate risk as well as
possible.82 Epidemics – once said to evoke total panic and breakdown –
by the early-modern period at least became simply accepted as ‘normal’
characteristics of urban life, and while precautionary measures were
developed, social transactions did not stop altogether. Peasant societies
are often a prime example of this – both pre-industrial and contemporary –
by shaping their survival strategies to deal with risks inherent to their way
of life, but never eliminating them. In a much-cited article from 1976,
D. McCloskey isolated this attitude towards risk as the distinctive elem-
ent of subsistence-oriented societies.83 Risk aversion characterized sub-
sistence-farmers, who in order to guarantee the long-term survival of the
family, tended to diversify income, crops, and plots, preferring a stable
but low income to higher but less certain profit.84
Still, however, it is important to point out that the ‘risk society’model of
hazard and disaster behavior is not seen in all occasions of the past.
Commercial and capitalist societies in Europe, on the rise during the early-
modern period, saw the development of a new and rational risk paradigm:
one founded on a belief in the capacity of humans to control the ‘vagaries’
of nature, and based on the development of technological, financial, and
institutional ‘improvements.’ Risk became a rational operation which
81 Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe,’ 31.
82 Bankoff, ‘The “English Lowlands,”’ 19.
83 McCloskey, ‘English Open Fields’; also McCloskey, ‘The Prudent Peasant.’
84 Pretty, ‘Sustainable Agriculture.’
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could be calculated, predicted, and hence controlled.85 In the modern
tradition, risk became equated with opportunity, a sign of human progress.
Originating in international trade, insurance contracts became the main
institutional tool of dealing with nature-induced risks.86 Accordingly then,
we suggest that risk retains its place as an important concept for disasters in
history – since, on the one hand, we should refrain from going as far as Beck
to conceive of the distant past and the contemporary as two different and
incomparable ‘worlds,’ and yet, on the other hand, we should recognize that
risk could mean very different things over time – with its meaning often
dictated by changes in the social distribution of resources and power.
85 Lübken & Mauch, ‘Uncertain Environments,’ 2–4; Jaeger et al., Risk, Uncertainty, and
Rational Action; Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity.
86 Mauelshagen, ‘Sharing the Risk of Hail’; Rohland, ‘Earthquake versus Fire.’
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3 History as a Laboratory: Materials
and Methods
A central premise of this book is that we can use history as
a ‘laboratory’ to test theories with relevance beyond particular
time–space contexts. This is an analytical approach to history, one
where the goal is not simply to tell the story of the past, to describe
conspicuous events, or to construct time series of certain phenom-
ena, but rather to develop and test hypotheses.1 The study of
disasters lends itself particularly well to this end for three main
reasons. First, hazards, disasters, and their effects are generally well
documented in historical written records across the globe, allowing
us to trace their social, economic, and cultural dimensions over time.
Second, environmental hazards occur at multiple scales – both spa-
tial and temporal – and are met with divergent responses and impacts
across these scales, allowing us to make comparisons and hence offer
a counterpoint to the limitations of descriptive analysis.2 Third,
where we lack written information on the hazards themselves, inde-
pendent of their impact, we can use other forms of knowledge such
as scientific proxies as a baseline.
Using history as a laboratory to better understand disasters, how-
ever, makes practical demands of us as historians: we need suitable
measures and methods to understand hazards and their effects, we
can work only with what is physically available to us, and we must
do so without losing sight of the critical approach to sources that
forms the cornerstone of sound historical scholarship. This chapter
discusses these issues: the process of identifying and interpreting
sources, of reconstructing and measuring disasters, and of analyzing
them in the historical laboratory. The rest of the chapter is split into
two parts: the first deals with sources of data and the second with
methods.
1 Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’ 2 See Section 3.2.3.
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3.1 Historical Sources
3.1.1 Types of Historical Sources
The types of historical sources available to research hazards, disasters,
and their aftermath are deeply intertwined with the characteristics of the
societies producing them. This book is mainly interested in historical
written records. This is not to say that non-written sources are irrelevant
for the study of disasters and history – far from it – but rather that written
sources provide the qualitative and quantitative basis for investigation
into the kind of questions that our historical laboratory aims to address.3
This section will introduce the types of sources available prior to the
widespread instrumental recording of environmental variability as well
as modern instrumental records. While we are concerned first and
foremost with the hazard–society nexus, we also cover the types of
sources and datasets available to provide information on hazards.
Indeed, an almost ubiquitous feature of the historical record, at least
in the pre-industrial period, is that the very same sources hold informa-
tion on both hazards and their societal impacts – as outlined in
Table 3.1 – making it difficult to separate one from the other in such
a discussion.
For the period before instrumental recording, evidence on hazards and
disasters is based on a combination of direct observations and descrip-
tions from contemporaries, and indirect recording of processes and phe-
nomena that were influenced by environmental conditions. This evidence
was recorded in a wide range of documents of a narrative and administra-
tive nature, although common to both direct and indirect evidence is the
fact that many records were not kept for the primary purpose of system-
atically recording hazards and disasters but were the product of other
(often economic) purposes.4
‘Direct’ documentary source types, where available, should represent
the first port of call, although in practice these sources are often not widely
available or detailed enough to assemble a comprehensive picture of
hazards and disasters. One direct source that has receivedmuch attention
is English manorial accounts extending back to the early thirteenth cen-
tury CE (1230 in the case of the Bishopric of Winchester). These sources
not only list the quantity of seed and yield for wheat but also make
consistent reference to the influence of severe weather conditions on
farming activity, providing a continuous series of seasonal climatic
3 For the relevance of non-written sources, see for example Section 3.1.2.
4 For a good indication about source types, see Pfister & Brázdil, ‘Social Vulnerability’;
Nash & Adamson, ‘Recent Advances.’
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conditions and their agrarian impacts until the middle of the fifteenth
century.5 While these sources are invaluable, and indeed have spurred
much work on the climate–society nexus in medieval England,6 it is rare
to have such a direct, consistent, and detailed source at our disposal at
that point in time.
Table 3.1 Historical documentary evidence for reconstructing hazards and
their impacts prior to instrumental recording
Hazard Associated impacts Key sources
Precipitation,
floods,
drought
Harvest failures/shortfalls, damage
to structures, loss of capital
goods, malnutrition, mortality
Harvest accounts, phenological
accounts (e.g. dates of
flowering), rogations, burial
records, colonial governmental
records, missionary accounts,
newspapers, private diaries (e.g.
of weather, farming, or more
indirect), ships’ logbooks, grain
prices
Temperature,
ice/snow
cover
Harvest failures/shortfalls,
malnutrition, mortality
Harvest accounts, missionary
accounts, ships’ logbooks, ice-
break accounts, burial records
Hurricanes,
cyclones,
typhoons
Inundation of land, harvest failures/
shortfalls, damage to structures,
loss of capital goods,
malnutrition, mortality
Missionary accounts, colonial
governmental records, private
diaries, ships’ logbooks,
chronicles, gazetteers
Earthquakes,
volcanic
eruptions,
tsunamis
Damage to structures, loss of
capital goods, mortality
Chronicles, gazetteers, petitions,
historical catalogs (chronologies
of events)
Sand drifts,
erosion,
landslides
Land degradation, damage to
structures, loss of capital goods
Rent and tax registers, charters,
bylaws, land books, maps,
reports, eye-witness accounts,
tenant contracts, chronicles,
petitions, newspapers
Epidemics Mortality, reduction in fertility Burial records, mortmain
accounts, wills and testaments,
ordinances, city accounts, bills of
mortality, plague house/hospital
documentation, medical
treatises, religious tracts,
orphanage records, chronicles
5 Titow, ‘Evidence of Weather’; Titow, ‘Le climat.’
6 Campbell, The Great Transition; Slavin, Experiencing Famine.
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Scholars are therefore more frequently drawn to sources such as chron-
icles, which are much more widely available and at a larger geographical
scale – particularly for medieval Europe, but also for early-colonial set-
tings during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Chronicles are
books that contain a chronological narrative centered on notable occa-
sions and often mention extraordinary weather events, diseases, and food
crises. In some cases these sources represent the only narrative evidence
we have on certain events. Secondary works that compile references to
hazards and disasters have relied extensively on chronicles, a well-known
example being Jean-Noël Biraben’s work that compiles ‘mentions’ of
medieval plague outbreaks.7 Comparable in nature, but focusing on
a specific type of event, are historical catalogs (chronologies of unusual
events and their impacts) composed by contemporaries. In Italy, for
instance, the first earthquake catalog, based on eye-witness accounts
and information from earlier chronicles, was compiled in the late seven-
teenth century.8 Other compilations assembled more recently but based
on similar source types include theMediterranean tsunami catalog, which
covers the coast of Greece, Turkey, Syria, Israel, and the Southern
Balkans, and extends back into the second millennium BCE.9
Parallels in non-Western societies sometimes go back to a more distant
past and are frequently more detailed than European chronicles and
catalogs. A famous example are the Egyptian Nilometers, specifically
constructed to measure the heights of the floods, which were essential
for agriculture. These give us an insight into the occurrence of floods and
droughts. Roman examples were preserved at Aswan and Luxor;
a medieval one can be seen in Cairo.10 The Babylonian Astronomical
Diaries, another example, not only record unusual natural phenomena,
but also give detailed price quotations, allowing analysis of the impact of,
for instance, locust invasions onmarkets in the fourth century BCE.11 For
China, local gazetteers – recordings of regional history and geography –
form a valuable source of information. The first gazetteer dates from
about 2000 years ago, but, especially during the Ming and Qing periods,
thousands of gazetteers on the provincial, prefectural, and county level
were compiled, usually by government officials or local scholars. Most
gazetteers contain sections devoted to extreme events such as storms and
floods; the later ones also give detailed information on the social, political,
7 Biraben, Les hommes et la peste, II. See Section 3.1.3 for an analysis of the pitfalls of such
datasets.
8 Rohr, ‘Man and Natural Disaster,’ 130.
9 Maramai, Brizuela & Graziani, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Tsunami Catalogue.’
10 Shaw, The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt, 420.
11 Pirngruber, ‘Plagues and Prices: Locusts.’
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and economic consequences of such events. Data from gazetteers have,
for instance, been used to reconstruct the effects of gender and family
relationships on coping strategies during the North China Famine of
1876–79.12
Such sources, however, are mostly limited to Western and Central
Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, and elsewhere we are forced to
look to other source types. For the pre-industrial period, written source
availability is often greatest in areas with histories of colonialism that
extend back beyond the late nineteenth century. Thus, recent work on
disasters and history of a more global scope has included Southern
Africa,13 South Asia,14 the Caribbean,15 and South America.16 One
source that has proven to be of high value in these areas is the records of
missionary societies. Missionaries were usually stationed in one area for
a significant length of time and were assiduous recorders of the physical
environment as it was crucial to subsistence and transportation, making
these documents of particular value for the study of hazards. Moreover,
unlike traders and many early-colonial officials, missionaries usually
turned their attention beyond the workings of the colonial machine and
onto the local population – especially during times of stress.17 These
sources have been supplemented by newspapers, which sometimes pro-
vided regular reference to provincial weather conditions,18 and the diaries
of hunters, travelers, traders, and explorers, who often reported weather
conditions and their perceived impacts on the societies through which
they traveled.19 All of these sources nevertheless have their own particular
biases and must be ‘read against the grain’ if we are to identify the local
voices within the narrative. Changes in source coverage must also be
taken into consideration when analyzing developments over the long
term. Gaps and silences in colonial records occur for many reasons, and
it must be ensured that absence of evidence relating to disasters is not
conflated with evidence of absence.
Indirect evidence (or proxy data), often derived from serial administra-
tive sources, also allows us to explore the occurrence, course, and conse-
quences of pre-industrial disasters. In parts of Central Europe, for
example, the beginning of the grape and rye harvest was reported
each year to the owner of the tithe to facilitate the monitoring and
12 Edgerton-Tarpley, ‘Family and Gender in Famine.’
13 Hannaford, ‘Long-Term Drivers’; Nash et al., ‘Seasonal Rainfall Variability.’
14 Adamson & Nash, ‘Documentary Reconstruction’; Adamson & Nash, ‘Long-Term
Variability.’
15 Berland & Endfield, ‘Drought and Disaster.’
16 Prieto & Herrera, ‘Documentary Sources from South America.’
17 See for example Hannaford, ‘Pre-colonial South-East Africa.’
18 Nash et al., ‘Seasonal Rainfall Variability.’ 19 Adamson, ‘Private Diaries.’
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collection of the crop. The close association between harvest dates and
seasonal climatic conditions, however, enables these sources to be used as
climatic proxy data.20 Evidence on yields can be used as an indicator of
food availability and is relatively widely available for Western Europe
from the fifteenth century onwards. Price series, usually of dominant
bread grains such as wheat or rye, are also frequently used as an indicator
for food crisis and famine. One needs to tread carefully when using price
series to reconstruct periods of dearth, however, as they are usually
limited tomore commercial (urban) regions and drawn from institutional
accounts, whose prices are not necessarily representative of the rates at
which themajority of the population acquired grain.21 Accounts (of cities,
villages, but also of religious institutions) can also contain references to
extreme weather events and/or disease. In Spain and Italy, for example,
the Catholic Church organized rogation services (rogativas) in an attempt
to bring an end to situations of protracted wet or dry conditions which
adversely affected crops.22 As the costs of these rituals were borne by the
municipality, expenses and receipts for rogations are found in the
accounts of ecclesiastical and civic institutions, which can give us an
indication of periods of climatic stress.23
One of the key indicators of disaster impact (or lack thereof) and
recovery is mortality, although this is sometimes challenging to recon-
struct. Mortmain registers, stemming from the feudal right of the lord to
part of his subjects’ inheritance, and similar to the heriots used for
England, have recently proved to be very useful for parts of medieval
Northwest Europe.24 Parish registers, often available there from the
sixteenth century and becoming increasingly widespread elsewhere in
Europe from the seventeenth century onwards, are best placed to give
us an idea of mortality via burial records,25 while baptismal and marriage
records allow us to reconstruct fertility and nuptiality – variables of
importance when assessing the demographic impact of crises and of
possible recovery.26 Burial records also sometimes contain direct refer-
ences to diseases, and similar references can be found within ordinances,
wills, theological and medical treatises, orphanage records, city accounts,
and so on. Such data are patchy in early-colonial contexts, and, where
20 See for example Wetter & Pfister, ‘Spring–Summer Temperatures’; Le Roy Ladurie &
Baulant, ‘Grape Harvests.’ See also Section 3.2.1.
21 Walter & Schofield, ‘Famine, Disease and Crisis Mortality.’
22 Rodrigo & Barriendos, ‘Reconstruction.’
23 Piervitali & Colacino, ‘Evidence of Drought.’
24 Roosen & Curtis, ‘The “Light Touch.”’
25 Curtis, ‘Was Plague an Exclusively Urban Phenomenon?’; Alfani, ‘Plague in
Seventeenth-Century Europe.’
26 Sella, ‘Coping with Famine.’
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they do exist, they often relate to the colonizers rather than the colonized.
However, data become much more widely available from the middle of
the nineteenth century, in parallel with the rise of censuses and more
formalized reports from colonies.
Demographic indicators are not the only variables affording us an idea
of impact and recovery. Information on land sales, credit transactions,
and criminal cases can all shed light on the severity of a crisis and on the
types of coping strategies that were developed.27 Of all types of coping
strategies, perhaps thosemost difficult to reconstruct are informal ways of
solidarity. In some regions of pre-industrial Europe, poor relief was
formalized, and so accounts of poor relief institutions or overseers of the
poor can offer insight here.28 Still, more informalmechanisms were vital –
even dominant in some regions – and these are much harder to investi-
gate. Practices linked to common rights, such as gleaning, can often be
traced in bylaws, but voluntary practices such as almsgiving are much
harder to trace, even though there are indications that it was of huge
importance.29 Such practices are also visible in some colonial accounts,
although again one must step out of the ideology and hegemonic dis-
course of these texts if informal coping mechanisms are to be correctly
identified.
From the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century onwards,
more and more sources are at the disposal of historians. This is mainly
linked to the fact that states became much stronger from the seventeenth
century onwards, coupled with the growth of bureaucratic administration
and colonial expansion. Alongside the rise of political economy, camera-
lism, and physiocracy in the eighteenth century, measurement became
essential for increasing ‘the wealth of nations.’ This also had an effect on
the types of sources linked to disasters. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 is
allegedly the first disaster in which the new focus on numbers and statis-
tics came to the fore. TheMarquis of Pombal “designed a national survey
to discover the causes and origin of the natural disaster, minimize future
risks and assess the damage the earthquake had caused.”30 This type of
survey was also used when it came to combating disease, as for example in
the Rinderpest outbreak in the late-eighteenth-century Southern
Netherlands.31
27 Campbell, ‘Nature as Historical Protagonist.’ For land and credit transactions, see
Schofield, ‘The Social Economy.’ For criminality as an indicator, see Vanhaute &
Lambrecht, ‘Famine.’
28 For the Low Countries, see Van Onacker & Masure, ‘Unity in Diversity’; Dijkman,
‘Bread for the Poor.’ For England, see Hindle, On the Parish?
29 Marfany, ‘Quantifying the Unquantifiable?’; Lambrecht, ‘The Harvest of the Poor?’
30 Araújo, ‘The Lisbon Earthquake,’ 9.
31 As mentioned in Van Roosbroeck & Sundberg, ‘Culling the Herds?’
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Sources originating with the government and its agencies become even
more important in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One of the
major changes throughout this period was the rapid growth in instrumen-
tal recording of environmental phenomena, as illustrated in the increase
in the coverage of national meteorological networks from 1850 to 2012 in
Figure 3.1.
The increased geographical coverage and temporal resolution of these
data in turn allow us to pose new questions relating to societal decision-
making and perceptions during hazardous events.32 Important changes
were also occurring within colonial administrations and their record-
keeping: during each of the major famines in late-nineteenth-century
India, for instance, the colonial authorities installed designated commis-
sions which produced extensive and detailed reports on causes, conse-
quences, and relief policies deemed necessary.33 Equally, the more
general annual reports compiled by colonial governments across the
world provide quantitative and qualitative material with which to assem-
ble chronologies of disasters – particularly relating to disease and famine –
at regional and local scales, and also to analyze the emergence of new
responses to hazards and disasters in newly colonized territories. One
example is insurance, which became more and more important (linked to
the emergence of a risk society).34 Likewise, the increase of newspaper
reporting (and in the twentieth century of radio and television broadcasts)
that came with the expanding role of the media can yield insights on how
disasters unfolded and their aftermath.35 Media coverage has proven
especially valuable for studies of the perception and ‘framing’ of disasters.
The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 again paved the way as sensational press
reports of this catastrophe, reaching audiences throughout Europe, cre-
ated a novel sense of proximity and public distress over so distant an
event.36
However,media sources, too, require intensive source critique. Photos,
for instance, can depict the same disaster in very different ways. The three
photos in Figure 3.2, for example, show very different sides to the
Manchurian plague of 1911. They are from an album covering the plague
instigated by Dr. Wu Lien-teh, a Chinese doctor who was sent to investi-
gate the struck region and subsequently became an authority in inter-
national plague research, as well as the first president of the China
Medical Association. Though all three photos are from the same album,
they can nevertheless convey a disparate message regarding the situation
32 Mauelshagen & Pfister, ‘Vom Klima zur Gesellschaft.’
33 Klein, ‘When the Rains Failed.’ 34 Rohland, ‘Earthquake versus Fire.’
35 See for example Cohn, ‘Cholera Revolts.’ 36 Araújo, ‘The Lisbon Earthquake.’
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.2 Photos of the Manchurian plague of 1911, from an album instigated
by Dr. Wu Lien-teh, a famous plague fighter. Courtesy of the Needham Research
Institute.
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in Manchuria. The first shows white coats, white masks, and an overall
‘scientific’ image of matters entirely under control, legitimizing territorial
jurisdiction at a tumultuous time (the final phases of the Qing dynasty).
The second photo strengthens this perception of control and legitimacy
further by depicting state distribution of firewood to the poor and needy.
Contrarily, the third photo shows several piles of plague victims being
cremated, conveying the impression that the situation was out of control,
and the number of casualties uncontainable.
3.1.2 Combining Historical Data with Sources from the Natural Sciences
In recent years, historical research into disasters has grown increasingly
interdisciplinary. Disaster historians have started to employ data from the
natural sciences, while scholars in the natural and social sciences have
begun to use historical data from the types of documentary sources
introduced above, as seen most visibly in studies linking past climatic
variability to human conflicts, plague outbreaks, and agricultural
productivity.37 Nevertheless, historical documents hold inherent
(c)
Figure 3.2 (cont.)
37 See the literature discussed in van Bavel et al., ‘Climate and Society.’
3.1 Historical Sources 53
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
limitations, and, as we will see in the following section, when not viewed
critically can lead to spurious conclusions.38
One of the most crucial limitations for the study of disasters is that the
documents do not necessarily reveal the ‘whole’ picture: that is to say, they
are not a dispassionate or objective reconstruction of the causes and
consequences of a disaster. For example, we may see ‘crisis situations’
described in tax registers, charters, court proceedings, or colonial reports,
and yet often these have the potential to be exaggerated for pleas for tax
exemptions, subsidies, or charity. Equally, certain aspects of disastrous
events can disappear from view in the records. Urban governments often
tried to downplay the severity of an epidemic present within the city in
order to maintain trading contacts and economic vitality.39 Direct refer-
ences by the urban administration of San Francisco to the earthquake of
1906were outweighed by references to the fire that ensued. Fire prevention
was simply an issue that could be more easily dealt with than earthquakes,
and this reveals the selective amnesia connected to the production of
documentary sources, even for a twentieth-century event.40 Indeed, refer-
ences to natural events and disasters appear in written sources only when
they are relevant for the author or administration. Arable fields could
experience serious erosion, but so long as they were cultivated and still
provided tithes or taxes, the eventswould go unremarked upon. As a result,
certain types of nature-induced disasters appear much more frequently in
sources than others, and some types of societies over-report events, while
others remain silent. In the Philippines, typhoons were registered much
more accurately than earthquakes and leave accounts as far back as 414
CE, simply because they were more disruptive for humans.41 Similarly,
storm surges that did not lead to floods badly affecting human habitation or
agriculture were less likely to appear in chronicles and diaries, making the
distinction between cause and effect rather blurred.42
Non-documentary evidence can, therefore, help prevent data hiatus
and help uncover source and method biases, which can allow the devel-
opment of new historical interpretations of hazards and disasters of the
past. Accordingly, traditional narratives on the ‘late-medieval crisis’ have
been reinvigorated with new kinds of data in recent times.43 Alongside the
more traditionally used information on harvests, historians have recently
38 Van Bavel et al., ‘Climate and Society’; Roosen & Curtis, ‘Dangers.’ See also
Section 3.1.3.
39 Roosen & Curtis, ‘The “Light Touch”’; Wilson Bowers, Plague and Public Health.
40 Rohland, ‘Earthquake versus Fire.’ 41 Bankoff, Cultures of Disaster.
42 Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’
43 Campbell, The Great Transition; Pribyl, Farming, Famine and Plague; Bauch & Schenk,
The Crisis of the 14th Century.
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begun to take note of the rapid growth in paleoclimate reconstructions
derived from ice-cores, tree-rings, lake sediments, cave speleothems, and
other sources.44 This has opened up new perspectives on the Little Ice
Age, its global scope, and its impacts on society.45 The laboratory has also
completely revolutionized research into plague over the past decade or
so,46 and bioarcheological evidence from skeletons in excavated burials
sites is providing information on health and living standards that simply
cannot be found in documents going back as far as the Middle Ages.47
Even better, this evidence is being actively integrated with documen-
tary evidence. For example, the integration of paleoclimatic and written
evidence of drought occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa not only provides
us with a more complete view of the specific occurrence of drought itself,
but also offers the opportunity to analyze why certain droughts led to
human disaster while others – perhaps those of even greater severity –
passed with only minor disturbance.48 Equally, more traditional forms of
archaeological research into the physical evidence – such as the increasing
or declining presence of pottery shards – can provide effective compara-
tive indicators for depopulation between regions – for example after the
Black Death.49 This is important, given that the geographical or temporal
span of our documentary evidence for reconstructing themortality effects
of late-medieval epidemics is often restricted.50 More generally, evidence
from the natural sciences allows us to go back in time to periods before the
widespread production of documents.
Furthermore, natural scientific data can provide an added layer of
chronological development and possibly allow more accurate dating of
events. For example, the dominant paradigm that disastrous sand drifts in
the European coversand belt (stretching from the British Brecklands
across continental Europe to Russia) increased only from the late
Middle Ages onwards has been falsified by combining historical and
geological data.51 Reliance on land books, maps, and tax registers grossly
exaggerated late-medieval and early-modern sand drifts, since docu-
ments of this nature in this part of Europe started to appear only from
the fourteenth century onwards. As a result, earlier disasters were neg-
lected and older dunes were dated much younger. Through new
44 PAGES2k Consortium, ‘A Global Multiproxy Database.’
45 Camenisch & Rohr, ‘When the Weather Turned Bad’; Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate,
History, Society’; Degroot, The Frigid Golden Age.
46 Little, ‘Plague Historians’; Bolton & Clark, ‘Looking for Yersinia pestis’; Green, ‘Taking
“Pandemic” Seriously.’
47 DeWitte, ‘The Anthropology of Plague.’
48 Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate, History, Society.’ 49 Lewis, ‘Disaster Recovery.’
50 Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics,’ 318.
51 Derese et al., ‘AMedieval Settlement’; De Keyzer, “All We Are”; Pierik et al., ‘Controls.’
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techniques such as optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) dating, which
dates when quartz particles became covered and were no longer exposed to
sunlight, different inland dune sites can be dated more accurately. As
a result, it has become clear that earlier disastrous drift sands had occurred
more often than had previously been believed, and the later medieval ones
relatively less often, with consequences for earlier explanatory models focus-
ing on land reclamation or population pressure on resources.52
While offering great potential for the study of disasters and history, data
from the natural sciences still require a critical assessment similar to that
made by historians working with documentary material. The contextualiza-
tion of data from the natural sciences is important for discerning the signifi-
cance of the overall effect that a scientific indicator has on either a human
society or a broader ecosystem. For example, in geomorphology every event
of sand re-sedimentation is considered vital, with every dated layer given the
same weight and importance when determining drift sand phases.53 Yet
some dunes are made up of thick layers of sand, deposited in relatively swift
events, while other dunes are formed by a sequence of thin layers taking
centuries to develop. It goes without saying that not all of these phases, with
their varying extents and chronologies, have the same impact on human
society or even on dune formation.54 Equally, paleoclimate proxy data vary
enormously in their geographical coverage and temporal resolution, so while
many long-duration tree-ring chronologies of seasonal or annual resolution
have been produced from the middle and high latitudes of Eurasia and
North America, it is muchmore difficult to identify such growth increments
across much of the tropics due to basic differences in climatological condi-
tions. Natural scientific data may also have undergone statistical processing
and modeling in order to make composite datasets at large geographical
scales. The increasing numbers of climate reconstructions in particular
regions, for example, have led to the production of what are known as
climate field reconstructions. This has enabled composite time series of
temperature, precipitation, and atmospheric pressure to be derived across
regions, continents, and even hemispheres.55 However, a degree of caution
must be applied when using these sources to study hazards within
a particular location, for they tend to be weighted to those locations in
which data density is greatest (for example, Northwest Europe). Efforts to
better define regional historical climate variability have also extended to
Southern Africa and South America through the construction of ‘multi-
52 De Keyzer, “All We Are”; de Keyzer & Bateman, ‘Late Holocene Landscape Instability’;
Pierik et al., ‘Controls.’
53 Castel, Late Holocene Eolian Drift Sands; Ballarini et al., ‘Optical Dating.’
54 De Keyzer, “All We Are”; Pierik et al., ‘Controls.’
55 Luterbacher et al., ‘European Seasonal and Annual Temperature.’
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proxy’ series.56 These series provide valuable information for efforts to
detect the nature of regional climate variability and change; however,
again, the use of more localized reconstructions should be prioritized
where the focus of research is on hazards within a specific area, otherwise
these may be obscured or dampened by regional averaging.
These discrepancies in data availability and the uncertainty that ensues
should be considered when using such data. Even more crucial when
exploring the hazard–society nexus, however, is the point that similar
fluctuations in environmental conditions in two different societies do
not always have the same impact for humans, or even for ecosystems.
Often, there is low potential for disruption to societies – and accordingly it
is essential to contextualize signatures of environmental variability found
within ‘natural archives,’ something that can be done by integrating both
documentary and non-documentary sources, where available.
3.1.3 History and the Digital Age: Opportunities and Pitfalls for Historical
Disaster Research
The digital age has hadmajor impacts on the ways in which historical data
have been used. Only just over a decade ago, newly constructed quanti-
tative historical datasets such as series of prices, mortality, and disease
activity were usually found in appendices of books, and the scholars who
used these data – or even knew of their existence – were typically histor-
ians. Today, many datasets are either published online with the original
work or digitized from an older work and hosted on publicly available
online repositories, which have led to increased visibility and availability
of historical data.57 This has resulted in a wealth of opportunities for
interdisciplinary scholarship into the human and environmental past.
Indeed, there has been a surge of scientific interest in linking long-term
human activity with environmental variability, with a new body of quan-
titative scholarship correlating the types of paleoclimatic data discussed
in the previous section with historical data on human activity spanning
the last millennium. This has led many to ‘explain’ human phenomena,
such as conflict or disease incidence, as an outcome of climatic change.58
56 Nash et al., ‘Seasonal Rainfall Variability.’
57 An example of the former: Brecke, ‘Violent Conflicts.’An example of the latter: Büntgen
et al., ‘Digitizing Historical Plague.’
58 See for example Zhang et al., ‘Global Climate Change’; Zhang et al., ‘The Causality
Analysis’; Büntgen et al., ‘2500 Years of European Climate Variability’; Hsiang, Burke &
Miguel, ‘Quantifying the Influence’; Zhang et al., ‘Climate Change andWar Frequency’;
Tol & Wagner, ‘Climate Change and Violent Conflict.’
3.1 Historical Sources 57
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
While the very real and clear benefits of increasing accessibility of data
cannot be understated, it is also important to consider what may be lost
during the digitization process before historical information reaches its
‘end state’ as a data point that appears in a published online dataset. Such
issues of source criticism are, of course, fundamental to historical
research, but can go missing when old datasets are digitized and much
of their contextual information is cast aside.
One such issue relates to the uneven collection and transcription of
this material by scholars past and present. For example, many recently
available online historical datasets are not new, but rely heavily on the
work of individual scholars many decades ago. This can create spatial
and temporal biases in data coverage as a result of the limited expertise
and linguistic knowledge of individual scholars, or simply due to
unequal access to archival material – particularly that outside of
Western Europe. These problems have recently been identified in Jean-
Noël Biraben’s original dataset on historical plague outbreaks, accord-
ing to which the Low Countries appear to have been free of plague
(Figure 3.3). However, a new inventory of data collected on plague
outbreaks in the Low Countries shows that this was in fact not the case,
but that this gap is a legacy of the work undertaken by one particular
researcher. This demonstrates the need to adopt a critical approach to
what may appear to be ‘complete’ datasets. At worst, such issues may
bring into doubt the validity and robustness of high-profile studies on
the causal factors behind historical plague outbreaks, susceptibility, and
spread.59
Digitized datasets are not limited to Europe. We have already seen the
opportunities that colonial records can provide for explaining historical
disasters and crises in non-Western societies, and, while such recordsmay
provide our only written sources of information at particular points in
time, theymust be subject to a particular type of scrutiny. One of themost
frequently used historical datasets in studies linking climate and conflict
incidence, for example, is Peter Brecke’s global ‘Conflict Catalog,’ which
was largely compiled from secondary publishedworks.60 By Brecke’s own
admission, this dataset is an unfinished product, with errors “especially as
we go back in time and into particular regions of the world.”61 Coverage
in the Southern Hemisphere – where data going back to 1400 have been
used in various studies – is deficient before 1800, with most entries
relating to conflicts between colonial powers and indigenous populations.
Even where conflicts between indigenous populations do appear in the
59 Roosen & Curtis, ‘Dangers.’ 60 Brecke, ‘Violent Conflicts.’
61 Brecke, ‘Notes Regarding the Conflict Catalog.’
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dataset, we also find issues. The widespread conflicts of the 1820s in
Southeast Africa, for example, are grouped into one decade-long conflict
of the ‘Zulu tribes,’ a notion that dates back to early colonial writings
which routinely exaggerated the effects of conflict, and in some cases even
fabricated its existence.62 The number of fatalities assigned to this conflict
(60,000) is very likely based on interpretations of the same problematic
sources that historians in Africa are reluctant to employ in their own
studies, yet the sources on which these numbers, and indeed the whole
dataset, are based are not made explicit. These criticisms are not to say
that large datasets are to be discarded outside of Eurasia, but rather that
new multidisciplinary efforts are needed to assess, add to, or create
datasets that are based on region- and period-specific contextual know-
ledge, original sources rather than published works, and rigorous source
critique.
As shown in recent work uncovering the history of plague in the Low
Countries, historians have a major role to play in ensuring datasets are fit
for purpose. This includes working with scholars from other disciplines to
ensure appropriate selection, use, contextualization, and interpretation of
historical data. At the very least, some key questions that should be
considered before employing a historical dataset include the following.
1. Are the data geographically representative for the area(s) under
consideration?
2. Is the temporal resolution of the data appropriate for the research
question(s) under consideration?
3. Are the variables in the historical dataset representative of the phe-
nomena under consideration? If not, what are the potential
uncertainties?
4. Are the historical source types on which the dataset is based consist-
ent, or do they vary? What uncertainties does variation in source types
introduce?
5. How does the volume of historical source material vary over time?
What uncertainties does this introduce?
Increasing specificity and transparency about uncertainty or potential
biases in the data are part of the solution, though broader shifts in the
publication process are also required. These could involve simple inter-
ventions like including historians as part of the peer-review teams, or
more concerted efforts to develop open-access platforms through which
to publish and access historical data. This would in turn incentivize
historians to publish and refine datasets in a similar way to the natural
sciences – theGeoscience Data Journal being just one example. Ultimately,
62 Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate, History, Society.’
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even with the most representative datasets, it is also incumbent upon
scholars using these data to ensure that appropriate methodologies are
selected, and it is to this issue that we turn next.
3.2 Methodologies
In this section, methodologies for historical disaster research are intro-
duced, and the potential uses of the types of data described in the
preceding section are demonstrated. This discussion of methodologies
includes those employed in the reconstruction of hazards (e.g. droughts,
floods, epidemics) and their impacts from historical sources, as well as
analysis of human vulnerability, resilience, coping, and adaptation to
these hazards. Crucially, this section stresses the importance of applying
comparative methodologies over long temporal trajectories, which
enables historians to move away from descriptive and event-focused
approaches, although we also note how, in practice, this is not always
straightforward to achieve.
3.2.1 Hazard and Disaster Reconstruction from Historical Sources
We have explored the types of historical documentary sources that can be
used to study hazards and disasters, but how can we turn the information
contained within these sources into systematic chronologies of hazard
occurrence, characteristics, and impact where we lack instrumental
records? Frequently the impact of hazards both past and present is
couched in emotive language. An earthquake may be said to have ‘deci-
mated’MexicoCity, or a tropical cyclonemay be said to have ‘devastated’
the Mozambican coast, but to what extent can hazards and disasters be
rendered comparable over space and time – and at what scales should we
strive for such comparisons? In many areas, long and detailed chronolo-
gies of hazards have already been produced – particularly for source-rich
regions such as Western and Central Europe. Reconstruction neverthe-
less remains an important part of interdisciplinary research in disaster
history and its cognate subdisciplines of historical climatology and histor-
ical epidemiology. Indeed, sources previously unused for the study of
disasters are still being brought to light, while improvements and innov-
ations in reconstruction methods have allowed ‘gappy’ data to be used
more robustly.
Documents containing abundant, regular, and systematic observations
have, unsurprisingly, receivedmost attention in the reconstruction of past
hazards. One of the major reasons for this is that sources of this nature
usually lend themselves to the application of statistical methods,
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especially where there is an overlap in observations of the same variable
between historical documents and modern data. In turn, this allows for
the calibration of statistical relationships between the recorded variable
(e.g. wind direction) and the hazard to which it relates (e.g. precipita-
tion), which can then be applied to historical data.63 This principle can
apply to a range of historical sources, with perhaps the most famous
example being harvest dates and temperature.64 In some regions, the
inverse approach has been adopted, where paleoclimatic data on tem-
perature have been used to reconstruct agricultural yields.65
In large parts of the Southern Hemisphere, the largely qualitative
nature of historical documentary sources means that statistical methods
are less suitable and other methods such as textual and content analysis
need to be used. Typically, this means that a body of hazard-related
quotations within a season or year is assessed against a quantitative
scale. In the case of rainfall reconstruction from missionary accounts
and private diaries, for example, such a scale might range from drought
(−2), dry (−1), ‘normal’ (0), wet (+1) to extremely wet (+2) relative to
‘typical’ rainfall levels.66 The resultant seasonal or annual values can then
be combined to produce long-run time series of semi-quantitative climate
data, which can be calibrated for accuracy in any overlap that exists with
early instrumental series. Similar methods have been used to reconstruct
cyclones, whereby qualitative descriptions of atmospheric conditions and
of the extent of damage to buildings have been used as a proxy for cyclone
intensity.67 Even where observations on hazards are too sparse or scat-
tered to reconstruct seasonal or annual variability in this way, however,
they should not go to waste. We have already seen how historical obser-
vers tended to record those hazards which led to some form of societal
impact. These subjective descriptions of climate-related hazards may be
as important for the historian concerned with disasters as an ‘objective’
instrumental record, since disasters themselves are the product of human
as much as environmental factors and are often subjectively defined
phenomena.68
Moving beyond the reconstruction of hazards themselves, three main
categories are accepted to measure the impact of a disaster: effects on
people (death, injury, disease, and stress), effects on goods (property
damage and economic loss), and effects on the environment (loss of
flora and fauna, pollution, and loss of amenity). We will focus on the
63 Hannaford, Jones & Bigg, ‘Early-Nineteenth-Century Southern African Precipitation.’
64 Pribyl, Farming, Famine and Plague.
65 Huhtamaa & Helama, ‘Reconstructing Crop Yield Variability.’
66 Nash et al., ‘Seasonal Rainfall Variability.’ 67 Nash et al., ‘Tropical Cyclone Activity.’
68 Hannaford, ‘Long-Term Drivers’; Miller, ‘The Significance of Drought.’
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use of mortality as an indicator in the following section.Mortality is by far
the most dominant category employed to measure the impact of
a disaster, and it gives us a clear insight into the challenges when it
comes to measuring impact. Mortality is commonly at the center of
thresholds and levels of minimal disruption used to identify and classify
disasters.69 For example, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (University of Louvain), which hosts one of the most extensive
modern disaster databases, includes only those events withmore than 100
deaths, as well as damages amounting to 1 percent or more of GDP, and
the number of people affected as 1 percent of the total population.70
This type of assessment is, however, very much focused on physical
damage and mortality, and excludes other important facets of disasters
that we have discussed in Section 2.1. Another strategy is to define
a perimeter that is hazard-dependent but uses a fixed threshold. Mark
and Catherine Casson defined a crisis in terms of a deviation from an
attested mean value – for example, rising mortality rates and soaring
average food prices that progressed 20 percent beyond the normal average
were deemed a crisis.71 This can, however, run into the same problems
highlighted above, in that fixed values and thresholds cannot be applied to
all hazards and are to some extent context-dependent.72 Other studies
draw more directly from the concept of ecological resilience, defined as
“the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system
redefines its structure by changing the variables and processes that con-
trol behavior.”73 Often this is applied to ecosystems, but it has been used
for societies and social institutions as well. With this definition, an event
can be labeled a disaster when it redefines the structure and behavior of
a society.
Mortality is an indicator of particular importance when reconstructing
epidemic outbreaks – a trend that has been reignited in recent years with
moves towards digitalization of data and GIS mapping. The sources
necessary for reconstructing epidemics can be divided into two broad
groups: direct documentary references or mentions of a disease that can
be used as one form of ‘diagnostic’ evidence, or epidemiological evidence
referring to the severity or spread of a disease, in its entirety or – prefer-
ably – differentiated by sex, age, and socio-economic status, as well as
separating rural and urban data.
69 See Section 2.2. 70 Smith, Keith & Petley, Environmental Hazards.
71 Casson & Casson, ‘Economic Crises in England.’
72 A point we will return to in Section 3.2.3.
73 Gunderson, ‘Ecological Resilience,’ 426. See Section 2.3.4 for a detailed breakdown of
the concept of resilience.
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Direct references to diseases can be found in various pre-modern sources,
including burial registers, ordinances, wills, theological and medical trea-
tises, bills of mortality, orphanage records, and city accounts. While these
records can provide useful pointers to the dominant epidemiological condi-
tions of a certain season or year, epidemiological information on a disease
within such documents is not direct diagnostic information on what that
disease actually was, and we should not always take the diagnosis of pre-
modern contemporaries at face value.74 The term ‘peste,’ for example, may
have referred to plague, but also may have been a ‘catch-all’ term to refer to
all kinds of different afflictions that may have had features similar to
plague.75 InWestern Europe, it is often difficult to find a systematic distinc-
tion between diseases prior to the second half of the fifteenth century –
though in the early-modern sources this becomes much clearer. For
example, scholars have been rather damning of what the burial records
can directly say about cause of death,76 but in more recent times certain
burial records have been shown to make very sharp distinctions between
diseases – often with numerous terms used even in the same year.77
Nevertheless, even if pre-modern scholars, especially by the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, couldmake broad distinctions between diseases,78 we
still must accept that their diagnoses could be wrong – only DNA pathogen
evidence can ultimately solve this. For some parts of the world, this lack of
absolute confirmative evidence for what a disease actually was has led to
substantial disputes: some scholars suggesting, for example, that plague did
not substantially feature in pre-modern Japan,79 and it has been questioned
whether the Chinese term ‘wenyi,’ broadly translated as plague, was actually
the same disease caused by Yersinia pestis,80 even if we now have strong
evidence that suggests the initial outbreak of the Black Death was linked to
strains of the Yersinia pestis pathogen originating in the Qinghai Plateau of
Western–Central China or southern Siberia.81
Mortality data also offer the opportunity to quantify the occurrence,
spread, and severity of epidemics. In recent years there has been an
attempt to quantify Black Death mortality rates across numerous local-
ities within Europe.82However, the sourcematerial behind this exercise is
74 Cohn, Cultures of Plague; Carmichael, ‘Universal and Particular.’
75 Theilmann & Cate, ‘A Plague of Plagues.’
76 Dobson, Contours of Death and Disease, 81.
77 Curtis, ‘Was Plague an Exclusively Urban Phenomenon?’
78 As suggested in Cohn, Cultures of Plague.
79 Bowman Jannetta, Epidemics and Mortality.
80 Dunstan, ‘The Late Ming Epidemics’; Cao & Li, Shuyi.
81 See the classic Cui et al., ‘Historical Variations.’
82 Christakos et al., Interdisciplinary Public Health Reasoning; Voigtländer & Voth, ‘The
Three Horsemen’; Gómez & Verdú, ‘Network Theory.’
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invariably not epidemiological. It consists of estimates ofmortality impact
by contemporary observers from all kinds of disparate sources, which, in
truth, are difficult to compare. More reliable epidemiological indicators
come from sources which have roughly consistent features between local-
ities and even over time, and, of course, exist for a large number of
localities – mortmain accounts and church burial records being two of the
main examples, although one problem has been that material for epidemio-
logical reconstructions over large areas and long periods is not as readily
available for the late Middle Ages.83 Methodologically, obtaining mortality
rates from these data sources is problematic as these require either recorded
population estimates or highly sophisticated numerical models in order to
produce the information. For England, the latter have been developed by the
Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, and
are expounded at length in the Population History of England.84 Other
methods beyond simply listing the total numbers of burials have also been
used. An example that has regained popularity is one originally developed by
the Italian demographer Massimo Livi Bacci, whereby relative annual mor-
tality is calculated on the basis of the percentage increase or decrease in
burials from preceding years, offering insight into the severity and spread of
mortality across different localities and regions.85 Because an increase in
burials to a level 50 percent or more higher than in previous years has been
suggested to have prevented the generation born in a given year from
replenishing the population, this threshold has been used as a sign of crisis
or disaster.86 Two of themajor advantages of this method are that it requires
no data other than the burial records themselves, and is amenable to rela-
tively straightforward calculations and processing. Analysis of seasonal dis-
tributions of burials can also give insight into causes of death, which may
include famine as well as disease. Age and gender may offer further clues,
although, given the uncertainties around the age and gender characteristics
of some diseases, one should be careful to avoid circular reasoning here.
3.2.2 Vulnerability Assessment
A vulnerability assessment analyses how exposed certain individuals or
groups are to a particular hazard. It tracks the potential population at risk
and tries to explain the social structures, economic behaviors,
83 For a discussion of these sources, see Section 3.1.1.
84 Wrigley & Schofield, The Population History.
85 Roosen&Curtis, ‘The “Light Touch”’; Alfani, ‘Plague in Seventeenth-Century Europe’;
Curtis, ‘Was Plague an Exclusively Urban Phenomenon?’; Curtis & Dijkman, ‘The
Escape from Famine.’
86 Alfani, ‘Plague in Seventeenth-Century Europe.’
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institutional conditions, and physical circumstances that determine the
exposure to hazards and the ability to recover from their occurrence.
Sometimes vulnerability is identified simply through the occurrence of
disaster, but this is problematic: at least in theory, vulnerability may exist
irrespective of whether a disaster occurs, even if in practice the underlying
patterns may be revealed only when disaster does strike.
One way to unravel – although not formally assess – vulnerability is
suggested by the Pressure and Release (PAR) model developed in disaster
studies.87 This model aims to explain how the interaction of vulnerability,
on the one hand, and the occurrence of hazards, on the other, may lead to
disaster. In the process, it also unpacks the concept of vulnerability. The
‘pressure’ component of the model distinguishes three levels of underlying
factors. At the base are ‘root causes’: economic, social, and political condi-
tions that affect the distribution of power and resources. ‘Dynamic pres-
sures,’ such as rapid urbanization, economic depression, or war, may
transform these root causes into the ‘unsafe conditions,’ such as settlement
in hazard-prone locations or unhealthy living quarters, that are the ultimate
expression of vulnerability. The concepts of root causes, dynamic pres-
sures, and unsafe conditions have also been used as a lens through which
vulnerability in case studies of historical disasters can be explained.88
Amore formalized assessment of vulnerability has also gained currency
within contemporary fields such as development or climate studies. This
typically draws upon quantitative social research methods such as house-
hold surveys, or may involve the analysis of larger economic datasets.
A common approach is the use of indicators. This involves the identifica-
tion of a series of indicators associated with exposure, sensitivity, and
adaptive capacity to a particular hazard, independently of the occurrence
of the hazard itself.89 These indicators can be based upon links estab-
lished from a range of general and context-specific literature, for example
that diversity in cultivated crops reduces sensitivity to drought, or that
grain storage enhances adaptive capacity. Other indicators may be more
subjective, where, for example, the integration of pre-colonial African
communities within intercontinental trade networks on the one hand
provided a potential source of grain in times of scarcity, but on the
other hand subjected these communities to exploitation. Indicators are
usually clustered in a limited number of relevant dimensions and subse-
quently translated into an index. Typically, indicators are given a value
that represents a positive or negative contribution to vulnerability. These
87 Blaikie et al., At Risk, 24.
88 Barnes, ‘Social Vulnerability and Pneumonic Plague’; Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’
89 Hinkel, “Indicators of Vulnerability”; Füssel, ‘Vulnerability’; Hahn, Riederer & Foster,
‘The Livelihood Vulnerability Index.’
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values may be weighted according to those components adjudged to
contribute the most to vulnerability, or they may simply be given equal
weight. The result can be a snapshot of vulnerability at a particular point
in time for a particular locality or social group, but it is also possible to
make temporal or spatial comparisons by including multiple localities,
regions, or time periods in the analysis.
Although in historical research assessment of vulnerability is usually less
formalized and frequently qualitative in nature, indicator analyses have
recently been applied to various historical contexts, notably the Irish fam-
ine of 1740–41,90 climate anomalies in Iceland and the Eastern United
States during the first and second millennia AD,91 and drought in
Southeast Africa between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.92 This
range of contexts demonstrates the particular value of indicator approaches
in areas where sources – which may also be archaeological or zooarchaeo-
logical – are fewer in number but are of sufficient breadth to capture the
multidimensional nature of vulnerability. Where documentary sources are
greater in number, the information available on one indicator (e.g. wages)
may go far beyond that available for a whole cross-section of indicators in
other contexts, and so the use of indicatorsmay be a less suitable approach.
There is also a difficulty in integrating cultural norms and religious beliefs
into indicator assessments, which can render them somewhat two-
dimensional. Thus, while indicator approaches provide a useful compara-
tive tool, the results should generally be seen as points of departure that
seek to simplify a complex reality rather than end-states of analysis.
Whichever way vulnerability is analyzed, in historical perspective we
can find merit in considering vulnerability as the ‘flipside’ of adaptation –
that is to say, vulnerability and adaptation are co-evolving, interdepend-
ent phenomena.93 Bringing adaptation into the discussion also calls for an
analysis of institutional responses and the social actors behind these
responses. We have already seen how responses to hazards and disasters
are not necessarily ‘rational’ or equivalent to the ‘common good,’ and this
is where qualitative analysis of institutional records of a narrative nature
can provide an invaluable counterpart to analysis of both pre-existing
vulnerabilities and hazard and disaster outcomes. This allows us to bring
into view the importance of contingency, social actors, and environmental
knowledge in human–environment interactions over time, while also
helping us avoid linear or teleological success narratives of adaptation as
‘improvement.’
90 Engler et al., ‘The Irish Famine.’ 91 Nelson et al., ‘Climate Challenges.’
92 Hannaford, ‘Long-Term Drivers.’
93 See arguments made in Rohland, ‘Adapting to Hurricanes.’
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3.2.3 Comparative Methodologies
This chapter started out by pointing to the importance of comparative
analysis. Before we expand on how this can be done, we must first
consider why it is necessary and the problems associated with some of
the other approaches that have been prominent in historical research on
disasters over recent decades. These approaches are linked to the move
that the historical profession has made away from the social sciences,
resulting in the situation where historians are less likely to subscribe to the
view that the past can be used to establish regularities, patterns, and
certainly not laws, through comparative analysis. This has been driven
in part by a fear of accusations of being ‘deterministic,’ therefore privil-
eging events and the narrative, and perhaps even a situation where post-
structuralists would offer up the past as an “undecidable infinity of
possible truths.”94 For the specific study of historical disasters, there are
a number of drawbacks to this present situation of the historical
profession.
First, a focus on events, as in histoire événementielle or evental history,
can lead to over-emphasis or over-exaggeration of certain features within
these ‘special cases’ that are then said to apply more broadly for other
hazards and the disasters that can ensue. For example, the notion that
epidemics inevitably caused societies to descend into scapegoating and
persecution of easily targeted groups has undoubtedly been connected to
scholars focusing in on just a few very spectacular cases such as the Black
Death or AIDS – which have proven to be anomalies when placed within
a broader temporal and geographical perspective of all social responses to
epidemics.95
Second, over-emphasis on one disaster can lead to the privileging of
certain theoretical or explanatory frameworks over others. For example,
for the medieval period, an exceptional amount of focus has gone into the
famine of 1315–17 in isolation, which is problematic in the sense that this
famine occurred – at least in a European context – within very special
social and environmental conditions that were probably not to be
repeated across the whole of the pre-industrial period to the same
extreme. That is to say, the famine of 1315–17 in many parts of Northern
Europe occurred in conditions of unparalleled population pressures on
resources – thus being an exceptional event – but not one representative of
all the famines that occurred throughout the medieval and early-modern
periods.96 As yet, few attempts have been made to compare, for example,
the famine experience of localities in conditions of high Malthusian
94 All discussed in Curtis, van Bavel & Soens, ‘History and the Social Sciences.’
95 Cohn, Epidemics. 96 A problem highlighted in Geens, ‘The Great Famine.’
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pressures with the famine experience of localities with low Malthusian
pressures. Similar concerns over the representativeness of historical
hazards chosen by scholars have recently been iterated by historians
and archaeologists focusing on late-medieval earthquakes in the
Mediterranean.97
Third, this can also lead to the problem of over-emphasizing
a conspicuous feature of a society hit by a disaster as possible causal
factor. Quite often, at least in studies focusing on the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, the factor that is often cited is ‘poverty’ – by way
of description or inductive reasoning – and this feeds into narratives that
see the ‘Global South’ as a disease-ridden, inhospitable place – poverty-
stricken and disaster-prone in equal measure.98
One of the positive developments in recent years in the study of histor-
ical disasters is the greater tendency towards assessing hazards and
shocks, and the disasters that can ensue, in a much broader geographical
and temporal perspective – that is to say, we are moving in a more global
direction. Recent literature has warned us of over-focusing on the Black
Death, and trying to apply abstract theoretical models of redistribution or
economic development based on the logical mechanisms connected to
this ‘anomalous’ shock.99 Scholars are now assessing the Black Death
within its place in the broader chronology of the Second Pandemic over
five centuries.100 In line with broader movements in the discipline of
history, scholars have also moved in more recent times to challenge
Eurocentric conceptions of the Black Death, instead using new kinds of
global data sources – particularly from bioarcheology and genome ana-
lysis – to reveal its truly global effects and consequences.101 On the
subject of famines, recent literature too has moved away from looking
only at very severe cases such as the 1315–17 Great Famine. Instead, it
considers how food crises and famines developed in regions across the
whole pre-modern period – comparing some of their features, causes, and
consequences in a more standardized way.102 Furthermore, we have
come to the realization that a terrible event etched in popular conscious-
ness such as the Great Famine of Ireland in the middle of the nineteenth
century was not a catastrophe for Ireland in isolation, but part of
a broader problem affecting much wider geographical territories – and
97 Forlin, Gerrard & Petley, ‘Exploring Representativeness and Reliability.’
98 Frerks & Bender, ‘Conclusion,’ 199.
99 Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics.’ 100 Cohn, ‘Patterns of Plague.’
101 The special issue of The Medieval Globe edited by Monica Green, Pandemic Disease,
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/tmg/vol1/iss1/. Also see Green, ‘Black as Death.’
102 Alfani & Ó Gráda (eds.), Famine; Collet & Schuh (eds.), Famines during the ‘Little
Ice Age.’
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that the excessive focus on events such as those in Ireland is entrenched in
historiographical traditions.103 Scholars are also now interested in placing
earthquakes in broader geographical and temporal frameworks. For
a long time earthquakes were the subject of analysis as isolated events,
and most comparative approaches were limited to those interested in
paleoseismological aspects of earthquakes – resulting in mere catalogs of
seismic events.104 Recent research has looked to add to that approach by
elaborating upon similarities and differences between Mediterranean
late-medieval and early-modern societies in coping with and preparing
for earthquakes.105
There are, however, practical challenges to employing comparative
approaches – which are applicable for the discipline of history as
a whole, but with even greater relevance for the study of historical disas-
ters. As we have seen in the previous sections of this chapter, the first issue
is that historical sourcematerial is a fickle substance, distributed unevenly
across time and space. Even when sources are relatively abundant, they
are often difficult to interpret and reveal only small segments of the
phenomenon under investigation.106 This can be demonstrated in the
study of the redistributive effects of disasters for dimensions such as
wealth and property. Each source for reconstructing inequality has its
own idiosyncrasies – differing methods of calculation, recording, and
exclusion rates – which mean that it is difficult to compare the redistribu-
tive effects of disasters between regions or localities in any absolute terms.
Some scholars have conceded this and suggested that these kinds of
sources can be used only in very relative terms –measuring the redistribu-
tive effects of shocks such as epidemics or floods in the same localities or
regions over time using the very same type of source.107 Indeed, we have
come to realize that it is in the temporal dimensions of comparison that
trained historians have considerable advantages and can provide added
value when trying to understand the causes and consequences of disas-
ters. Another source-related problem connected to comparative
approaches is the simple issue of their complete absence – or rather
random appearance over time. In keeping with the same example of
redistribution, the problems can be seen in Walter Scheidel’s The Great
Leveler on the redistributive impact of terrible mortality shocks and
103 See the essays in Ó Gráda, Paping & Vanhaute (eds.),When the Potato Failed.
104 For a selection of online catalogues see www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Seismologie/E
rdbebenauswertung_en/Kataloge_en/historisch/historische_erdbeben_inhalt_en.html
105 Forlin & Gerrard, ‘The Archaeology of Earthquakes.’
106 Curtis & Roosen, ‘On the Importance of History.’
107 Alfani &Ammannati, ‘Long-TermTrends in Economic Inequality’; van Bavel, Curtis &
Soens, ‘Economic Inequality.’
70 History as a Laboratory
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
outbreaks of violence.108 The only empirical study cited in Scheidel’s
book that actually has this very specific kind of systematic information for
the pre-industrial period (immediately before and after a shock) concerns
one town in Northern Italy in the seventeenth century.109 Put simply,
throughout history, we have very few occasions where we have an empir-
ically measurable record for distribution just before a disaster and then
just after a disaster, and it is even rarer to have both of those (which would
be necessary for assessing direct short-run effects) and then a long-term
series of the same information. This reduces our confidence in the posited
causal links between, for example, ‘leveling’ and catastrophic shocks. And
this does not merely apply to redistribution but to a whole raft of social
indicators – the same problems can be posited for the effects of disasters
on age of marriage, for example.110
A second problem explicitly related to the subject of historical disasters
is that it is very difficult to apply systematic social science methods: an
obvious one being to hold a number of variables constant as much as
possible, in order to isolate those that are held to be crucial and are tested
for. Although the geographical and temporal scope of our comparisons
has broadened with regard to historical disaster studies,111 systematic
comparative approaches lag some way behind. In his discussion of social
science concepts and comparative methods, Giovanni Sartori noted that
“If two entities are similar in everything, in all their characteristics, then
they are the same entity. If, on the other hand, two entities are different in
every respect, then their comparison is nonsensical.”112 Disaster studies
scholars have to work more on reducing the number of variables – one of
the most important components of successful comparative research – if
they are going to get closer to answering important social science ques-
tions such as why some societies cope more effectively than others with
hazards. The problem here is that quite often we are comparing different
hazards, or at least different magnitudes and intensity of the same type of
hazard, at the very same time as comparing different societal variables of
possible importance.113
This issue can be demonstrated by focusing on just one typical kind of
failure in this regard: for example, in the comparison undertaken
between two floods occurring in 1993 and 1994 in two different
108 Scheidel, The Great Leveler.
109 Investigated by Alfani, ‘The Effects of Plague.’ See also Curtis, ‘All Equal in the
Presence of Death?’
110 See Section 6.1.1. 111 See the recent Schenk (ed.), Historical Disaster Experiences.
112 Sartori, ‘Comparing and Miscomparing,’ 246.
113 As argued at length in van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’
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countries – in Northwest Italy and theUSMidwest.114 In conclusion the
author suggests that very divergent ‘human responses’ to the floods were
connected to essential differences between the afflicted societies in
terms of socio-political traditions and organization and levels of integra-
tion within communities. This may, of course, prove to be correct, but
the argumentation is overshadowed by the fact that we are never sure
what impact the differing magnitude and scale of the respective floods
had on societal responses. It thus becomes difficult to separate factors at
the local or national level, and it is unclear what differences exactly
played a crucial role in light of the numerous differences between
these two societies. What could have been more illuminating is to take
the research one stage further and compare responses of different local-
ities within either the US Midwest or Northwest Italy – limiting the
number of possible independent variables and thus being more able to
hold the hazard constant. In fact, this is where the pre-industrial period
actually has some advantages over these kinds of modern studies
because, on a regional and even local level, small-scale societies which
were very close to each other (separated by just tens of kilometers) could
have very divergent economic and agricultural organization, micro-
demographic regimes, and patterns of tenure and resource distribution,
among other factors.115 Very different societies close to each other and
exposed to the same exogenous pressure can be identified – a good
example being the regional comparison of different plantation econ-
omies dealing with the eruption of Mount Soufrière in 1812 on the
island of St. Vincent, and actually showing very divergent rates of
recovery.116 Furthermore, this is generally something far easier to find
in the historical context than for the twenty-first century – particularly in
the ‘developed’ world, where these differences have become less sharp
under the homogenizing forces of modern commerce, the rise of nation
states, improved transport, and better communication.
Smaller-scale comparisons over longer periods of time offer a way
forward for comparative approaches into historical disasters, and that in
itself may bring with it new opportunities for other kinds of comparisons –
often within the same individual localities or communities themselves.
This can be acrossmany dimensions which are often underexplored in the
historical context – the differential impact of a disaster occurring within
the same locality over time betweenmen andwomen, adults and children,
114 Marincioni, ‘A Cross-cultural Analysis.’
115 Curtis, Coping with Crisis; van Bavel,Manors and Markets.
116 Smith, ‘Volcanic Hazard in a Slave Society.’
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the healthy and the frail, the rich and the poor, and recent migrants and
(so-called) natives. Smaller-scale comparisons may also avert some of the
problems relating to disparities in source types and availability that come
with larger-scale comparisons. There is still a great scope for analytical,
smaller-scale comparative work on historical disasters.
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4 Disaster Preconditions and Pressures
This chapter looks at the preconditions and pre-existing pressures that
help determine the impact of hazards, and the potential disasters that can
ensue. Although many disaster studies look at the effects that unfold after
the occurrence of a disaster, preconditions and structures that were
present before a shock are as potentially important for explaining why
a hazard can turn into a disaster as the immediate and long-term
responses. Hazards take place within environmental and social contexts
that shape or even determine how a disaster unfolds, and how a society or
social groups can respond. These might be considered the core compo-
nents behind the resilience of societies and vulnerability of different social
groups to hazards.1 Some of these pressures and preconditions develop
slowly and incrementally or are just basic features of a particular region,
while others are short-term pressures that arose just before the occurrence
of a hazard such as warfare, rebellions, or migration. In this chapter, we
distinguish between a number of different pre-existing pressures: climatic
and environmental conditions, levels of technology, and the state of
economic development, but also pre-existing pressures connected to
social organization. This includes institutional configurations and soci-
etal coordination systems, levels of poverty and inequality, and cultural
aspects. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that while we consider these
as potential preconditions to a disaster, none of these pressures occur out
of nothing. Indeed, as the disaster cycle framework implies,2 they are
frequently in some way the result of an earlier hazard risk or disaster.
4.1 Environmental and Climatic Pressures
A prime factor, and an intrinsic aspect of risk, is geography.3 Every place
on earth has a particular geological, environmental, and climatic setting
which defines the underlying hazard exposure of that specific region and
thus contributes to levels of vulnerability. Earthquakes occur along fault
1 See Section 2.3.3. 2 See Section 2.3.2. 3 Hewitt, Regions of Risk, 12.
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lines in the earth’s surface, droughts are a frequent life experience in the
Sahel, the coastline between Bordeaux and Schleswig-Holstein is prone
to flooding, while malaria is limited to the habitat able to support suffi-
cient quantities of the Anopheles mosquito. This is called biophysical
vulnerability. Every region on earth struggles with at least one, but pos-
sibly multiple, biophysical vulnerabilities.
The 1930s Dust Bowl in the American Great Plains, for example, can
only be understood by taking the dual biophysical vulnerability of that
region into account: droughts and aeolian soils. Droughts have been
a long-standing hazard in the Great Plains, as the informal name Great
American Desert suggests. Simulations have shown that the Great Plains
witnessed periods of drought, such as the one in the 1930s, at least four
times between 1900 and 1950. While the severity of the 1930s drought
was perhaps exceptional, major droughts have occurred in the Great
Plains once or twice a century over the past 400 years.4 The cause of
these droughts can be attributed to changing sea surface temperatures,
with a strong correlation detected between varying Pacific sea surface
temperatures and periods of low precipitation in the Great Plains of
America.5
Droughts, however, do not cause major erosion and sand drifts unless
they are combined with fine-grained soils from wind-deposited sedi-
ments, such as those that characterize the Great Plains. These aeolian
soils have been deposited throughout the Holocene, and are prone to
sand drifts and erosion when not covered by sturdy vegetation. For a long
time, the region had been considered unsuitable for agriculture and was
covered by prairie vegetation. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, however, the search for productive and commercial land
changed the landscape into one dominated by cattle ranches and later
arable land. The soil was plowed and laid bare, heightening biophysical
vulnerability by exposing the inherently erosion-prone soils to the winds
that swept across the American plains.6 The Great Plains of America can
be seen, therefore, as an example of a ‘region of risk.’ The concept was
coined by Kenneth Hewitt and defines a geographical region that is
characterized by recurrent natural hazards of a certain type.7
Vulnerability resulting from environmental conditions figures promin-
ently in policy and risk evaluation reports. Indeed, as noted by Bankoff,
the idea that “disasters are simply unavoidable extreme physical events
that require purely technocratic solutions still remains the dominant
4 Schubert et al., ‘On the Cause of the 1930s Dust Bowl,’ 1858.
5 Schubert et al., ‘On the Cause of the 1930s Dust Bowl,’ 1855.
6 Lee & Gill, ‘Multiple Causes of Wind Erosion.’ 7 Hewitt, Regions of Risk.
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paradigm within the UN and multilateral funding agencies such as the
World Bank.”8 As a result, no efforts are spared to map these risks and
vulnerabilities. The British government, for example, has created and
shared an interactive map showing flood risks in all of England.9 Similar
projects and risk assessments exist for every type of biophysical and
chemical risk. In Northwest Europe, floods along the North Sea coast
have been a frequent life experience, and coastal communities face this
constant biophysical vulnerability. In the struggle against floods there
from the Middle Ages to the present, risk analyses have plotted possible
winter storms and flood hazards. Certain regions are considered much
more hazard-prone than others, however. Western countries have helped
establish a discourse that distinguishes between themselves as safer
regions and the rest of the world that is inherently considered more
risky or unsafe.10 The edge of the Pacific Ocean, for example, stretching
from Australia to East Asia and the American West Coast, is often called
the ‘Ring of Fire,’ because of the subduction of tectonic plates, leading to
high frequencies of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Similarly, tropic
zones are consistently marked as dangerous, with warnings concerning
infectious diseases and health risks. Societies living in hazard-prone zones
of this type are often considered highly vulnerable, regardless of the
prevention measures and mitigation strategies implemented to cope
with these hazards.
Biophysical vulnerability has often been considered as forming a static
backdrop to human affairs, with the geological and environmental char-
acteristics of particular regions seen as a given set of circumstances that
will continue to affect societies throughout time. However, increased
knowledge of changing climatic conditions past and present is changing
this idea fundamentally. In the fields of historical climatology and paleo-
climatology, progress has been made in mapping changing biophysical
conditions in the past. For example, the Sahel has not been affected by the
same drought conditions throughout the Holocene. Owing to climatic
shifts, the biophysical hazard of drought in this particular region of risk
has experienced multiple changes. The shift from the Medieval Warm
Optimum to the Little Ice Age increased humidity in this region, with
obvious implications for susceptibility to drought.11
Nevertheless, even ‘global’ climatic shifts like the Little Ice Age
mapped out onto particular regions in different ways – especially through
8 Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe,’ 25.
9 Long term-flood risk information, https://flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk/lon
g-term-flood-risk/map (last visited 18 April 2019).
10 Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe.’
11 Carré et al., ‘Modern Drought Conditions’, 1949.
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the changes in precipitation levels that sometimes accompanied cooler
temperatures. Sam White has convincingly shown that in the Middle
East, the Little Ice Age did not bring the same type of weather patterns
that Western Europe encountered. The North Atlantic Oscillation that
influences Northwest Europe as well as the Middle East had an opposite
impact in the two regions: while Northwest Europe was confronted with
wetter conditions, the Middle East experienced increased droughts and
more frequent extreme cold spells.12 Equally, societies in Southeast
Africa experienced generally drier conditions throughout much of the
Little Ice Age, while those in Southwestern Africa were confronted with
wetter conditions.13
Biophysical vulnerabilities therefore can and do change throughout
history. This realization has become even more important given current
climatic change, with extreme climatic events as well as longer-term
changes at least partly linked to human agency and responsibility. It is
important to map these temporal and geographical patterns to fully
understand regions of risk and their inherent biophysical vulnerabilities.
Notwithstanding the importance of shifting environmental baselines, one
of the underlying premises of this book is the social vulnerability
approach: risks do not simply arise from environmental circumstances
but are almost always shaped by social vulnerabilities and adaptability.
The next sections therefore explore societal preconditions of hazards and
disasters.
4.2 Technological, Infrastructural, and Economic
Preconditions
4.2.1 Technological and Infrastructural Preconditions and Pressures
Technological and infrastructural changes are often linked to mitigation
measures and long-term changes after the occurrence of a disaster, and
we address those changes and effects in Chapter 5. Equally important,
however, are the technology and infrastructure already present before
a hazard or shock, which help us to understand how a disaster unfolds.
Societies develop their technology and infrastructure under particular
economic, social, and political conditions. Agricultural technology in
sub-Saharan Africa can provide an illuminating example. One of the
factors contributing to the persistence of famine in Africa up to the
present day is low agricultural productivity. In the 1950s and 1960s,
agriculture in the Western world, but also in large parts of Latin
12 White, The Climate of Rebellion. 13 Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate, History, Society.’
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America and Asia, was transformed by technological innovations such as
high-yielding or drought-resistant varieties of cereals, chemical fertilizers,
pesticides, and improved techniques for irrigation, which allowed agri-
cultural production to keep up with population growth or even exceed it.
Large parts of Africa, however, lagged behind: an African ‘Green
Revolution’ did not materialize. Even today, many African smallholders
have only very limited access to the technological means to raise product-
ivity. Yields are very low: in fact, food production per capita has declined
by about 10 percent since the early 1960s.14 Obviously, behind this
chronic under-production lie other factors: widespread poverty, limited
access to education, and a lack of government support for subsistence
agriculture, for example. Furthermore, factors not related to agricultural
production also contribute to the persistence of famine, such as weak
internal markets, armed conflict, poorly functioning governments, and
perhaps also the liberalization of the global food trade. The fact remains,
however, that Africa’s vulnerability to famine is in part determined by the
state of technological development of its agriculture.
In many cases infrastructure and technology were shaped not just by
general economic, social, and political conditions, but also by responses
to previous hazards and shocks. Until the nineteenth century, most
inhabitants of European and North American cities were dependent on
water pumps and wells for their drinking water. The introduction of
piped-in water supply systems was partly a reaction to the health risks
posed by contaminated drinking water. The availability of running water,
however, led to a large-scale increase of water consumption. Among the
many innovations introduced were water closets in the houses of the well-
to-do. These water closets were not yet connected to a sewage system, but
used underground vaults and cesspools as the main manner of disposal.
Leaking vaults and overflowing pools could easily infiltrate the water
tables used for the remaining wells and pumps, actually increasing health
hazards instead of reducing them. Contaminated and polluted water,
therefore, became an increasing pressure in changing cities.
This combination of risks could eventually lead to disaster, as hap-
pened in London, when the bacteriumVibrio choleraewas found in a water
pump in Broad Street, causing an epidemic outbreak of cholera. By
carefully mapping the first casualties, physician John Snow identified
the infected pump and concluded that cholera was spread via contamin-
ated water in 1854. Accordingly, infrastructure and available technology
in the populous and crowded nineteenth-century cities had created the
14 Devereux, ‘Why Does Famine Persist in Africa?’; Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short History,
263–266.
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preconditions for the recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases that char-
acterized most of that century.15 These outbreaks of cholera alarmed
governments all around the Western world and triggered investment in
large-scale public works, such as the development of sewage and water
systems. AsTarr noticed, however,most of the technological solutions for
these pressures, such as new sewage and water systems, created new risks
and pressures of their own. Running-water sewages, for instance, created
water contamination in rivers and streams, negatively affecting settle-
ments downstream – places previously unaffected.16 Again the techno-
logical jump forward created new pressures for regions and cities
previously not affected. This build-up of risks shows how infrastructural
or technological changes are never implemented on a ‘clean slate’ and
that preconditions are hardly ever entirely independent from former
hazards and shocks.
An even clearer example of the interplay between mitigation measures
and preconditions is provided by coastal infrastructures along the North
Sea shoreline. In the early and highMiddle Ages,most communities in this
region developed tidal economies. Instead of tackling floods and regulating
tidal flows, these societies found ways to co-exist with a tidal landscape and
adapt to the marshy and wet conditions. Fishing, salt production, and
grazing, using the resources provided by the salt marshes, became the
dominant economic activities along the North Sea shores. All these activ-
ities benefited from the recurrent seasonal inundations and were unthreat-
ened by frequent storm floods. This co-existence with the marshy
landscape required some infrastructural adaptations, however. While
some communities benefited from natural elevations in the landscape to
build their villages, most had to adjust by creating elevations in the land-
scape – thesemounds known asWurten inGermany or terpen andwierden in
the Low Countries. These mounds could be up to 6 meters above sea level
and several hundred meters wide – sometimes encompassing the whole
settlement. In this way, houses and warehouses were protected from the
recurrent inundations, while the meadows, salt marshes, and creeks
remained influenced by the tides.17
Inundated landscapes were not ‘unaltered’ pieces of wilderness either.
To make sure the optimal amount of water entered the meadows and salt
pans and the water was able to drain at the ideal time, sophisticated water
management systems were developed. These systems should not be
confused with embankments and drainage works: they managed the
15 Baldwin,Contagion and the State; Briggs, ‘Cholera and Society’; Cohn, ‘Cholera Revolts.’
16 Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink, 182–184.
17 Soens, Tys & Thoen, ‘Landscape Transformation’; Van Dam, ‘Denken over
natuurrampen.’
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flow and prevented an excess of water in bad weather. In the English
Fenlands, for example, lodes (derived from the old English gelād, or to
lead) and catchwater drains were installed from at least the early tenth
century, but probably already by the seventh century. This elaborate
system of pipes, canals, and ditches required extensive technical know-
ledge and the investment of ample time, labor, and capital. This gravity-
controlled system regulated inundations and optimized hay production
in the meadows.18 In most regions around the North Sea, water
Figure 4.1 George Pinwell, ‘Death’s Dispensary,’ appeared in Fun
Magazine (London, 1866). Pinwell’s cartoon shows poor people
surrounding a water pump that is being controlled by a skeleton or
a figure of death, referring to John Snow’s recent discovery about the
cause of cholera.
18 Oosthuizen, ‘Water Management’; Oosthuizen & Willmoth, Drowned and Drained.
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management systems which fostered co-existence with floods were grad-
ually replaced by other types of infrastructure which aimed to exclude
flooding altogether and to introduce dryland agriculture in wetland envir-
onments. Only in some regions, such as the English Fenlands, could the
amphibious system persist well into the seventeenth century, although
increasingly marginalized by state-sponsored ‘improvement’ projects.19
As these two technological systems served clearly different purposes –
accommodating floods versus excluding them – they also produced pro-
foundly different landscapes of risk and disaster.
4.2.2 Economic Pressures and Crises
The view that the pre-existing level of economic development determines
the impact of hazards is perhaps most evident in the discourse about
disaster vulnerability comparing the ‘developing’ world with the ‘devel-
oped’ world. From the nineteenth century onwards, but especially after
1945, disasters increasingly came to be seen as characteristic of a global
South characterized by poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness. The West,
by contrast, was believed to be largely protected from disasters by its high
levels of economic and technological development.20 In some regions this
belief was supported by the relative infrequency of severe natural disasters
for a longer period of time: Switzerland, for instance, experienced such
a ‘disaster gap’ in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
three quarters of the twentieth century.21
There is a certain logic to the idea that economic preconditions, and
more particularly poverty and ‘underdevelopment,’ affect hazard preven-
tion, mitigation, and recovery. In affluent countries, higher living stand-
ards usually imply better-quality housing, a wider range of options for
evacuation and shelter, and insurance to cover the costs of rebuilding
after the disaster. Widespread poverty makes all of this much more diffi-
cult. In the 1970s, critical geographers like Phil O’Keefe and BenWisner
framed disasters in the Third World, such as the 1976 Guatemalan
Earthquake as ‘classquakes’ produced by underdevelopment and
marginalization.22 Poverty has also been singled out as the prime driver
causing producers to abandon traditional restraints in the exploitation of
fragile ecosystems. On the other hand, other scholars warn against the
simple association of poverty with overexploitation of resources and
exposure to natural hazards, since poor people may develop their own
19 Robson, Improvement and Environmental Conflict.
20 Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe.’ 21 Pfister, ‘Die “Katastrophenlücke.”’
22 O’Keefe, Westgate & Wisner, ‘Taking the Naturalness.’
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coping strategies to minimize risks or mitigate the impact of natural
hazards.23 As well as living standards, public resources also matter:
economically advanced countries are better positioned to generate,
through taxation, considerable sums to invest in infrastructural works,
warning systems, or other high-tech solutions aimed at preventing haz-
ards or mitigating their impact. They may, however, not always be willing
to do so. A variety of motives – ideological, political, social, economic –
can prevent them from prioritizing hazard protection over other goals.
Alternatively, they may be roused into raising expenditure only when it is
too late, as the state of the levees in New Orleans before Hurricane
Katrina suggests.
Economic development is not the only way in which economic precon-
ditions may affect the impact of shocks, as the characteristics and struc-
ture of the economy – at local, regional, or national level – should also be
taken into account. We focus here on three interrelated aspects: intensifi-
cation, diversification, and commercialization. Even before the Industrial
Revolution, intensification can often be linked to an increased exposure to
natural hazards. In the eighteenth century, Europe was repeatedly
afflicted by cattle plague, for instance, and its diffusion was directly
connected to the intensification of the long-distance cattle trade in the
preceding centuries. Every year, thousands of animals made the journey
from their breeding places in Northern and Eastern Europe to the urban
consumption centers in Western Europe. The dense concentration of
animals provided the conditions for epidemic diseases, the outbreak of
which was fostered by the vulnerability of the animals, which were often
on the brink of starvation after the long journey West.24
Diversification can be seen as a risk-reducing strategy of medieval
peasants. By growing multiple crops, cultivating many small plots scat-
tered over a large area, and combining farming with non-agrarian activ-
ities such as gathering nuts and berries or cottage industries, the risks of
adverse weather and subsequent harvest failure were reduced.25 Research
on famines in later periods suggests that regions with diversified econ-
omies fared better. During the major famine of the early 1590s in
Northern Italy, the drop in the number of births in mountainous regions
was not nearly as severe as in the lowlands, as mountain populations were
able to supplement a grain-based diet with locally sourced dairy products,
fruit and vegetables, and chestnuts collected in the woods,26 while the
23 Martinez-Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor.
24 Appuhn, ‘Ecologies of Beef’; Brantz, ‘Risky Business.’
25 McCloskey, ‘The Prudent Peasant’ ; Pretty, ‘Sustainable Agriculture.’ See also
Section 2.3.6.
26 Alfani, ‘The Famine of the 1590s.’
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extreme dependency of the Irish population on potatoes was one of the
factors – although not the only one – contributing to the dramatic impact
of the potato blight in Ireland in the 1840s.27
The relationship between commercialization and vulnerability to haz-
ards is more complex. On the one hand, in commercialized economies,
substantial investments in hazard protection can be facilitated by the
existence of markets for capital, labor, and commodities, if this serves
the interests of the investors. This was the situation in Holland in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when entrepreneurs investing in
land reclamations were prepared to fund dikes and drainage systems in
the expectation of substantial long-term returns.28 Entrepreneurs, rural
and urban alike, were not always keen on making large-scale investments
in protection andmitigationmeasures, however. It depended on the time-
scale and the economic interests of the entrepreneurs. In Holland farmers
were owners of the land and aimed for long-term profits, and as a result,
commercialization was not accompanied by environmental pressures.
An unchecked quest for short-term profits, however, is more likely to
lead to overexploitation of natural resources or to the neglect of protective
elements. Indeed, commercialization can at times also be linked to accu-
mulation practices and the constantly increasing production and con-
sumption of renewable and non-renewable resources. A growing group of
scholars has portrayed these economic strategies as clashing with envir-
onmental boundaries in a limited world. According to Moore, the spread
of capitalism and commercialization created the preconditions for envir-
onmental disasters to occur throughout the world. Indeed, scholars from
awide range of disciplines are calling for amoral economy, degrowth, and
a return towards commons and subsistence in order to prevent detrimen-
tal pressures.29 Some historical sand drifts have been considered
examples of the detrimental effects of commercialization, and the
American Dust Bowl of the 1930s is often taken as a case in point.30
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether it was caused by a lack of
environmental knowledge of the region or by the commercialization of
grain production.
A related issue concerns the integration of the economy in international
or interregional market networks. Open economies, at least in theory,
have easier access to commodities and services in other regions, which
may help them to cope with hazards and facilitate recovery, as has been
27 Ó Gráda, ‘Ireland’s Great Famine.’
28 Van Cruyningen, ‘From Disaster to Sustainability.’
29 Schneider, Kallis & Martinez-Alier, ‘Crisis or Opportunity’; Raworth, Doughnut
Economics; Moore, ‘Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift.’
30 Worster, Dust Bowl, 80–97. See also Section 1.2.
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a long-standing argument for the relatively early escape from famine in
England and the Northern Netherlands.31 But integration in a network of
markets may also result in the removal of scarce resources to other places.
Markets, after all, respond not to needs but to purchasing power. The
Irish Famine of the middle of the nineteenth century is a case in point
again. Food was imported to Ireland, in the form of sizable quantities of
maize that arrived directly from America in the spring of 1847. Although
this was not enough, it helped to save lives. But in the winter before the
maize arrived, grain exports from Ireland to England had taken place in
much the same way as they had done before the crisis, “presumably
because the poor in Ireland lacked the purchasing power to buy the
wheat and oats that were shipped out.”32
While this book does not focus on wars as hazards or disasters in
themselves, we should also note that conflict could affect and exacerbate
the impact of other environmental hazards. Only in very recent times have
we seen how distrust of health workers, clinicians, governments officials,
and drivers during Ebola outbreaks in Western Africa – sometimes lead-
ing to violence – was connected to pre-existing levels of suspicion and
distrust linked to ongoing civil war conditions.33 The difficulties of deal-
ing with hazards during wartime are also seen going back into the pre-
industrial past: in medieval Flanders, for example, the Flemish–French
war of 1314–15 formed one of the main preconditions for the harvest
failures of 1315–17 – caused by excessive rainfall – to turn into a full-
blown famine.34 In order to finance the war and feed the troops, the
Count of Flanders implemented a confiscation policy, redirecting the
goods and grain of rebels and political adversaries to the national treasury
and army.Most of these confiscations of grain were derived from the front
zones in Flanders: the towns of Ypres and Cassel. Other regions escaped
relatively lightly and could contribute in cash rather than grain, which was
an advantage, given the harvest failures. To make things worse, the
provisioning of the army interfered with local grain markets. In areas
where troops were stationed, extra grain was purchased, which meant
ever lower grain stocks available for the local population. The usual
famine mitigation measures of grain imports were prevented as well,
since the County of Flanders derived most of its imported grain from
the North of France, a trade route now blocked because of impending
31 But see Curtis & Dijkman, ‘The Escape from Famine.’
32 Ó Gráda, ‘Ireland’s Great Famine,’ 53.
33 Blair, Morse & Tsai, ‘Public Health and Public Trust’; Wilkinson & Fairhead,
‘Comparison of Social Resistance.’
34 Geens, ‘The Great Famine.’
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hostilities. Because of these burdens of war, Ypres and Cassel were the
worst-hit regions within theCounty of Flanders during theGreat Famine.
4.3 Coordination Systems and Institutional Preconditions
Institutions are highly relevant to the issue of vulnerability and resilience.
Broadly defined as formal and informal rules and the associated organ-
izations and networks, institutions can be specifically designed and imple-
mented to cope with hazards: relief organizations, emergency legislation,
forms of insurance, or rescue systems, to name but a few.35 The function-
ing of these specific hazard-oriented institutions is central to the study of
historical disasters. However, it has become increasingly clear that the
ability of communities and societies to cope with hazards depends not
only on these specific institutions, but also on the overall ‘ordinary’
institutional infrastructure. Among them are the institutions which
organize the exchange, allocation, and use of resources more generally;
for instance, the arrangement of property rights or the institutions struc-
turing market exchange. Sometimes indirectly, but often also directly,
they affect the capacity of societies in preventing hazards turning into
disasters, or their capacity to recover quickly.36 Institutions usually do not
function in isolation. They are embedded within one of the larger coord-
ination systems that regulate the allocation of resources in any society: the
family, the state, the market, and various forms of collective action. The
preconditions shaped by these coordination systems are the main focus of
this section.
The extent to which institutions affect the capacity of societies to cope
with shocks is debated in the literature, although not always in
a systematic way. Viewpoints in the debate are often loosely related to
the varying views on the formation of institutions more generally.
Sometimes institutions are perceived as the result of rational choices
made by utility-maximizing individuals. In this view, competition ensures
an optimal outcome: the best and most efficient institutions survive.37
This position, however, is hardly tenable in the light of the persistence of
a multitude of institutions that increase vulnerability instead of reducing
it. Indeed, institutions often have oppositional effects. While an institu-
tion might, for instance, help to push up profitability or clarify and secure
property rights, it might also at the same time have detrimental effects on
sustainability – thereby increasing vulnerability. Furthermore, it is
35 See for these institutions and organizations the extensive discussion in the next chapter
on prevention and responses.
36 Bankoff, Cultures of Disaster, 11–13. 37 North, Institutions, 17–20.
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precisely the profitability for some that may obstruct attempts of others to
adapt the institutions in question in order to reduce vulnerabilities or
enhance resilience. This problem, connected to themultifaceted effects of
institutions, thus points to a more fundamental issue: institutions are
often the result of social bargaining or even conflict. They are intimately
linked up with the leverage and positions various social actors have and
may therefore be formed and dictated by the interests and preferences of
certain individuals and social groups.38
The embeddedness of institutions in social, political, and economic
structures also explains why many institutions cannot easily be changed:
once they are in place, they tend to be reinforced by the groups that profit
from them. In cases like this change takes place only under great pressure.
Sometimes, disasters themselves can create such pressures. A study of
recent floods in the Netherlands and in Poland shows that hazards and
disasters can create a perfect window of opportunity for institutional
change. As ‘focusing events’ they draw attention to risks andmay emphasize
the urgency of action – in turn leading to institutional change.39 Mostly,
however, institutions are the result of a path-dependent process and not
easily changed; that is, they have an entire logic of their own.The capacity of
societies to cope with hazards through their institutions, therefore, cannot
be taken as a given, as they will not automatically be geared towards coping
but will instead be geared towards the interests of certain interest groups, or
can persist even if they weaken a society’s coping capacity. Institutions
devised to tackle one challenge may also have side-effects (positive or
negative) in other domains, which are often largely unforeseen. Some of
these themes are now explored in the sections that follow.
4.3.1 Coordination Systems: The Family, the Market, and the State
All societies require some form of coordination to organize the exchange
and allocation of resources. Four main systems can be identified: the
family or household, collectives such as local communities and associ-
ations, the market, and the state. These systems do not primarily develop
with the explicit intention of coping with hazards, shocks, and disasters,
but through their sets of political, social, and economic institutions they
do affect a society’s capacity to mitigate the impact, recover, or prevent
recurrences. With the possible exception of small groups of hunter–gath-
erers, all societies rely on more than one coordination system at the same
time. The exact combination, however, varies widely, both between
38 Nee & Ingram, ‘Embeddedness and Beyond’; Ogilvie, ‘“Whatever Is, Is Right”?’
39 Kaufmann et al., ‘Shock Events and Flood Risk Management,’ 51.
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societies and over time. All these coordination systems have changed
fundamentally through time and with varying trends and evolutions
over the globe. Processes such as state formation and state failure, the
development and demise of formalized collectives, and the shift between
the core household and extended family systems have significant reper-
cussions for vulnerability and resilience towards hazards.
When struck by a calamity, many people turn to family members first
for basic necessities such as shelter, food, and emotional support.
Families can also be instrumental for recovery afterwards. Families are
great providers of ‘bonding’ social capital: horizontal ties within homoge-
neous groups that generate solidarity and reciprocity.40 Although the
European marriage pattern, characterized by a predominance of the
neolocal nuclear household, consensual late marriage, and monogamy,
has been viewed positively for lowering child mortality rates, raising
education, and stimulating economic development,41 its specific impact
on vulnerability towards hazards and shocks is unclear in the absence of
convincing micro-level research.
On the one hand, as demonstrated by research in the aftermath of
hurricane Katrina, household size affects evacuation behavior. In New
Orleans, high costs and practical problems related to the needs of elderly
family members complicated evacuation decisions, and consequently
large extended households were more likely to stay behind than small
nuclear ones.42 Extended families, on the other hand, offer other advan-
tages. In the summer of 1994, torrential rains during a typhoon caused
a terrible flood in the Beijiang basin in the southern province of
Guangdong, China. Although there were no casualties, the flood caused
great damage. Summer crops were almost entirely destroyed, and in the
city of Qingyuan and the surrounding villagesmore than 80 percent of the
houses collapsed.43 Even though aid, in the form of bricks and funds, was
provided by donations fromHongKong, the state was not able tomitigate
all effects and propagated self-reliance. Kinship, social networks, and
communal ties therefore became crucial. During the rebuilding period
the Chinese victims of this great flood relied on these ties not just for food
and shelter, but also for loans in order to buy the seed and equipment they
needed to resume farming – with extended families acting as a buffer.44
40 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 22–24.
41 De Moor & Van Zanden, ‘Girl Power’; Foreman-Peck, ‘The Western-European
Marriage Pattern’; for a dissenting view: Dennison & Ogilvie, ‘Does the European
Marriage Pattern Explain Economic Growth?’
42 Tierney, ‘Social Inequality,’ 116–117.
43 Wong & Zhao, ‘Living with Floods,’ 190, 193.
44 Wong & Zhao, ‘Living with Floods,’ 198.
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Marriage patterns could have very different effects on vulnerability
levels depending on the strength of marital ties, as is shown by Megan
Vaughan’s study of a famine in lowland Nyasaland in 1949. Vaughan
stresses that entitlements to food of households are only part of the story:
it is also important to look at allocation and distribution of food within the
household too. In lowland Nyasaland it was customary for women to
marry men from the highlands in the North and West, who would then
move to the lowland to live with their wife and her family. In 1949 this
custom brought advantages: many husbands made the arduous journey
to their relatives in the highland region and were able to bring back food
supplies to their wives and children. Others, however, stayed with their
relatives until the famine was over, and some even found themselves
a new wife in their region of origin, leaving their first spouse destitute.45
This marriage pattern could thus have very different effects on vulner-
ability levels, being highly dependent on the strength of the marital ties
and the willingness of marital partners to extend relief.
In almost all societies, past and present, yet another coordination
system is at work: the market. Commodity markets are usually the first
to arise; well-developed markets for land, labor, and capital are, from an
historical perspective, not as common.46 Through their role in allocating
resources, the existence and the organization ofmarkets affects the coping
capacity of societies during crises. Notably, Amartya Sen’s influential
analysis of the Bengal famine of 1943 is largely based on the combined
effects of labor and commodity markets. Sen argued that the famine was
not a question of insufficient food, but rather of specific groups experien-
cing insufficient access to food. The reasons for this ‘entitlement decline,’
he claimed, originated partly from ‘market imperfections’ related to
wartime inflation, hoarding, and speculation, but also from the fact that
the wages of certain occupational groups stagnated, or even fell, while the
prices of basic foodstuffs rose.47
Exactly howmarkets affect resilience and vulnerability depends, again,
on political, social, and economic circumstances. In fifteenth- and six-
teenth-century coastal Flanders, growing commercialization in combin-
ation with changing property relations gave rise to reduced flood
protection. With the increase of urban landownership and the reduction
of peasant smallholding, investments in water management fell. Peasants
prioritized safety and continuity of their holdings, but absentee urban
landlords adapted their strategies to expectations of profitability: they
were not eager to step up investments in the maintenance and
45 Vaughan, ‘Famine Analysis,’ 186–189. 46 Van Bavel, The Invisible Hand?
47 Sen, Poverty and Famines, 63–70.
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improvement of dikes, drains, and sluices, as risks were high and returns,
in the shape of lease prices, modest.48 In contrast, in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Holland and Zeeland, urban entrepreneurs were
quite willing to invest in equally risky large-scale reclamation and re-
embankment projects, and thus contributed to the improvement of
flood protection. Investments were stimulated by expectations of sub-
stantial profits, but also by the fact that the political power of urban
entrepreneurs allowed them to negotiate tax exemptions and thus reduce
costs.49
The last coordination system to be discussed here is often referred to as
the ‘state’: a convenient shorthand, but not a very accurate one since
various local and regional authorities also reside under this heading. How
governmental bodies prepare for and respond to hazards is important;
their role in this respect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Just
like family systems or markets, governmental systems may affect the
capacity of societies to deal with shocks. In modern societies, individuals
have high expectations of government when it comes to disaster manage-
ment. However, efforts by governments to prepare for shocks or mitigate
their impact are not new. Some governments went to considerable
trouble to set up warning systems. The thirteenth-century caliphs of
Baghdad, for example, maintained a system to warn the city of an
impending flood by having the water level of the Tigris measured at
a location hundreds of kilometers upstream.50 Another kind of prepar-
ation concerns emergency relief, the organization of which tends to reflect
prevailing political and social relations. In Europe, with its tradition of
urban self-rule, famine relief was first and foremost a responsibility of
town governments. Between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries,
urban authorities in many parts of the continent, driven at least in part by
fear of civil disturbance, established public grain stocks to relieve distress
in cities.51 Here, however, the focus is on the conditions created by pre-
existing governmental systems not specifically aimed at hazard and disas-
ter management.
The belief that regime type impacts coping capacity is at the heart of
Amartya Sen’s claim that democracy provides a safeguard against famines.
According to Sen, a free press and political accountability will force author-
ities to take decisive and timely action to prevent the worst.52 Other
researchers have focused not so much on democracy per se as on specific
48 Soens, ‘Floods and Money.’ 49 Van Cruyningen, ‘From Disaster to Sustainability.’
50 Weintritt, ‘The Floods of Baghdad,’ 168.
51 For example in Italy: Alfani, Calamities and the Economy, 70–78; in the North Sea region:
Dijkman, ‘Coping with Scarcity.’
52 Sen, Development as Freedom, 178–184.
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institutions and practices of good governance found more frequently – but
not exclusively – in democratic societies, such as high government capacity,
controls on corruption,53 effective decentralized government,54 checks to
prevent domination of government by a single interest group, a clear
division of responsibilities between governmental bodies,55 and
a combination of political, legal, economic, and social mechanisms and
pressures to ensure that mobilization against famine actually takes place.56
How vulnerability and resilience can be affected by a failure to fulfill
these conditions is demonstrated by the famines that occurred in Ethiopia
and Sudan in the 1980s. These famines may have been triggered by
drought, but they were exacerbated by the lack of political voice among
the poorest and by the suppression of the press. Initiatives to address the
emerging crises were not sufficiently supported by the government or
were used for political goals.57 In Ethiopia, the dictatorial socialist
Dergue regime played a particularly damaging role by imposing heavy
grain exactions on the countryside in order to feed the army and the urban
population, and especially by the campaign to counter insurgency in the
Tigray region. This campaign included the destruction of crops and rural
markets, the imposition of restrictions on trade, forced resettlement of
people, and the denial of relief to the region.58
Institutional preconditions can also be influenced by other characteris-
tics of the state than regime type, such as the ideological underpinnings of
state power. In early-modern Europe, and increasingly so during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, changing attitudes to the control
of nature and the role of knowledge and expertise gave rise to a much
more proactive role of the state. A political culture of stewardship induced
states to focus on protecting their subjects from the vagaries of nature, as
for example in the construction of dikes and retaining walls on the Canal
du Midi in seventeenth-century France. Using techniques derived from
military engineering, dikes and retaining walls shielded the land from
flooding, thus emphasizing the ability of the king to tame the ‘wild
weather’ and control the land. This, in turn, reinforced the legitimacy
and authority of state power: disaster management and state building
went hand in hand.59 The eighteenth century shows us the first examples
of state intervention based on the compilation of ‘scientific data,’ as in
eradication policy in several European states to deal with rinderpest, or
the reconstruction of Lisbon after the earthquake of 1755.60 Underneath
53 Burchi, ‘Democracy, Institutions and Famines.’
54 Banik, ‘Is Democracy the Answer?’ 55 Rubin, ‘The Merits of Democracy.’
56 De Waal, Famine Crimes, 11. 57 Von Braun, A Policy Agenda, 8.
58 De Waal, Famine Crimes, 110, 116–120. 59 Mukerji, ‘Stewardship Politics,’ 129.
60 Van Roosbroeck & Sundberg, ‘Culling the Herds?’; Araújo, ‘The Lisbon Earthquake.’
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this discourse of the ‘common good,’ severe differences of opinion could
be present, as in the case of the drainage of the Fens in England, where the
state’s desire for control over nature clashed with the local population’s
survival mechanisms.61 Whether heightened state intervention is seen as
a success story or as more efficient is therefore clearly in the eye of the
beholder.
In the modern era centralization of political power, expanding state
resources, and the rise of the welfare state have contributed to a vigorous
increase of state intervention in disaster management. In the late nine-
teenth century and early twentieth century, when new ‘professional’
disaster relief organizations, such as the Red Cross, started to operate
alongside private philanthropic networks, the state was still largely absent.
The ColdWar era marked the rise of national civil defense in theWestern
world, as the threat of air raids and particularly of nuclear attack grew.
The legal framework this created played its part in the emergence of
national disastermanagement and relief schemes.62 International disaster
relief schemes emerged from the 1970s onwards, as the UN was increas-
ingly criticized for its lack of organized response when disasters struck in
developing countries. The United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
(UNDRO) was established in 1971/72, and disaster relief and manage-
ment became a prerequisite at the national level for member states as
well.63 For the same reasons, however, the chances of governments
becoming part of the problem instead of its solution have also increased.
International disaster relief has also received fierce criticism, as relief
organizations often end up empowering authoritarian regimes and dis-
empowering victims, linking up with Sen’s focus on the importance of
democracy and political contract.
4.3.2 Institutions for Collective Action and the Commons
The family, the market, and the state are the three most familiar coordin-
ation systems, but inmany societies their role was complemented by other
forms of cooperation and collective action – sometimes assuming
a prominent role in relation to hazards and shocks. Family resources to
deal with hazards, for example, were often restricted by their size, scope,
and capacity to last, and thus relief strategies were often supplemented by
coping mechanisms that relied on collective action: various forms of
cooperation between individuals and households. Here, another type of
social capital comes into focus: bridging social capital links people from
61 Ash, The Draining of the Fens. 62 Quarantelli, ‘Disaster Planning.’
63 Kent, ‘Reflecting.’
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different social backgrounds, giving them access to assets from a wider
segment of society.64
Cooperation and coordination are not always institutionalized: infor-
mal networks, for instance between kin or neighbors, may also perform
these functions. For some scholars, however, formalized collective action
in particular is a vital component of risk reduction vis-à-vis hazards. This
is argued for pre-industrial Northwestern Europe, where the nuclear
household was the basic family unit from the Middle Ages onwards. In
what has been labeled the ‘Silent Revolution,’ from the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries onwards, collective action became formally institu-
tionalized in organizations such as commons, guilds, fraternities, water
boards, and beguinages, in order to reduce risks, share costs, and offer
broader welfare and protection opportunities.65 These institutions
offered solidarity, where vulnerable community members received aid
to secure their livelihood. Guilds, for instance, could protect small entre-
preneurs from fluctuating markets and volatile prices.66 Beguinages pro-
vided a secure life for single women, surrounded and supported both by
blood-kin and by non-relatives.67 Religious or civic poor relief organiza-
tions funded by charity offered support to those unable to provide for
themselves: the poor, the sick or handicapped, the elderly – even if in
comparison with modern welfare states the levels of assistance provided
by these institutions were modest.68
Most institutions for collective action were not primarily established for
the purpose of managing hazards or the ensuing disasters. Instead, they
addressed structural issues, which indirectly impacted levels of vulner-
ability and resilience. During famines, for instance, poor relief organiza-
tions faced a growing demand for assistance: people who survived on
the edges of subsistence in normal times were threatened when food
prices peaked. In the sixteenth-century Southern Low Countries, food
distribution by the ‘poor tables,’ organizations run by members of the
local community, increased significantly during major food crises.
Nevertheless, context mattered: distributions were more forthcoming in
regions with a more equitable distribution of power and wealth, as
a broader base of people donated to the system in normal years as
a form of ‘collective insurance.’69 However, financial reserves of poor
64 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 22.
65 De Moor, ‘The Silent Revolution’; de Moor, The Dilemma of the Commoners.
66 For this kind of view on guilds see de Munck,Guilds; de Munck, ‘Fiscalizing Solidarity’;
Prak et al., Craft Guilds. Although at the same time potentially benefiting members to the
detriment of non-members: Ogilvie, The European Guilds.
67 Overlaet, ‘Replacing the Family?’; de Moor, ‘Single, Safe, and Sorry?’
68 Van Bavel & Rijpma, ‘How Important Were Formalized Charity and State Spending?’
69 Van Onacker & Masure, ‘Unity in Diversity.’ See also Section 4.3.1.
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relief organizations were often limited, as was their ability to raise add-
itional funds, especially during times of general hardship. Many of them
were therefore unable to sustain significantly raised levels of expenditure
over a long period.70
Notably, in several countries –most notably (rural) France and Spain –
institutionalized relief during famines was almost entirely absent. In the
French countryside, food security was often guaranteed by the communal
practice of gleaning.71 Outside of Europe, famine aid also often took
shape in different ways: in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century India, for
example, the common form was individual giving by well-to-do land-
owners or merchants in the form of food, alms, or work. This kind of
charity was frowned upon by the British, who objected to its indiscrimin-
ate character: they feared it would pauperize people and make them
dependent on aid permanently. This thinking was very much in tune
with the developments in Great Britain itself, where the 1834 Poor
Law, prohibiting outdoor relief in favor of the Victorian workhouses,
was even more focused on labor control than earlier legislation.72 Yet,
with the rise of civil society in the late nineteenth century, indigenous
Indian famine relief was partly transformed as voluntary local committees
emerged to raise funds, start kitchens, or organize work projects.73
Overall, however, the impact of formalized relief must not be overstated –
even in Western Europe. While some forms of collective action were
successful in lowering vulnerability levels, others had only a minor impact
on the members of the collective.
Among the institutions for collective action, commons deserve special
attention: they have been seen as an effective institutional framework for
reducing vulnerability by limiting environmental degradation and offer-
ing buffers against, for instance, soil erosion and sand drifts.74 In some
contexts, arable agriculture was organized collectively. Open fields,
a basic system of scattering of arable plots across a number of fields,
offered a number of risk-limitation possibilities: preventing certain land-
holders from monopolizing the most fertile soils, spreading the risk of
drainage problems and overall crop failure, and equitably distributing the
distances needed to walk from settlement to fields. This kind of tactic is
still seen around the globe today in peasant societies. Another form of
70 Dijkman, ‘Feeding the Hungry.’ Similarly, crises such as epidemics also limited the
dedicated guild funds to assist members during hardship: Van Leeuwen, Mutual
Insurance, 17–82.
71 Vardi, ‘Construing the Harvest.’ 72 King, ‘Welfare Regimes,’ 56.
73 Brewis, ‘Fill Full the Mouth of Famine,’ 890, 897, 901.
74 De Moor, ‘Avoiding Tragedies’; de Moor, ‘Participating’; Beltrán Tapia, ‘Social and
Environmental Filters’; van Zanden, ‘The Paradox of the Marks.’
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commons was the shared, but rationed and regulated, access to rights and
obligations over non-arable resources such as pastures, forests, wastes,
and marshes. Such rights have been seen as an important form of welfare
or protection for pre-modern rural inhabitants, especially if they had little
access to arable land, and could benefit from the right to graze animals, to
pick herbs, fruit and fungi, to hunt and fish, and to extract fuel and
building materials such as dung, timber, and peat.75
The idea that the commons could bring about reductions in societal
vulnerabilities has not always been accepted. The most influential and
widely cited critic was ecologist Garrett Hardin, whose story of the
‘tragedy of the commons’ argued for a number of dangers – in particular
the problem of avaricious individuals acting in self-interest who would
eventually deplete finite common resources or goods.76 This would even-
tually lead to a ‘tragedy of the commons,’ in the form of soil degradation,
a shift of the ecological stability domain, or a subsistence crisis because of
a lack of natural resources. However, in more recent times, the commons
as an effective tool for managing resources has been re-established by
scholars pointing to the fact that the use of common resources was
normally regulated and sanctioned.77 In many cases formal restrictions
applied, dictating how much of a resource could be used, and, more
importantly, by whom. In that sense, commons were no ‘free-for-all’
doomed to ruin by greedy individuals, but instead were complex, multi-
layered, adaptable, and often exclusionary.78 The fact that evidence exists
for societies throughout history passionately defending their collective
rights to different resources points to a system that continued to offer
many people a large number of real benefits in terms of reducing
vulnerabilities.79
The disintegration of the commons – in various parts of Europe basic-
ally complete by the nineteenth century – is now often interpreted as
a negative development, especially for the poor, who were more reliant on
these resources. There is a parallel in the contemporary world, where the
poor are disproportionately dependent on the commons in developing
and underdeveloped countries.80 Also, many scholars point to a rise in
vulnerability levels more generally after the decline of forms of collective
action, as has happened in current-day Africanwetlands, where the loss of
traditional rights to fishing as a common property resource has eroded the
75 See also Curtis, Coping with Crisis, 40–42. 76 Hardin, ‘Tragedy of the Commons.’
77 Ostrom,Governing the Commons; Casari, ‘Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions,’
220; de Moor, ‘Avoiding Tragedies’; Laborda Pemán & de Moor, ‘A Tale of Two
Commons,’ 13.
78 Congost, ‘Property Rights,’ 90. 79 Curtis, ‘Did the Commons Make,’ 650.
80 Beck & Nesmith, ‘Building on Poor People’s Capacities,’ 119; Jodha, Life on the Edge.
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livelihoods of local communities.81 The privatization of commons has
even been labeled as (common) land grabbing and resource grabbing.
Where communities in Morocco and Ghana were hitherto able to cope
with periods of crisis thanks to access to communal land and collective
grazing, the privatization of those communal resources and the abolition
of collective action significantly impacted on their level of vulnerability to
hazards and crises.82
The increasing realization now is that the potential for collective action
in general and the commons in particular, both past and present, to
reduce vulnerabilities stands somewhere between the completely negative
views of Hardin or the ‘Enlightenment reformers’ and the wholly positive
interpretations now being spun by those working directly within the
‘commons’ or ‘collective action’ sub-fields. For the pre-industrial period
at least, it would be wrong to think that the commons were equitably
divided and the poor always had sufficient access to welfare and protec-
tion components.83 In fact, historically speaking, this was more the
exception than the rule. Indeed, mirroring broader inequalities across
societies in general, especially as we move into the early-modern period,
we find commons as part of restrictive access regimes, with highly strati-
fied access and fear of encroachment by outsiders.84
Indeed, within the commons, access to collective rights could be
attached to privileged farms or families, acceptance or integration into
the community, length of residence or lineage, or payment of license fees,
or related to ownership of private land and livestock.85 That is to say,
accumulation of land could also mean a decreasing number of residents
with actual access to the commons or a say in how they functioned.
Increasing levels of inequality could thus be detrimental to the good
performance of commons, manifesting themselves in ecological problems
such as the seventeenth-century sand drift that destroyed the village of
Santon Downham and clogged the nearby river in the English
Brecklands.86 Parallels can be seen with highly stratified and exclusionary
access to other collective institutions. Decision-making in medieval water
boards, for instance, was traditionally restricted to landowners, and in the
Flemish coastal area, for example, this category originally included a large
segment of the region’s population. However, from the thirteenth century
onwards, when smallholding made way for tenant farming, the water
boards of the Flemish coastal area were increasingly dominated by
81 Haller, ‘Understanding Institutions.’
82 Ryser, ‘Moroccan Regeneration’; Gerber, ‘New Commons and Resilience.’
83 Curtis, ‘Did the Commons Make.’ 84 De Keyzer, ‘The Impact,’ 521.
85 On all these different methods: Curtis, ‘Did the Commons Make.’
86 De Keyzer & Bateman, ‘Late Holocene Landscape Instability.’
4.3 Coordination Systems 95
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
absentee landlords, while local peasants were hardly represented at all.
The result was a decline in investments in water management, ultimately
giving rise to increased vulnerability to flooding.87 In general, therefore,
the historical evidence suggests that there is a link between collective
action and a reduction in vulnerability – although still more important
for the outcome was the particular socio-political context in which the
collective institution operated.
4.4 Social Pressures: Poverty, Inequality, and Social Distress
Poverty and inequality in the distribution of wealth, resources, and
incomes are often cited as significant factors influencing vulnerability –
which is important, given that these two factors have shown strong
variation between societies and across time. Do high levels of poverty
and economic inequality affect societies’ capabilities to anticipate shocks
and hazards, mitigate the effects of disasters, and adapt to them? Indeed,
poorer individuals and groups are said to be most severely affected by
hazards and disasters, and a number of aspects of ‘being poor’ are said to
contribute to this. The poor tend to live in inherently hazard-prone
locations, they lack the capital to invest in preventive measures or build
up resource buffers for anything unexpected, they have more restricted
access to helpful social networks, and frequently are disenfranchised from
the political process that can help steer policies more conducive to their
protection.88 They also tend to have lower standards of health through
poorer diets and access to healthcare. Drought is the hazard said to be
most clearly connected to cases of extreme poverty.89 Income, wealth,
and access to material resources are also significant factors in explaining
why certain communities are hit hardest by hurricanes.90 In NewOrleans
after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the poorest groups, disproportionately
coming from African-American communities, inhabited the lowest and
most flood-prone parts of the city, while wealthier communities lived on
the land near the river front that was 3 meters higher.91 Indeed, in the
United States, it is often the case that poorer ethnic minorities are dispro-
portionately located in inferior housing physically segregated into low-
value neighborhoods. It is this segregation that creates so-called ‘commu-
nities of fate,’ whereby residents share the same fate regarding quality of
life and opportunities, but also regarding exposure to certain types of
hazards.92
87 Soens, De Spade in de Dijk?, esp. Chapters 2 and 3.
88 Sen, Poverty and Famines; Wisner et al., At Risk.
89 Shepherd et al., The Geography of Poverty. 90 Reed, ‘The Real Divide,’ 31.
91 Colton, ‘Basin Street Blues,’ 237. 92 Logan & Molotch, Urban Fortunes, 19–20.
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The issue of the impact of inequality on vulnerability is more complex,
however, and discussed less frequently. One of the major issues is the lack
of explicit distinction between the effects of unequal distribution of
wealth and resources, on the one hand, and overall poverty, on the
other. For example, Ted Steinberg in his book Acts of God assumes that
more equitably arranged societies can reduce the destructive effects of
hazards,93 and yet, within his analysis, it is difficult to distinguish between
the negative effects of poverty and those of unequal distribution – espe-
cially when both exist simultaneously. Recently, statistical analyses have
established a positive correlation between income inequality and
increased susceptibility to disastrous outcomes from natural hazards in
present-day countries.94 Controlling for the number of natural disasters
and national wealth, countries with less income inequality (as well as
more democratic nations) suffer fewer deaths from disasters. This effect
has been observed for a set of fifty-seven countries analyzed for the period
1980–2002, with the effect of income inequality found to be very large.95
Empirical research at meso- or micro-levels is rare, however, and studies
at the household level on the impact of wealth on coping strategies have
provided inconclusive results.96 While poverty may hamper adaptive
capacities,97 inequalities often remain undiscussed. Moreover, we lack
insight into the exact aspects of inequality that make a society less able to
cope or adapt. One of the reasons for this may be that different kinds of
inequalities can impact differently upon vulnerability – the effects of
income inequality may not be the same as the influence of differences in
the distribution of resources, or of the differential access to voting rights
and networks.
Long-term historical research may help us identify some of the mech-
anisms that are at play when linking vulnerability and inequality: history
can function as a laboratory, where the effect of different types of inequal-
ity interacting with the same type of hazard can be tested in a long-term
perspective.98 Some evidence from history suggests that while the links
between poverty and vulnerability are often direct – by dictating habita-
tion locations, resource buffers, social networks, or exposure to unpre-
dictable markets – the links between inequality and vulnerability are often
indirect and therefore more complex. During a series of floods in the pre-
93 Steinberg, Acts of God. 94 Hillier & Castillo, ‘No Accident,’ 16.
95 Kahn, ‘The Death Toll.’
96 Hoddinott, ‘Shocks and Their Consequences’; Béné et al., ‘Is Resilience Socially
Constructed?’
97 Carpenter & Brock, ‘Adaptive Capacity’; Carter et al., ‘Poverty Traps.’
98 Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters’; Curtis, van Bavel & Soens,
‘History and the Social Sciences.’
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modern Low Countries, for example, it has been shown that economic
inequality – defined in this case as unequal ownership of wealth or
property and use of resources – especially affected societal responses to
hazards and shocks by impacting upon the development and use of
institutions – in this case water boards.99 Vulnerability, as measured by
increasing prevalence and severity of flood outcomes, tended to occur
when water management institutions failed to adapt to a context of
redistribution of economic resources. Many medieval water boards func-
tioned well under a system that attributed the construction and mainten-
ance of flood defenses to a large group of smallholders: each was
individually responsible for maintaining a part of the dike or drainage
system, according to the size of the holding. However, when at the end of
the Middle Ages or in the early-modern period – the timing varied
between regions – landholding was gradually consolidated in the hands
of elites, fewer people had an incentive to contribute their labor or
money.100 The quality of flood defense deteriorated significantly.
Very similar kinds of movements towards greater economic inequality,
together with an insufficient regulation of actions of the elite, have been
associated with dysfunction in water management structures in contexts
as diverse as Mamluk Egypt in the fifteenth century and the British
Punjab of the late nineteenth century.101 Comparable effects can also
be demonstrated for other types of disasters, for instance through the
impact of drought in pre- and early-colonial Southern Africa.102 Despite
increasing inequality, seventeenth-century expansion of Portuguese land-
holding in the lower Zambezi valley brought with it an increased diversity
of cultivated crops, including winter wheat, which reduced the sensitivity
of the agricultural system to drought during the main summer rainy
season. This, together with access to grain imports, centralized grain
storage, and localized decision-making, enabled increasingly effective
responses to short-term drought events. In the eighteenth century, how-
ever, continued growth in absentee landownership, together with the
concurrent growth of the slave trade, led increasing numbers of landhold-
ers to seek short-term gains by selling peasant farmers to coastal slave
traders, but at the expense of the core agricultural functioning of the
estates. Initial reductions in the sensitivity of African peasant farmers to
short-term low-magnitude drought events through crop diversification
therefore masked gradual but fundamental new vulnerabilities, which
99 Van Bavel, Curtis & Soens, ‘Economic Inequality.’
100 This has also been shown to be the case in the Po Valley ofNorthern Italy in the sixteenth
century: Curtis & Campopiano, ‘Medieval Land Reclamation.’
101 Ali, ‘Malign Growth?,’ 124; Borsch, ‘Environment and Population.’
102 Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate, History, Society.’
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were exposed when a severemulti-year drought in the period 1824–30 led
to the near breakdown of the entire social and agricultural system.
However, inequality was not inevitably a barrier to reducing vulnerabil-
ity. To return to flood protection in the pre-modern Low Countries: in
some regions a new balance was reached at a later point in time, on the
basis of the investment of large amounts of capital by wealthier absentee
elites in a more unequal setting. This did work well, but it materialized
only once the institutional system had shifted definitively to a fully com-
mercialized and monetized system based on contracted wage labor.103
Accordingly, both equal and unequal societies could produce reduced
levels of vulnerability. The same complexity has been demonstrated by
research into inequality in the pre-modern Brecklands of Southeast
England – a fragile ecosystem with inherent pre-existing vulnerabilities
to erosion and sand drifts. Here, polarization in the distribution of wealth
did not necessarily lead to a higher level of vulnerability. Only when this
was accompanied by political inequalities, with elites such as landlords
and wealthy tenant farmers monopolizing local decision-making, did the
Breckland communities become more exposed to sand drifts.104
What could be said, then, is that a system of inequality was sometimes
compatible with low vulnerability, if reciprocal agreements were estab-
lished between elites and those with fewer resources that enhanced wel-
fare and protection.105 The extent to which this happened, however,
depended on the precise incentives of those elites, and whether their
power and prosperity were intrinsically related to and dependent on the
welfare of the poor and the reproduction of the institutions that protected
the interests of broad groups – in a sense creating a type of ‘collective
wealth.’106 This was a situation characteristic of many pre-modern soci-
eties with patron–client relationships at the core of social stability and
economic well-being,107 and, more specifically, a situation that charac-
terized many feudal societies where the power of the lord was not simply
vested in ownership of large amounts of land and capital, but was also
dependent on (and limited by) the efforts of the peasantry to work this
land and pay rents and taxes.108 Indeed, a main source of vulnerability in
England during early-fourteenth-century subsistence crises and the fam-
ine of 1315–17 was perhaps not the inequalities between lord and peas-
ants, but rather those in the ranks of the peasantry themselves. Wealthier
tenants establishedmore secure positions for themselves by consolidating
103 Van Bavel, Curtis & Soens, ‘Economic Inequality.’
104 De Keyzer, ‘The Impact of Inequality.’ 105 Levi, ‘Aequitas vs Fairness.’
106 Di Tullio, ‘Cooperating in Time of Crisis.’
107 In late Qing and early Republican rural North China, for example: Duara, ‘Ten Elites.’
108 Curtis, Coping with Crisis, 57.
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the property of those weaker tenants who had to sell land out of desperate
necessity.109 If it suited their purposes, elites could cooperate with lower
socio-economic groups for mutual benefit, investing in works and coer-
cing others to build water management structures,110 construct defensive
and protective infrastructures, and perform obligatory public works
strengthening agriculture.
4.5 Cultural Preconditions
Within the field of disaster studies, increasing attention is being paid to
cultural factors.Worldviews, values, norms, attitudes, and customs shape
the capacity of communities to cope with shocks, while disasters in turn
may shape culture. Although this section focuses on pre-existing cultural
factors, in regions characterized by high-frequency hazardous events, it
could be said that culture and risk co-evolve over time.
How cultural preconditionsmay affect coping capacity is demonstrated
most clearly, perhaps, by the multi-faceted role of religion, defined as
a coherent system of beliefs, values, practices, and organizations. Even in
modern societies religion is often invoked when a disaster occurs. Ted
Steinberg has, for instance, pointed out that in the United States disasters
are frequently presented as ‘acts of God.’ According to him, this exoner-
ates political leaders from the responsibility to prevent those calamities,
and allows them to refrain from addressing the social and economic
inequalities that explain the high vulnerability of specific groups in
American society.111 However, religious beliefs can also shape the way
in which individuals and communities perceive hazards, shocks, and
disasters, for instance as divine punishment for wrongdoings, or as
a test of faith. Such perceptions subsequently affect coping strategies. If
a sudden shock is perceived as the conscious action of a displeased deity,
it makes good sense to aim for appeasement by reaching out to the
supernatural via a religious ritual. While from a secular perspective it is
tempting to think of such a course of action as ineffective, religious rituals
can bring comfort, hope, and a sense of belonging. Religion may also
affect vulnerability of groups or individuals negatively, in more direct
ways: by prescribing certain practices and forbidding others. Dietary
and hygiene regulations may, for instance, affect susceptibility in case of
epidemics, positively or negatively. Moreover, through its institutions,
religion can contribute significantly to the potential for collective action:
109 Campbell, ‘The Agrarian Problem’; Campbell, The Great Transition, 189.
110 Campopiano, ‘Rural Communities’; Bolòs, ‘Changes and Survival,’ 328; Galloway,
‘Storm Flooding,’ 178.
111 Steinberg, Acts of God.
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churches, mosques, and other communal places of worship offer
a reservoir of social capital which can be employed to organize and
support relief and recovery efforts.112
If true for present-day societies, then this is perhaps even more appar-
ent for past ones, given that religion was for pre-modern societies
a powerful force that pervaded almost every aspect of life. In pre-
modern Europe an awareness of the laws of nature was by no means
absent, but people were nevertheless inclined to attribute calamitous
events such as devastating floods or earthquakes to the wrath of God,
turning to prayer and religious rituals for protection.113 When in 1634
amajor flood hit the coast in the North of Germany, for instance, this was
attributed to the will of God; the extraordinary dimensions of the flood
and the speed with which it struck were considered proof of this. Penance
and devotion were deemed necessary for recovery and to prevent a -
recurrence.114 By the early-modern period, most Western European
societies ‘explained’ epidemic diseases through a mixture of frameworks
that could co-exist side-by-side: ‘miasma’ (bad airs and atmospherics),
contagion (via people or products), but also providence (from God).115
Religious institutions also offered practical support in crisis situations –
and not just the already-mentioned contribution of poor relief.116 In
Ming China, the impact of religion on resilience worked along different
lines. Confucian notions of reciprocity implied that the emperor was
responsible for the well-being of his subjects. A failure to see to their
basic needs would jeopardize the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ on which his
political authority was based. This provided a strong incentive for the
development of the Chinese system of state granaries.117
In regions characterized by high-frequency hazardous events, the
impact of cultural factors on resilience and vulnerability is closely related
to local knowledge and experience. These societies are often well aware of
the threat of repetitive and recurring natural hazards such as floods,
seismic activity, and droughts. It has been suggested that these ‘regions
of risk’ are often associated with high cultural embeddedness of risk –
affecting perceptions and stimulating creative adaptations, and therefore
making societies less vulnerable to high-frequency low-amplitude
hazards.118 In contrast, low-frequency high-amplitude events can cause
serious disruption even to highly resilient societies because of the
112 Schipper, Merli & Nunn, ‘How Religion and Beliefs Influence Perception.’
113 Gerrard & Petley, ‘A Risk Society?’
114 Jabukowski-Tiessen, “Erschreckliche und unerhörte Wasserflut.”
115 Curtis, ‘Preserving the Ordinary.’ 116 See Section 4.3.1.
117 Brook, The Troubled Empire, 109. For the Chinese granary system see Section 5.1.
118 The expression ‘regions of risk’ was coined by Hewitt, Regions of Risk.
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unforeseen nature of the event, and the lack of previous precedent close in
time.119
Regions of risk then, while confronted with higher levels of hazard
exposure, do not necessarily exhibit higher vulnerability: the predictability
of a recurrent hazard instead offers the opportunity to learn and to antici-
pate future hazardous events.120This is in linewith the IPCC’s anddisaster
studies’ dominant ‘challenge-and-response approach,’ which holds that
disasters are triggers for adaptive processes.121 According to Franz
Mauelshagen, all strategies of coping are based on the expectation of
repetition drawn from the experience of repeated disasters.122
A renowned example of such adaptation because of anticipation concerns
the ‘amphibious cultures’ in the coastal plains along the North Sea.123
Living in regions of risk, where virtually no generation could escape
a serious flood event, these communities developed ‘landscapes of coping.’
After every destructive storm, dikes were raised to prevent a recurrence;
settlements were moved to safer places and drainage projects became
increasingly sophisticated. Reconstruction efforts were accompanied by
technological innovations such as the introduction of wheelbarrows, but
also required organizational adaptations: cooperation between landowners
was regulated by ‘dike laws’ that clarified the rights and duties of each and
made arrangements for conflict resolution.124 In the Low Countries, this
mindset has been referred to as the ‘poldermodel,’ whereby collective
action and bottom-up decision-making became culturally ingrained as
a way of managing complex water management tasks.125
Similar societal adaptations are found in other types of risk societies as
well. In pre-Hispanic Mexico, for example, the awareness of recurring
droughts induced pre-colonial communities to construct irrigation sys-
tems, rely onmixed farming, andmaintain a safe level of seed and grain in
stock, to reduce vulnerability to likely future droughts.126 In the pre-
modern Campine area (Low Countries), the insidious threat of drifting
sand was well known to the rural communities. They actively geared up
against this hazard by collectively planting windbreaks and enclosures to
stop the sand from drifting and, through the local decision-making insti-
tutions, they also prohibited the uncovering of the bare soil.127 This kind
119 Endfield, ‘The Resilience and Adaptive Capacity,’ 3677. 120 See also Section 5.2.1.
121 Noble et al., ‘Adaptation Needs and Options.’
122 Mauelshagen, ‘Flood Disasters and Political Culture,’ 134.
123 Van Dam, ‘An Amphibious Culture.’
124 Mauelshagen, ‘Flood Disasters and Political Culture,’ 133–139.
125 For a discussion on the existence of the polder model see: Soens, ‘Polders zonder
poldermodel?’
126 Endfield, ‘The Resilience and Adaptive Capacity,’ 3677.
127 De Keyzer, “All We Are.”
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of behavior has been described as ‘subcultures of coping’; a concept
which refers to cultural patterns that – usually out of necessity – are geared
towards accommodating problems and risks arising from an awareness of
a persistent disaster threat. Risky and unstable environments fostered
particular patterns of behavior, social structures, and institutions to
build resilience and ‘normalize’ these hazardous recurring life
experiences.128
In his work on the Philippines, Bankoff explains how the entire (pre-
colonial as well as colonial) culture of the islands was formed by the
experience of recurrent seismic and meteorological hazards in this region
of risk, in order to reduce the level of vulnerability. Indigenous building
techniques, for instance, were adapted to environmental risks as the use of
light materials such as nipa palm and bamboo minimized casualties from
earthquakes, while low ceilings reduced the damage incurred from
typhoons. To cope with adverse circumstances, agricultural systems
were geared to ensure food security through crop diversification, land
fragmentation, and the use of trees as windbreaks. The ‘culture of disas-
ter’ in the Philippines also includes the practice of moving out of harm’s
way by resettling in a safer location, plus a number of cognitive strategies
and ideological elements such as a reliance on the ‘leave it to fate’ senti-
ment (bahala na) as a sense-making strategy, strong group cohesiveness,
and exchanging jokes about disastrous events as a way to relieve anxiety
and psychological distress.129
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that all societies facing
recurrent hazards are able to seamlessly adapt, for the development of
a culture of coping may be impeded by political, social, or economic
circumstances. In Northern Germany, Mauelshagen notes significant
land losses due to storms in the late fourteenth century, possibly because,
after the Black Death and recurring plague outbreaks, the manpower
needed for the repair and construction of dikes was lacking, and again
in the seventeenth century, when the Thirty Years War placed a heavy
fiscal burden on the population of the coastal region.130 Likewise,
Eleonora Rohland points out that in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
New Orleans, recurrent hurricanes and floods did not give rise to sophis-
ticated infrastructural designs to reduce the level of vulnerability. The
French and Spanish colonial authorities prioritized short-term strategic
interests and built forts in flood-prone locations, ignoring both traditional
environmental knowledge and observations from their own engineers.
Relief and reconstruction after the hurricane of 1812 were prevented by
128 Bankoff, ‘Cultures of Disaster.’ 129 Bankoff, Cultures of Disaster, 163–170.
130 Mauelshagen, ‘Flood Disasters and Political Culture,’ 135–136.
4.5 Cultural Preconditions 103
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
the political turmoil and racial issues that had emerged after the purchase
of Louisiana by the United States in 1803.131
Overall then, alignments of interests and distributions of power in
decision-making are crucial determinants of whether cultures of coping
are sustained in ways that reduce vulnerability. A mismatch of priorities
between what ‘outsiders’ consider as disaster risks and the different ways
in which risks are perceived and responded to by ‘insiders’ can cause
‘culture gaps,’ which may lead to negative outcomes for those who have
little say.132 This could be applied to the attempts of ‘outsiders’ to
implement containment measures for Ebola-afflicted communities in
Western Africa – with resistance from ‘insiders’ stemming from greater
precedence put upon maintaining traditional and customary practices,
social networking, and economic activity.133 Such patterns have also been
noted with respect to contemporary disaster management, where the
prevailing disaster risk reduction rationalities do not always align neatly
with culture, or where local elites communicate concerns different from
those of the majority of the population.134
131 Rohland, ‘Adapting to Hurricanes,’ 6–9. 132 Krüger et al., Cultures and Disasters.
133 Cohn and Kutalek, ‘Historical Parallels.’ 134 Krüger et al., Cultures and Disasters.
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5 Disaster Responses
While the previous chapter focused on the pre-existing conditions and
pressures that helped determine the impact of hazards, this chapter looks
at societal responses to hazards – active decisions, policies, and adapta-
tions aimed at enhancing the resilience and reducing the vulnerability of
societies or groups. This covers interventions as varied as adaptations of
land use or building styles to environmental conditions, physical protec-
tion against hazards, the use of warning or prediction systems, measures
to contain the spread of disease, or the distribution of disaster relief. The
distinction between the initial shock, on the one hand, and its eventual
impact, on the other, implies that all such measures can be seen as forms
of disaster prevention: even when the shock itself cannot be avoided, it
may well be possible to prevent it from developing into a disaster. That is
why we refrain here from distinguishing between ‘structural’ measures
that modify the event and ‘non-structural’ ones that modify human
vulnerability.1 Instead, in this chapter we discuss three important general
aspects of responses to shocks: the relationship between top-down and
bottom-up initiatives, learning from experience and the application of
‘expert’ knowledge, and the constraints on active responses to hazards –
especially via the unequal application of power and wealth.
5.1 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Responses
Previously we discussed the increasing involvement of the state in disaster
management since the early-modern era, and subsequently we pointed to
the importance of collective action: formal or informal cooperation and
coordination at the local level.2 In terms of this distinction, responses can
be arranged between two extremes. At one end of the scale are top-down
interventions imposed by a government or elite, requiring substantial
investments and making use of advanced technological knowledge. At
1 For a categorization of this type: Smith & Petley, Environmental Hazards, 73.
2 See Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
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the other are bottom-up initiatives that rely on local resources and know-
how. In many cases elements of both are present: that is to say, even top-
down initiatives are not entirely ‘imposed’ but simultaneously require
acceptance and implementation at ‘street level’ too.
While the technological advances of the modern era have stimulated
the use of top-down interventions, it would be a mistake to think they
were absent earlier. A prominent case is the sophisticated ‘ever-normal’
granary system established in Qing China, intended to stabilize grain
prices and provide a safeguard against famine. Although the system
built on some of its predecessors, it was greatly expanded and refined in
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, reaching its greatest
complexity in the middle decades of the latter. By then, granaries had
been established in all main population centers. In order to keep reserves
in these granaries at stable (‘ever-normal’) levels, they were regularly
restocked through purchase, tribute, or private contributions in exchange
for titles of honor. Transport – mainly by river or canal – was organized
from granaries in regions with a surplus tomeet shortages elsewhere in the
empire. In years of poor harvests, grain was distributed at reduced prices
to the entire population; stocks were also used to minimize seasonal price
fluctuations. All of this required very substantial financial resources and
bureaucratic efforts by the state.3 It is estimated that in dearth years
granary distribution would feed around 5 percent of the population of
any province for two months, while the total costs of the granary system
amounted to 0.5 to 2 percent of the state’s annual revenues.4
In situations where state power was not as strong, top-down interven-
tion might take a somewhat different shape. In the late twelfth century,
the urban authorities of Verona, in Northern Italy, tried to prevent
a recurrence of the famine of 1178 by actively increasing the area of
land under cultivation in the surrounding countryside. Marshlands were
granted to wealthy citizens who started reclamation projects, whereas
more arid land, after an irrigation canal had been dug, was divided into
farms onto which a community of peasant families was settled.5 In the
first case, then, the Chinese authorities simply had the power and
resources to coerce implementation of the necessary prevention meas-
ures, whereas in the second case, Italian city-states still had to make some
concessions to get the process under way. In fact, it was often the case that
even when ambitious authorities did initiate top-down preventive meas-
ures, they still had to fall back on local knowledge and networks. For
3 Will & Wong, Nourish the People, esp. 43–73.
4 Will & Wong, Nourish the People, 481–484, 493–494.
5 Campopiano, ‘The Evolution of the Landscape’, 324.
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example, in the late-eighteenth-century Southern Low Countries, the
government imposed a series of drastic measures to contain recurrent
outbreaks of the rinderpest, including the compulsory slaughter of all
cattle on farms where the disease was identified (Figure 5.1). The policy
was carried out despite resistance by the farmers, but in order to achieve
this process of ‘stamping out’ the authorities had to rely on the ability of
experienced local lay veterinary healers present in every community to
diagnose the disease.6
However, disaster management specialists have argued that while top-
down interventions may protect lives and livelihoods, they may also
generate or exacerbate vulnerability.7 The first phase of the Greater
Dhaka Flood Protection Project carried out in the 1990s is a good
example. This large-scale engineering project, aimed at preventing the
flooding of this area of Bangladesh, turned out to have many unexpected
Figure 5.1 Engraving showing the drastic measures imposed by the
Dutch government in 1745 to contain the rinderpest – the compulsory
slaughter of all cattle on farms where the disease was discovered – and
the resisting farmers. Caption: Gods slaandehand over nederland door
de pest-siekte onder het rund vee naa het leeven getekent en gegraveert
door Jan Smit (1745). Courtesy of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
6 Van Roosbroeck, ‘Experts, experimenten en veepestbestrijding.’
7 Blaikie et al., At Risk, 218.
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side-effects in the areas just outside the embankments. There, the inflow
of polluted water forced many residents to abandon agriculture, resulting
in a decline of average income. In addition, serious problems emerged
with waste disposal, water quality, and sewerage, posing risks for public
health.8
Accordingly, bottom-upmeasures may be more attuned to local needs:
agricultural systems, settlement location, and construction methods were
often adapted to the natural environment in order to minimize risks. In
the Campine region of the Southern Low Countries, located in the
European sand-belt region, sand drifts have long posed a serious threat
to farms, fields, and villages. Yet in the late Middle Ages the inhabitants
alleviated ecological degradation through different prevention tech-
niques. A framework of collective resource management and property
rights stimulated members to plant shrubs and trees and restrict harmful
practices such as peat extraction and mowing. Inhabitants had the cap-
acity to do this, since powerful elites were not present to violate, obstruct,
or ignore communal regulations, and inhabitants also had the incentive,
since their welfare was intrinsically embedded within the sustainability of
the socio-ecological system. However, prevention strategies of this type
require a thorough understanding of local conditions. If change happened
very quickly or if the area was settled by newcomers from other agricul-
tural regions, preventative measures might not develop. In the early
Middle Ages the Campine region did witness the destruction of settle-
ments by sand storms, for newly arrived settlers reclaiming the land were
unaware of the risks of deforestation and large open fields in this environ-
ment, setting irreversible sand storms in motion.9
Epidemic disease was one threat that clearly brought about a series of
complex prevention strategies in the pre-modern period – especially those
introduced by urban governments. Although contagion was often seen in
a context of divine punishment, pre-modernEuropean andMiddle Eastern
societies did understand contagion – viewed through the lens of miasmatic
theory, for instance.10 Accordingly, plagues and other diseases fashioned
the need for urban governments to impose various kinds of practical
regulations and restrictions, many of which still feel remarkably familiar
to anyone living through present-day outbreaks of epidemic diseases such
as the 2019–20 coronavirus disease COVID-19. Some of the earliest
plague ordinances can be found in the fourteenth century, though they
increased in frequency from the fifteenth century onwards, and some have
8 Alam, Damole & Wickramanayake, ‘Effects of Flood Mitigation Measure.’
9 De Keyzer, “All We Are.”
10 Shefer-Mossensohn, ‘Rethinking Historiography,’ 15–16.
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been described as particularly successful – the rapid response by the
Neapolitan government in the 1690s kept plague in Apulia restricted to
just ten agro-towns,11 while Ragusa (Dubrovnik) was already plague-free
during the early stages of the sixteenth century – a public health success
story.12Most ordinances were concerned with the same things, even if they
had local variations: (i) isolation of the sick or suspected sick in their
houses, (ii) maintaining hygiene in public spaces, (iii) the regulation of
trade, and (iv) supervision and social control. In connectionwith this, some
scholars have argued that the fear of epidemic outbreaks was instrumenta-
lized by ‘elites’ or ‘authorities’ as an ‘excuse’ for implementing order.13 In
pre-modern Europe, social control is said to have taken the form of heavy
impositions on certain vulnerable groups: beggars and vagrants, prosti-
tutes, foreigners and outsiders, and the general poor. In some cases,
straightforward persecution took place, as was the case with the carefully
orchestrated pogroms against Jewish populations during outbreaks of
plague in the later Middle Ages.14 As well as offering the blueprint for
social behavior, authorities also developed systems to enforce compliance –
often through onerous punishments, usually of a financial nature.15
As mentioned above, however, top-down authoritarian attempts to
implement behavioral patterns that reduced the likelihood of an epidemic
disease, or restricted its spread once in motion, could not really work
without cooperation from below. Evidence from pre-modern Europe
suggests that these kinds of impositions were rarely accepted automatic-
ally. In fact, rather than being a suitable vehicle for overly draconian
measures and social control, plague epidemics in particular became
a context for those lower down the social hierarchy to vent their frustra-
tions and fears, if not in the same politically chargedmanner as seen in the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century cholera outbreaks.16 More often this
was only in a passive way via a refusal to cooperate with the authorities,
but on occasion it included more assertive and direct action leading to
conflict. Examples of this kind of failure to do the authority’s bidding
included the rejection of supervised and restricted burial practices.
Instead, family, friends, and neighbors continued to carry and transport
infected bodies – despite dangers to themselves – and often erupted in
violent protest when prevented from doing so.17 Frequently, we find
11 Fusco, ‘The Importance of Prevention.’
12 Blažina Tomić & Blažina, Expelling the Plague.
13 For the original work: Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 195–200. Examples of this idea:
Lis & Soly, Poverty and Capitalism, 79; Naphy & Spicer, The Black Death, 80.
14 Cohn, ‘The Black Death and the Burning of Jews.’
15 Curtis, ‘Preserving the Ordinary.’ 16 Cohn, Epidemics.
17 Curtis, ‘Preserving the Ordinary.’
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people refusing to pay fines for contravening regulations and rejecting
orders to move from their homes to isolated quarantines. Given that
communal suspicions and distrust of the decisions and actions of ‘elites,’
‘authorities,’ ‘experts,’ or ‘outsiders’ are seen even today in the wake of
serious epidemics, with the case of the 2013–15 Ebola outbreak in West
Africa as an obvious example, leading to violent resistance and outcry at
the local level,18 the need to engage local communities and respect
cultural contexts when developing epidemic prevention and containment
strategies is something that runs very deep across different societies, but
also goes far back in time.
5.2 Experience, Memory, Knowledge, and Experts
5.2.1 Memory and Learning from Experience
The belief that it is possible to learn from disasters is a vital element in the
disaster cycle. Memory and learning from past experiences affect both
vulnerability and resilience. Anticipating recurrent hazardous events may
trigger investments in infrastructural works, changes in societal structures
and reorganization of institutions to prevent a future hazard from unfold-
ing into a disaster, thus reducing vulnerability. When eradicating the
hazard or shock altogether is not possible, learning and memory can
help to mitigate the effects of the shock and enable a much faster recovery
or adaptation. This influences resilience as well. Memory and learning
can take place on various levels. Governments and other policy makers
can draw conclusions from what went wrong – especially in present-day
situations, they can frequently avail themselves of the results of official
investigations – in order to take technical and managerial measures, but
memory and learning are just as much a matter of common people
applying practical knowledge in day-to-day-life, individually and
collectively.
Reactions to famines in late-twentieth-century Africa provide an
example of the former situation, where changes of government policies
occurred on the basis of experiences during earlier disasters. In Ethiopia
and Sudan national authorities and NGOs drew lessons from the terrible
famines of the 1970s and 1980s to prevent a recurrence during the
droughts of the mid-1990s. Projects introducing technological innov-
ations in agriculture were initiated, and both countries – Ethiopia in the
late 1970s and Sudan in the mid-1980s – established agencies that were
given the task of setting up and maintaining early-warning systems and
18 Kutalek et al., ‘Ebola Interventions’; Cohn & Kutalek, ‘Historical Parallels.’
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establishing national cereal reserves. In cooperation with NGOs,
food-for-work programs were initiated to provide food rations to hundreds
of thousands of households in return for labor, and food aid from abroad
increased substantially. Health services and sanitation were improved.19
Policies were successful in the sense that the threat of faminewas addressed
more effectively and quickly in 1994 than in earlier decades.20
But while resilience has improved, vulnerability remains: famine is still
a very real risk in parts of Africa. Although the governments of Ethiopia
and Sudan also tried to redirect agricultural policies towards national self-
sufficiency, in this respect they were much less successful.21 In addition,
social and political factors affect vulnerability through themarginalization
of social or ethnic groups and the recurrent armed conflicts that exacer-
bate the effects of droughts. In some cases famine is even used as
a deliberate strategy in those conflicts. As the authors of a recent report
on African famines over the last three decades conclude, learning lessons
is one thing, but actually translating them into action is another. Early-
warning systems, for instance, have little effect if the warnings are not
followed by ‘early action.’When learning takes the form of adjustments in
government policies, the political will to act upon the insights gained from
experience is decisive.22
Political will does not carry the same weight in situations where learn-
ing is a bottom-up process. A good example is the culture of coping with
hurricanes or typhoons in the Philippines, which has already been dis-
cussed above.23 The impact of the recurring typhoons was actively miti-
gated through preventive buildingmethods and infrastructural works, but
also through themental acceptance of risk and a strong sense of solidarity.
Since everybody was susceptible to risk, relief systems and redistributive
mechanisms were immediately put in motion to help neighbors and
community members who had been struck during a hazardous event.
These informal networks were eventually adopted by the Spanish rulers of
the islands in the form of fraternities called cofradías.24 Collective action
mechanisms and the culture they supported secured continuity in the face
of risk and helped prevent most hazards from turning into true disasters.
A disaster memory often requires decades or even centuries to develop
and relies upon a certain level of demographic stability. Only when
communities can get acquainted with an environment and its hazards
can traditional environmental knowledge be formed, which is the basis of
19 Von Braun, A Policy Agenda, 14–19.
20 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, A Symposium, 6.
21 Von Braun, A Policy Agenda, 13–14.
22 Devereux, Sida & Nelis, Famine, esp. 11–14, 27–28. 23 See Section 4.5.
24 Bankoff, ‘Cultures of Disaster,’ 268–273.
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a culture of coping. This is not evident inmoremobile or rapidly changing
societies. In New Orleans, for example, traditional environmental know-
ledge was continuously lost. The French and English settlers did not
inherit or appropriate elements of environmental knowledge from local
communities. Strategic interests induced the colonizers to locate their
settlement in a vulnerable zone. Most of the city was surrounded by
water, and drainage issues were a significant problem. But, on arrival,
the settlers were unaware of the recurrent hurricanes. This was demon-
strated by the unforeseen and hence disastrous hurricane and inundation
in 1722 within four years of the foundation of the city. Unlike other
settlements in the Americas that proved to be ill-located, New Orleans
was not relocated or deserted for a more suitable site. The plain of
Manchac was deemed an ‘indispensable necessity’ for the new colonial
powers. Moreover, in New Orleans successive colonial powers followed
each other at relatively high speed. By the second half of the eighteenth
century, when local environmental knowledge had been developed, the
colony had been given to the Spanish and the process had to start again.
Distrust of French settlers and fear of slave revolts in the wake of hurri-
canes prevented an efficient response to the disasters. As a result a culture
of coping did not develop despite the repetitive character and nature of
the environmental hazards.25
Finally, lessons from the past do not automatically stick forever: experi-
ence and knowledge may fade when they are not maintained. Such
instances of forgetting or ‘de-learning’ can be triggered by a reduced
frequency of shocks, either because of changes in the natural environment
or, ironically, as a result of effective disaster prevention. Thismay give rise
to a false sense of security, similar to the ‘levee effect’ discussed above,26
in turn leading to the erosion of the institutional framework required to
maintain expertise and ensure its transfer to the next generation. The
outbreak of the plague in Surat (Western India) in 1994, for instance,
took place almost thirty years after the last case of plague in the region and
more than sixty years after the last major epidemic.27 The outbreak was
caused by a combination of factors. These included, among others,
unhygienic living conditions in the city’s crowded slums, but also the
abandonment of plague monitoring schemes due to budget cuts, related
in turn to the austerity measures imposed in order to ward off a national
debt crisis. These schemes were easy targets in a situation in which the
immediate threat of the disease seemed no longer present.28
25 Rohland, ‘Adapting to Hurricanes’.
26 For a description of the ‘levee effect’, see section 4.2.1.
27 Barrett, ‘The 1994 Plague’. 28 Barnes, ‘Social Vulnerability.’
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5.2.2 The ‘Rule of Experts’
“Don’t find a fault. Find a remedy.” This quote from Henry Ford
included in the 2006 Bipartisan Katrina Report, ‘A Failure of
Initiative,’ reflects how present-day governments and societies aim to
deal with disaster.29 The remedy usually suggested is technological and
those suggesting it are usually ‘experts,’ that is, scientists and engineers.
This dependence on experts and their mastering of techniques and tech-
nology to deal with and adapt to hazards and disasters is, however, not
self-evident and can be better understood by tracing the historical roots of
this phenomenon and its evolution throughout time.
The rise of experts as a separate social group with a separate kind of
‘expert knowledge’ is usually situated at the end of the sixteenth century
and the beginning of the seventeenth, and is often considered a crucial
feature of themodernist interaction with nature.30 As argued by Eric Ash,
the meaning of the concept ‘expertise’ in late-sixteenth-century England
gradually shifted from practical experience in a certain field to insight in
more abstract, mathematical models. When it came to navigation, for
example, in the early sixteenth century expertise was seen as belonging to
well-versed seamen, who had elaborate experience of finding their way on
the ocean. At the end of the same century, navigational expertise was
expressed in complex mathematical models, in the new genre of ‘naviga-
tional handbooks.’31
The new, late-sixteenth-century definition of expertise heralded the
emergence of a new social group, the ‘experts,’ who used this new idea
of expertise to establish their own position. Their ally in this pursuit was
the emerging early-modern state, which legitimized their expertise and
used experts for its own gain: as mediators and project coordinators they
allowed the state to expand its scope and undertake projects in more
distant parts of the realm. Experts and the state thus co-evolved.
In the modern era, the rise of the nation state and the advance of
technology and science gave the rule of experts a dominance it had not
previously possessed. In the middle of the nineteenth century ‘social
engineering’ and techno-politics flourished, as the new nation states left
behind their laissez-faire social policies – inspired by the Neo-Malthusian
idea that demographic checks were necessary – opting instead for a new
focus on proactively developing social measures. This development was
not restricted to the Western world: it can also be observed in other parts
of the globe colonized by European powers.32 In older studies the
29 See www.npr.org/documents/2006/feb/katrina/house_report/katrina_report_full.pdf.
30 Long, Engineering the Eternal City. 31 Ash, Power, Knowledge, and Expertise.
32 For instance in Egypt under British rule: Mitchell, Rule of Experts.
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increased state intervention and its heavy use of science and technology
have often been seen as a story of progress, and of the success of
modernity.33 This is not without reason, for state-sponsored techno-
logical innovation based on scientific expertise did sometimes indeed
contribute to a reduction of disaster vulnerability. Some of the most
spectacular examples can be found in the battle against infectious diseases
in European cities in the second half of the nineteenth century. By the
1860s it had become clear that diseases such as cholera were spread by
contaminated water and that the existing water wells and sewers were to
blame for the spread. It was physician John Snowwho discovered in 1854
that cholera was conveyed by water and that the pandemic of London was
linked with one very particular pump in Broad Street. The ground water
of the well in Broad Street was contaminated by the water seeping from
the different cesspools in the area. As a result, urban as well as national
governments in Europe and America became convinced that sanitary
reform was urgently needed. In England Sir Edwin Chadwick, who led
the Poor Law Commission, urged a complete reconstruction of the poor
neighborhoods and advised a sanitary reform, whereby sewers and piped
water supplies were provided in all English towns for all social classes.
Soon, similar measures were taken in towns and cities in other European
countries, with very favorable results.34
The rule of experts, however, also has a reverse side: states may use
their social policies to control the lives and bodies of their subjects –
biopolitics as Foucault would have called this. Chadwick, in his famous
1842 report on Sanitation, was very explicit in his – in hindsight very
Foucauldian – ambitions: implementing centralized sewer systems and
piped water networks would mean that more poor people would be
healthy and could earn a decent living through working.35 Nineteenth-
century state intervention in other social domains bears witness to
a similar approach. Hunger, for example, became a ‘social problem,’
and practitioners in the emerging fields of nutrition and domestic science
helped craft a response to this problem. The introduction of British
school meals, offered to those children who failed to develop according
to scientific benchmarks, is a clear case in the battle against hunger,
influenced by this cooperation between state and science.36
There is a vast literature on how the combination of state control and
the rule of experts disrupted normal routines in socio-environmental
systems, often with devastating results. The irrigation agriculture in the
33 Some poignant examples of this can be found in Shapin, ‘Science.’
34 Baldwin, Contagion and the State, 147–156. 35 Hamlin, Public Health.
36 Vernon, ‘The Ethics of Hunger,’ 696.
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Egyptian Nile Delta offers a famous example of a highly complex socio-
environmental system, the maintenance of which was largely devolved to
individual village communities, at least from the Mamluk period
onwards. From the late eighteenth century onwards massive public dam
and canal building – such as the reconstruction of the Ashrafiyya/
Mahmudiyya Canal, linking Alexandria to the main Nile branches in
1816–19 – required a forced mobilization of thousands of peasant labor-
ers, not only resulting in a high number of casualties among the work-
force, but also disconnecting peasants from their homes and traditional
knowledge of their environment. These grand projects would not have
been possible without the combination of a new type of ruler, in this case,
khediveMehmet Ali, ‘the father of modern Egypt’ (1805–48), and a new
type of expert, personalized by Rohidin, an Ottoman engineer from
Istanbul and founder of the Egyptian School of Engineering in 1816.37
According to Alan Mikhail, these public dam-building projects, from the
Mahmudiyya Canal to the AswanHigh Dam in the 1950s and 1960s, not
only constituted a complete make-over of both the environment and the
rural society of the Nile Valley, but also increased the vulnerability to
natural hazards, which came in the form of salinization, shrinkage of the
Delta, siltation of the irrigation network, and evaporation of water.38
The Foucauldian perspective, in which expertise and technology are
used by states and their expert-allies to control people, often by control-
ling nature, also emphasizes how this led to an increased vulnerability
among the ‘powerless.’ Through their impact on the environment,
technological systems help to produce and reproduce social inequalities
and power relations. In risk-prone regions, the use of capital-intensive
technology to counter hazards such as flooding or earthquakes usually
privileges the wealthier districts, either directly or indirectly, as the real
estate market will push poorer people towards the least protected areas.39
What is more, technology in itself may also lead to hazard and disaster,
as in the case of ‘technological lock-in.’ The choice for a specific type of
technology creates a certain path-dependency and can create its own
vulnerabilities. A clear example of technological lock-in is the case of
Dutch flood safety. When the Dutch started draining their wetlands
around the year 1000, they set in motion a process that was hard to
stop. The land subsided when it had been drained, so dikes (seawalls
and river embankments) had to be built. Owing to the lack of flooding, the
deposition of sediments decreased, meaning dikes had to be raised even
37 Mikhail, Nature and Empire, 260.
38 Mikhail, Nature and Empire, 254–255, 294–295.
39 For historical examples, see Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’ For a case study on Hurricane
Katrina, see Tierney, ‘Social Inequality.’
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more, and so on, and so on. The confidence of the Dutch in this type of
technological solution is large – especially after the Delta Works, follow-
ing the 1953 floods, which kept Dutch feet dry for over sixty years. The
chances of failure seem slim (standards are set at once every 10,000 years
in densely populated areas and once every 4000 years in less densely
populated districts), but this ignores the fact that the calculations of
flood safety levels are highly uncertain and that if flooding happened the
consequences would be disastrous, as millions of people currently live
below sea level. The impact of climate change accelerates the process of
falling land levels and a need for rising levees, which in the long run seems
untenable. Thus “the Netherlands truly finds itself in a lock-in because
there is no question the entire population in low-lying areas can move
elsewhere.”40 However, during the last couple of years the ‘accommoda-
tion paradigm’ (i.e. leaving space for water) has been slowly gaining
ground, indicating that political and economic choices might indeed
provide a way out of technological lock-ins.
5.3 Constraints on Disaster Responses
5.3.1 Inequalities in Power and Property
Previously, inequality has been discussed as one of the pre-existing con-
ditions that help determine the impact of hazards.41 Inequalities in
wealth, resources, and power are also among the factors that may con-
strain the ability of societies to respond. Coping strategies for the ‘com-
mon good’ were sometimes blocked or hindered, if they conflicted with
the goals and desires of those with more resources or wielding more
power, and on occasion the responses that were allowed to be enacted
benefited only a small elite group rather than society at large.42 It is clear
that one society’s capacity to respond to a hazard under conditions of
plantation slavery was different from another society’s response capacity
under conditions of feudalism, and this again was different from the range
of responses available to people in peasant societies or free market-
oriented democracies.
In some cases, inequalities in power and property could represent
conditions that enhanced responses to hazards – or at least the speed,
intensity, and completeness with which they could be implemented. For
example, in medieval Europe powerful manorial lords were often influen-
tial in laying out open fields, even if this still required negotiation with
40 Wesselink, ‘Flood Safety,’ 241–242. 41 For this discussion, see Section 4.4.
42 Dennison & Ogilvie, ‘Serfdom and Social Capital.’
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tenant communities. In an open field both demesne and tenant lands
were fragmented, mixed, and distributed in the fields. Such spatial
spreading of exposure to the elements was an important feature of risk
limitation in medieval agriculture.43 Likewise, powerful urban lords in
Northern Italy incentivized (or coerced) rural communities to maintain
water defenses in the light of flood risks. These were occasions when elite
goals happened to coincide with broader communal ones: manorial
demesnes also benefited from the sub-division of plots, while those
water defenses allowed wealthy investors to reclaimmore land for capital-
intensive farming.44 The same could be said of the process of incastella-
mento in tenth- and eleventh-century Western Europe. Concentration of
inhabitants into fortified villages helped protect ordinary people from the
hazards of violence, and yet the seigneurial lords who initiated this bene-
fited from collecting a labor force large enough to colonize new areas, and
crystallize and secure territorial power.45
More often, however, the application of inequitable power or control
over resources led to situations where coercive strategies could be
employed to stop adaptive responses that were intended to prevent or
mitigate hazards. In medieval and early-modern Leiden, for example,
tenants and the town council both had interests in maintaining good-
quality public health infrastructure, and the disposal of waste into com-
munal cesspits. This was a system that was still in balance in the sixteenth
century, but by the seventeenth century it had been replaced by a system
of sewers that simply led to the flushing of waste into the city canals, and
was likely responsible for terrible epidemic outbreaks that occurred
throughout the 1600s. Residents’ needs for adequate hygiene provision –
with frequent complaints made to the town council – conflicted with the
needs of landlords who wanted to keep their costs down (by not main-
taining expensive cesspits), and the needs of landlords in an increasingly
inequitable city were privileged and protected by an urban council that
wanted to expand its housing base to attract migrant workers for the
textile industries.46
Colonialism was, almost by definition, characterized by unequal power
relations and forms of coercion. How this could result in constraints on
the response to hazards is demonstrated in early-twentieth-century
Malawi, at the time the British protectorate Nyasaland. Here, from the
late nineteenth century onwards, a dual agricultural system developed: in
the commercial sector cash crops, intended for export, were produced on
43 Curtis, Coping with Crisis, 52.
44 Curtis & Campopiano, ‘Medieval Land Reclamation.’ 45 Curtis, ‘The Emergence.’
46 Van Oosten, ‘The Dutch Great Stink.’
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large estates established on alienated land, whereas traditional subsist-
ence agriculture was relegated to the increasingly congested but less fertile
lands reserved for the native population. By the 1940s many smallholders
combined wage labor in the commercial sector or in the emerging indus-
tries of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and neighboring Northern
Rhodesia with subsistence agriculture on their own small plots of
land.47 Increasingly they focused onmaize instead of sorghum or cassava.
Maize yields a high caloric value per unit of land or labor, but is also very
sensitive to water deprivation.48As the dependency on maize increased,
so did vulnerability to drought. Although the drought-induced famine of
1949 was a minor one in numbers of victims, the fact that it occurred
nevertheless demonstrates the narrowing of traditional coping mechan-
isms under colonial rule. Moreover, the consequences were long-lasting:
in combination with other factors, the lack of diversification in agriculture
gave rise to another famine in 2001–02.49
Although low levels of inequality do not guarantee an adequate
response to hazards, they do offer advantages. In more equitable societies
both assets and risks are more evenly distributed. This balancing removes
an important source of conflict when it comes to responding to hazards,
for it is more likely that responses that benefit elites also benefit others.
Moreover, in economically equitable societies political power tends to be
shared by a larger group: these societies are usually characterized by
collective-choice arrangements that impose restrictions on short-term
rent seeking and prioritize sustainable solutions. With their emphasis on
local, bottom-up governance and rules design, they also promote flexibil-
ity and adaptability.
Flexibility or the opportunity to adapt is a recurring trope in the litera-
ture on the resilience of communities. The idea that societies where
resources and power are more equally divided are better at adapting is
often implicitly present within the literature on ‘institutional resilience,’
with its emphasis on local, bottom-up governance and rules design.50
Likewise, anthropologists and historians have pointed to the fact that
institutions are not necessarily efficient and are often very much steered
by those in power. Ensminger, for example, focusing on the Orma people
in twentieth-century Kenya, pointed to the fact that new institutions
evolved very much according to the needs of those with the highest
bargaining power and most resources.51 Similarly, work on the Kafue
floodplains in Zambia showed how, in the transition from colonial rule to
47 Vaughan, ‘Famine Analysis.’ 48 McCann, ‘Maize and Grace,’ 249.
49 Devereux, ‘The Malawi Famine.’ 50 See also Section 4.3.1.
51 Ensminger,Making a Market.
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independence, the former local common pool institutions were eroded
and altered by being incorporated into a new state structure. Yet, tribal
leaders and absentee herd owners were able to steer the new entitlement
rules in such a way as to benefit their particular interests, for instance by
imposing open access rules without any limit on their use of the common,
while disregarding the social and environmental costs of these choices.52
By implication, the power balance within a community and the position
of the elite relative to other groups – which is linked to economic (in)
equality, but in a more nuanced way – played a part in securing or
hindering resilience. This is noticeable, for example, in the way poor relief
strengthened resilience in different types of communities during periods
of grain crisis in the pre-industrial Low Countries. Poor relief played an
important part in helping the poorest cope in two different peasant
regions. In Inland Flanders, where small, proto-industrial peasants lived
in a co-dependency with large tenant farmers, the local elite (that is, these
large farmers) decided to invest in relief as it was clearly in their interest to
maintain this system of reciprocal – though unequal – exchange, where
peasants traded their labor for grain and credit. Their efforts, however,
were limited: the main aim was to enhance the status of the donors and
maintain a labor force sufficient to meet demand.53 In the Campine area,
a communal peasant-dominated region, where independent peasants
governed the villages, a more elaborate and inclusive relief system was
in place, as vulnerability was much more equally divided among the
people of this region and even local elites were not protected from the
risks imposed by natural hazards or infirmity.54
The role of elites is also stressed byDi Tullio in the context of resilience
to warfare for fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Lombardy in Italy. The
Geradadda communities were able to reproduce their social network and
contain inequality, thanks to their communal assets, the credit-related
opportunities provided by lay confraternities, and the role the elite played
in enabling this. Di Tullio sees cooperation among different social groups
as quintessential and claims that “reciprocity came before equality”;
collective assets were essential to all social groups.55 The suggestion
that we have to look beyond mere economic equality has also been
made by de Keyzer in her work on sand drifts in the pre-industrial
Campine area in the Low Countries. By combining historical source
material with OSL dating, she found that the late-medieval Campine
52 Haller & Chabwela, ‘Managing Common Pool Resources.’
53 For the eighteenth century, see Lambrecht, ‘Reciprocal Exchange’; Vanhaute &
Lambrecht, ‘Famine.’
54 Van Onacker & Masure, ‘Unity in Diversity.’
55 Di Tullio, ‘Cooperating in Time of Crisis.’
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village societies were entirely capable of mitigating the effects of sand
drifts on the common heath lands that were essential to the economic
viability of this region. This resilience can be explained by the fact that all
interest groups there (small peasants, village elites, tenant farmers, and
lords) relied to some extent on the survival of these commons, thus
creating firm incentives for protecting them. Their strong property rights
and the powerful grip of the village community on the government of
these commons were essential as well.56
Institutional resilience – that is, the ability to adapt institutions to
changing circumstances – therefore has a nuanced relationship with
equality. The literature points firmly to the importance of bottom-up
control and collective arrangements, but whether this constellation
worked was strongly dependent on the socio-economic context. It is
noticeable that a balance of power and shared interests between the social
elite and other social groups seem to have been essential in creating
flexible institutions that strengthened resilience.
5.3.2 Institutional Rigidity and Path Dependency
Institutional rigidity and the entrenchment of norms, practices, beliefs,
and values that shape vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience can act as
constraints on responses to hazards – in some cases even pre-determining
their outcomes.57 A common cause of rigidity is path-dependent pro-
cesses. These processes typically take root during the ‘critical junctures’
or key moments in time at which institutions are (trans)formed, after
which certain directions of change are established and others are fore-
closed in a way that shapes developments over long time spans.58
Importantly for hazard and disaster response, as institutional arrange-
ments become ‘locked in’ they becomemuchmore difficult to change – in
a similar way to technological lock-ins – even if they make people more
vulnerable and lead to negative disaster management outcomes.59
A classic example of institutional rigidity and path dependency is found
in former colonial contexts. In these settings, the imposition of colonial
rule upon indigenous governance structures was a common critical junc-
ture at which institutions were typically transplanted from the colonizer to
the colonized, invariably acting in the interests of the former. Upon
independence, however, many post-colonial nations did not simply dis-
band their colonial institutions, but rather these became the new
56 De Keyzer, “All We Are.” 57 See also Sections 2.3.5 and 4.3.1.
58 Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence.’
59 Adamson, Rohland & Hannaford, ‘Re-thinking the Present.’
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apparatus of the post-colonial state, with inherent colonial legacies in
their functioning and even in ideology. Macro- and micro-level studies
on Latin America have thus shown that the persistence of deep-rooted
inequality embedded within colonial institutions constrains the use of
resources and thus perpetuates unequal developmental outcomes in the
present.60 Just as many post-colonial nations had continuities from the
colonial past in their dominant forms of economic activity, then, it follows
that there are also legacies in responses to threats to those activities – as
has been shown in governmental drought and famine relief intervention
methods in sub-Saharan African nations,61 and in hurricane response in
the Southern United States.62
Historians have also shown that institutional rigidity may be influenced
by cultural and religious perceptions asmuch as by political responses – or
may even be determined by a hybrid of the two. In pre-colonial societies
across much of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the coming of rain was
linked to helpful intervention by ancestral spirits in the heavens – a belief
systemwhich spurred ‘rainmaking’ rituals in times of drought. As some of
these societies evolved into more centralized state structures (a pre-
colonial critical juncture), links between rainfall and ancestral spirits
became tied to the political leadership, who were believed to have the
ability to intercede directly with the heavens and bring rain.63 Ultimately,
the entrenchment of these links between institutions and the environment
could – and, according to some, did – have negative consequences for the
fate of the political leadership or even state structures as a whole in times
of protracted environmental stress, or could lead to blame and scapegoat-
ing of marginalized or minority groups.64
In turn, colonial actors brought their own perceptions and usually
attempted to marginalize indigenous belief systems, although the extent
to which they succeeded in doing so was context-dependent. In the
Southern African case, even during the seventeenth-century high water
mark of Portuguese power, indigenous beliefs and perceptions concern-
ing rainfall were disparaged but did not disappear – an outcome that likely
had as much to do with the weaknesses of the Portuguese as with the
deep-rooted nature of indigenous norms that had built up over several
centuries. In other cases, however, we observe that it was the perceptions
of the colonists that were remarkable for their change rather than their
rigidity. For example, in Jamaica it has been shown that while the English
60 Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism; Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development.
61 Devereux (ed.), The New Famines. 62 Rohland, Changes in the Air.
63 Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate, History, Society.’
64 Huffman, ‘Climate Change during the Iron Age’; Brook, The Troubled Empire; Klein
et al., ‘Climate, Conflict and Society.’ See also Sections 4.5 and 6.1.4.
5.3 Constraints on Disaster Responses 121
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
imported their puritan ‘wrath of God’ perceptions of extreme weather
events to the Caribbean, this religious perception waned over time as new
environmental knowledge was acquired through repeated encounters
with hurricanes.65 That is to say, environmental hazards themselves
acted as a partial trigger for (informal) institutional adaptation rather
than rigidity, creating new constraints and opportunities for responses
to hazards.
The above paragraphs therefore show a double perspective on institu-
tional rigidity, change, and path dependency. On the one hand, political
and cultural factors seemingly unrelated to hazards had significant effects
on the ability of institutions and societies to cope with such hazards
through enforcing rigidity or enacting change. Yet on the other, recurring
extreme events themselves could also act to influence institutional change
and to overcome rigidities. A challenge for research into institutional
rigidity and path dependency, therefore, is to identify potential patterns
in its possible causes – in other words: what are the mechanisms by which
path-dependent processes come into being or are broken? As we argue
throughout this book, this necessitates a move away from the event-based
focus of many studies on historical disasters.
65 Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society.
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6 Effects of Disasters
The previous chapters have focused on the preconditions and pressures
that make hazards more, or less, likely to occur, and how societies
respond to these hazards – with a view to stopping them turning into
disasters. It is clear, however, that even in the face of adaptive measures,
many societies throughout history could not prevent disastrous conse-
quences – and it is those consequences that are the focus of this chapter.
We divide our discussion between those effects seen only in the immedi-
ate aftermath or the short term – mortality and victims, demographic
recovery, blame, scapegoating, and social dislocation – and longer-term
structural consequences for economic reconstruction, social relations,
and redistribution of resources. Across the course of the chapter we
show that disasters – even ones of similar type and magnitude – did not
always produce homogeneous outcomes, and in some cases even led to
divergent paths of development in the long term. Furthermore, rather
than being totally damaging or even controversially regarded as a ‘force
for good,’ we show that the effects of disasters are best assessed when
making a basic distinction between developments at the aggregate level
(for example, on the basis of GDP recovery) and those at the distributive
level – where it is clear disasters could also be instrumentalized to benefit
a certain segment of a given population over others.
6.1 Short-Term Effects
6.1.1 Victims, Selective Mortality, and Population Recovery
Mortality is one obvious short-term consequence of hazards and shocks,
although it could also have very significant knock-on consequences in the
long term, depending on the scale and nature of death. Mortality has for
a long time been a common indicator for measuring the impact of disas-
ters – both for contemporary and for historical societies – but, as we come
to see in this section, we still lack solid empirical information onmortality
characteristics from many disasters. To some extent, this is down to
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source limitations. Before the nineteenth century, and even in large parts
of the world today, the victims are not always registered meticulously or
accurately. This is sometimes exacerbated because certain groups are
under-represented in statistics as a consequence of their isolated or mar-
ginal position in society. Even when deaths are recorded, problems can
emerge: for example, the registration of casualties in selective environ-
ments such as refugee camps.1 Before enumeration by census became
widespread in the nineteenth century, church burial records offer insights
into excess mortality – although even with this source, coverage is patchy
over time and space (and mainly for Europe only), with limitations such
as our inability to calculate accurate death rates (percentage mortality as
proportion of resident population) and very unsystematic attempts to say
much about cause of death.
Moreover, the discussion on mortality as a measure of disaster impact
raises even more fundamental issues. One pertinent question is whether
mortality figures can actually be a good indicator for the success or failure
of a society to deal with a particular hazard or shock. On the one hand,
mortality seems like the perfect indicator, as it signals the ability of
a society’s institutions, technology, and knowledge to offer protection to
inhabitants’ lives in the face of pre-existing vulnerabilities.2 However, at
the same time, mortality can be a flawed indicator in this regard. First, it
often happens that hazards and the disasters that ensue do not kill, but
rather destroy capital, disrupt societies and institutions, or ruin ecosys-
tems. When mortality is considered the main indicator, all of these disas-
ters are overlooked or underestimated. Furthermore, some of the health
implications connected to disasters play out only over an extended period
of time. The famine of the Great Leap Forward in China in 1958–61, for
example, created early-life stresses that caused lasting damage to health
much further down the line. Individuals born during the famine were,
having reached adulthood, more susceptible to hypertension than the
non-exposed, and they did not attain the same height. They also worked,
on average, fewer hours and their incomes were lower.3 But second, and
more importantly, the causes of death can be unrelated to a resilience or
vulnerability framework. In pre-industrial societies in particular, many
people died of diseases that were perhaps more likely to occur during
periods of hardship, but also could quite reasonably be the result of
a random association or chain of events. More fundamentally, mortality
1 For an interesting and unusual early example seen during the disaster relief program of the
Yellow River Floods of 1935 in Shandong, China, see Li, ‘Life and Death.’
2 For a positive view on mortality as an outcome variable: Sen, ‘Mortality.’
3 Chen & Zhou, ‘The Long-Term Health and Economic Consequences’; Huang et al.,
‘Early Life Exposure.’
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shocks more frequently occurred in what some people may deem
a ‘successful’ society. In the countryside of early-modern England it was
often the case that the poorer marginal areas with low levels of aggregate
wealth were much more salubrious than those with more commercialized
forms of agricultural production – one clear reason being that overall
poverty acted as a stimulant to outward migration rather than inward.4
Selective Mortality Hazards and shocks kill varying numbers of
people, but equally important is that the ‘type’ or ‘status’ of those who die
is not always the same. Floods are generally not the biggest killers, but of
those that do kill, there is often a social profile to the victims – we see this
even in modern times with Hurricane Katrina, along the lines of race and
socio-economic status.5 For the pre-modern era, it has been shown in
a variety of contexts around the world that floods tended to afflict the poor
to a larger degree, because of the greater likelihood that they were residing
in places much more unsuitable for human habitation.6 Indeed, recent
literature on the North Sea coastal floods has shown that landless agricul-
tural laborers, often living in flimsy structures close to dikes, were much
more likely to die, while wealthy farmers survived.7 Certain disasters in
history did kill large numbers of high-status individuals, however: in
Catania during the earthquake of 1693, 62 percent of the clergy were
reported to have died. They fell victim to the collapse of many of the city’s
churches, where at the exact moment of the earthquake an important
religious ceremony was going on.8
Given that the poor live closer to the edge of subsistence than wealthier
groups, it is unsurprising that famines tend to discriminate in their mor-
tality effects according to wealth.9 The belief that poverty reduces access
to scarce food supplies is in fact one of the pillars of Amartya Sen’s
‘entitlement theory.’ Entitlements can be based on the ability to purchase
food, but also on production: Sen has shown that, during the 1974
Bangladesh famine, mortality was far higher among wage laborers than
among farmers.10 During the 1984–85 Darfur famine, however, the
relationship between economic situation and mortality was largely
absent, probably because the effects of occupation were greatly over-
shadowed by the highly localized impact of disease.11 In pre-industrial
4 Dobson, ‘Contours of Death,’ 88–89.
5 Elliott & Pais, ‘Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina.’
6 Morera, ‘Environmental Change,’ 92–93; Perdue, ‘Official Goals,’ 762; Borsch,
‘Environment and Population’; Ali, ‘Malign Growth?,’ 124.
7 Soens, ‘Resilient Societies,’ 163–164.
8 Condorelli, “U tirrimotu ranni,” 231, 403–405.
9 Dyson & Ó Gráda, ‘Introduction,’ 14–15. 10 Sen, Poverty and Famines, 144.
11 De Waal, ‘Famine Mortality,’ 16.
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Europe, the extent of famine mortality tended to diverge between urban
and rural environments. It was often higher in the countryside, even
though that was where food was produced, while the cities stockpiled
provisions for their own residents (attempting to avoid social disorder),
called upon distant trade links for emergency provisions, and generally
had a stronger set of relief institutions.12 It is no surprise, then, that,
during times of famine, country dwellers often migrated to the cities in
search of food and resources – a migration process that in turn helped
raise mortality in the cities.13 Famine mortality could also differ between
rural environments. For example, in sixteenth-century Italy, mountain
communities showed lower mortality rates and recovered more quickly
than the lowlands, despite the harsh environmental conditions, due to
their lower population densities, isolated location, and diversified pro-
ductionmethods.14 In general, highly specialized regions, especially those
focused on grain production, were more likely to witness high mortality
rates than regions that diversified their economic activities and grew
different crops.15
Famines can kill men and women, young and old, at different rates.
Significant amounts of research have suggested over the years that women
have a greater capacity to survive famines than men and that the under-
lying cause is their superior ability to deal with periods of acute
malnutrition.16 Various social factors have been posited as causes, includ-
ing things such as women’s ‘marketable value’ in prostitution, control
over household resources, restricted fertility limiting the dangers of child-
birth, preferential welfare schemes, and a reduced tendency to migrate,
but the overriding explanation is still based on physiology – the ‘body fat
hypothesis.’17 Notably, more body fat also means higher amounts of
leptin – a key driver of the body’s immune system – which is important
given that (a) famines often led to death via diseases rather than outright
starvation, and (b) modern laboratory work tends to show that adult
women are more resistant than adult men to most kinds of bacteria,
viruses, parasites, and fungi (with only a few exceptions such as malaria
and measles). However, while case study evidence is plentiful for the
period after 1850,18 direct quantifiable evidence for the pre-industrial
period is scanty, and we should be careful not to assume that the pre-
12 Curtis & Dijkman, ‘The Escape from Famine,’ 239–240.
13 Alfani, ‘The Famine of the 1590s,’ 31–32; Landers, ‘Mortality,’ 356–361.
14 Alfani, Calamities and the Economy, 136–168.
15 For example in the Beauvais region in early-modern France: Goubert, Beauvais et le
Beauvaisis, 79–80. On the impact of diversification see also Section 4.2.2.
16 Ó Gráda, Famine, 99–102.
17 With nuances: Speakman, ‘Sex- and Age-Related Mortality Profiles,’ 823.
18 Zarulli et al., ‘Women Live Longer.’
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industrial experience inevitably mirrors the modern. When bioarchaeo-
logical or documentary material has appeared, it does not necessarily
provide clear proof – at least not to the same extent.19 Even if we accept
the scientific principle that women have ‘natural’ advantages, certain
social conditions can conspire to push women into close proximity with
points of contagion or vectors, or limit their access to welfare and
resources.20 Male prioritization during scarcity occurred in Northern
India in the early nineteenth century, for example.21 In terms of intra-
household resource distribution during famines, gender-based inequal-
ities also often differed along age lines. In late-Qing China, for example, it
has been shown that elderly women were high up in the food hierarchy,
because of an enduring principle of filial piety, while younger females and
girls were at the bottom.22
Moreover, if there was a ‘female mortality advantage’ during periods
of acute malnutrition, superior survival capacities often came together
with terrible experiences for women – which links back to our previous
statement that mortality is not without its limitations as a disaster effects
indicator. In both nineteenth- and twentieth-century famines in China,
it has been noted that women could often obtain lifesaving resources
such as rice and grain, but at the expense of exploitation – frequently in
the form of rape and sexual abuse.23 Women – especially in the country-
side – could also often find themselves abandoned in isolated areas
during famines, as more mobile men went off in search of resources or
employment in cities.24 Other works have noted the potential for young
girls during food crises to be forced into marriage as minors to obtain the
household’s early access to marital dowries,25 and women could be
‘pawned’ into other households as seen in nineteenth-century
Kenya.26 Posing moral dilemmas on food sharing, these kinds of tactics
can be seen in the same light as infanticide – the sacrifice of the individ-
ual for a perceived ‘greater good.’27 Linked to this, we should also note
that, in certain parts of the world, female children were more likely to be
abandoned than their male counterparts in times of hardship caused by
19 Healey, ‘Famine and the Female Mortality Advantage,’ 186; Yaussy, DeWitte &
Redfern, ‘Frailty and Famine.’
20 Curtis & Han, ‘The Female Mortality Advantage.’
21 Sharma, Famine, 112. On this concept of male prioritization during disasters more
generally: Rivers, ‘Women and Children Last.’
22 Edgerton-Tarpley, ‘Family and Gender in Famine,’ 142; Edgerton-Tarpley, Tears from
Iron, 165, 188.
23 Yang & Cao, ‘Cadres, Grain and Sexual Abuse.’
24 Vaughan, ‘Famine Analysis,’ 186–189. 25 Devereux, ‘Goats before Ploughs,’ 56.
26 Jackson Jr., ‘The Family Entity,’ 205–208.
27 Sen, Poverty and Famines, 29; Agarwal, ‘Gender Relations and Food Security,’ 192.
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famine.28 Certain institutional configurations have been cited as more
likely to provide protection to women in times of food crisis and famine,
however. The development economics literature has exalted the effects
of the commons for women’s adaptive capacities – often presented in
opposition to the market, which is apparently more likely to be organ-
ized by males.29 Furthermore, an alternative to the ‘wife and daughter
selling’ narrative during famines in Qing China has recently been
posed – noting also how, in times of crisis, women would bring an
‘extra’ husband into the family for support.30
The epidemic diseases that were such an important cause of death in
the pre-industrial period could also vary in terms of the population sector
they targeted, and this is important because it had knock-on conse-
quences for the organization of societies and economies. If more adults
of working age died during an epidemic, this created new kinds of societal
vulnerabilities – who was left to care for the elderly, the infirm, the
disabled, or minors? In underdeveloped and developing countries
today, unexpected deaths in adulthood, often during epidemic outbreaks,
create significant social problems – orphaned children and uncared for
elderly parents,31 young survivors left with reduced family or community
support, weak social networks, and poor access to food and healthcare,
and all the while minors assume new roles as ‘heads of household,’
principal care-givers, and earners.32 Conversely, if an epidemic killed
more of the ‘frail’ – those seen to be a drain on resources rather than
a contributor – it could thereby alleviate a number of societal pressures:
fewer to care for, fewer to feed. On a related point, if an epidemic was
highly selective by socio-economic status, mainly victimizing the poor
(perhaps in specific neighborhoods), this led to little structural change in
the economy as new poor migrants simply came in to replace the old
ones – a feature often seen in urbanized areas of early-modern Europe.33
On the other hand, if a disease had ‘universal characteristics,’ killing
a wider range of people, this could destroy a pre-industrial society’s
human capital levels – and then it was not always a given that this would
be quickly and easily replenished.34 Although diseases such as the plague
28 Strengthening the ‘missing women’ phenomenon in places such as China and India: Das
Gupta & Shuzhuo, ‘Gender Bias,’ 487.
29 Agarwal, A Field of One’s Own, 455. And for eighteenth-century Western Europe it was
claimed that the “resources of the commons were often all that stood between [women]
and total destitution”: Hunt,Women in Eighteenth-Century Europe, 148.
30 Sommer, Polyandry, 33, 57–58, 71.
31 Atrash, ‘Parents’ Death and Its Implications for Child Survival.’
32 Ronsmans et al., ‘Effect of Parents’ Death on Child Survival’; De Vreyer & Nilsson,
‘When Solidarity Fails.’
33 Cipolla, ‘The Plague.’ 34 Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics,’ 335.
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are often suggested to be selective against the poor – a link posited from
late Antiquity to present-day outbreaks inMadagascar – episodes such as
the plague of 1629–30 have been shown to be indiscriminate killers.35
Population Recovery One difficulty in accounting for the casual-
ties of disasters is the blurred line between immediate mortality and other
facets of post-disaster population recovery – connected to fertility, nup-
tiality, and migration, for example. Given that we do not always have
good time series for mortality over long periods, some scholars are reliant
on sources giving population counts at different intervals – sometimes
with long temporal gaps – and naturally this kind of information tends to
hide the reality behind what is driving differential rates of recovery after
a disaster.36
Some scholars have suggested that population recovery after disasters is
influenced less by the immediate death rate, and more by other demo-
graphic factors linked to nuptiality and fertility.37 During serious economic
crises – especially those linked to harvest failures and famines – societies
have often experienced lower fertility rates, and this could last for some
time afterwards – as seen with the famine in China associated with the
Great Leap Forward.38 Especially in the pre-industrial period, marriages
were often dependent on the ability to set up an independent household.
This required a plot of land, employment, or adequate savings. Disastrous
famines, therefore, forced individual households to postpone marriages of
their members, and thus birth rates could drop significantly in the first
years or even decades after a disaster. Indeed, it has been said that, inmany
contexts throughout history, there has been a cultural aversion to marriage
during times of scarcity, and in any case, even disregarding newmarriages,
fertility rates went down in existing marriages simply through conditions
much less suitable for conception and for successful full-term pregnancy.39
Parallels can be found in the modern era: in Ethiopia conceptions declined
during the prolonged and multidimensional crisis of the 1980s, when
a combination of civil war, repression, inflation, and especially famine
induced married couples to practice birth control.40
35 On plague and poverty: Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics,’ 326;
Carmichael, Plague and the Poor, 1; Campbell, The Great Transition, 306–307. On the
1629–30 plague as universal killer: Alfani, ‘Plague.’
36 See the critique offered in Roosen & Curtis, ‘The “Light Touch,”’ 36.
37 This is a distinctive view attributed most famously to the Cambridge Population Group:
Wrigley & Schofield, The Population History; perhaps in contrast to those more inclined to
highlight mortality itself: Hatcher, Plague; Benedictow, ‘New Perspectives.’
38 Zhao & Reimondos, ‘The Demography.’ 39 Alfani, ‘The Famine of the 1590s.’
40 Lindstrom & Berhanu, ‘The Impact.’
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This was not always the case for all disasters, however – especially not
for those linked to significant mortality spikes such as epidemics occur-
ring outside famine periods (such as plagues). Here, instead, marriages
and birth rates may have declined temporarily during the chaos of the
peak mortality periods, but in the immediate aftermath, new marriages
spiked – especially driven by remarriages of those who had lost their
partner to disease.41 Of course, this depended on institutional factors
too – some newly single widows or widowers became attractive to pro-
spective new partners on the basis of inheriting resources from their
previous marriage, and in some places, such as Southern Italy, the remar-
riage of men was acceptable but not that of women (who remained
lifelong widows after their husband’s death) – making it necessary for
some to look outside their immediate localities of residence for new
partners.42 Of those women who could technically remarry, not all
decided to do so – those inheriting resources from deceased partners to
support themselves independently may have chosen to enjoy freedoms
outside the constraints of marriage.43 Furthermore, in some rural areas
men left women and children behind, and did not return – creating sex-
skewed habitation patterns in their places of origin, with distorting effects
upon marriage opportunities. Accordingly, the rates of remarriage
depended on a complex set of pre-existing configurations in inheritance
practice, dowry demands, and access to and control of property.44 This
process was often further complicated by the fact that mortality crises
caused by famines or epidemics affected not only nuptiality rates, but also
the average ages at which people decided to marry, and this had obvious
knock-on effects for fertility and the rate at which populations could
replenish themselves.45
Population levels could also be affected by societal shifts that were
initiated during or after a disaster. For example, during the ‘calamitous’
fourteenth century, many people succumbed to disease, famine, and
warfare, but population recovery was sometimes halted, and this did not
always have purely demographic causes. Regions that were previously
densely populated and supporting labor-intensive arable agriculture in
Europe, for example, were transformed into labor-extensive pastoral
societies. Before the Black Death the main problem was keen competi-
tion for agricultural opportunities, but after the plague the main prob-
lem became that there were too few agricultural opportunities
altogether – necessitating outward migration to the cities – particularly
41 Livi Bacci, La société italienne, 67–69. 42 Da Molin, ‘Family Forms,’ 520.
43 Franklin, ‘Peasant Widows’ “Liberation.”’
44 Guinnane & Ogilvie, ‘A Two-Tiered Demographic System.’
45 Carmichael et al., ‘The European Marriage Pattern,’ 16.
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for women.46 This kind of rural–urban movement explains why cities in
some areas appeared to be more resilient in the face of mortality spikes
than the countryside. Not everyone migrated, however: the capacity for
people to stay in, or repopulate, a particular area depended on the
economic opportunities that were provided for wage labor, access to
property, and institutional forms of welfare such as the commons and
poor relief.47 The same can be seen in modern times. After the major
tsunami in 2004 caused by the Indian Ocean earthquake, many Sri
Lankan coastal communities were unable to replenish themselves.
This was not necessarily only connected with the casualties of the
flood wave itself, but also with the inland relocation of the fishing
communities after the disaster. Because of government interventions,
coastal villages were demolished and replaced by hotel complexes and
tourism, which turned the densely populated coastal zones of Sri Lanka
into vast uninhabited stretches of beach.48
Population recovery was often highly influenced by migration, which is
one of the most common responses during and after disasters of all kinds.
During epidemics, a commonly suggested pattern was flight from the
cities while the disease was active in its worst phases, and rural–urban
migration in the aftermath as people looked to fill vacancies.49 Epidemics
often occurred during periods of warfare – conflicts that frequently bore
heavier consequences for rural communities – and thus may have further
heightened movement towards ‘safe harbors’ in the city.50 This inward
movement of people to the cities is said to be one of the reasons for the
establishment of ‘urban graveyards’ – high-mortality urban demographic
regimes – in Europe by the early-modern period and thus shows the
circular nature of this process: hazards create movement of people, move-
ment of people creates new hazards.51 However, it must be noted that
quantitative empirical evidence to flesh out these arguments still remains
scarce – they are often based on abstract modeling, logical intuition,
anecdotal evidence, or evidence of a low-resolution macro nature – or
the logic behind the mechanisms posited remains conflicted. Elsewhere,
during other disasters, many families may have migrated intending an
immediate return to their place of origin, but then were prevented from
doing so. For example, after the Lisbon earthquake, several previously
poor neighborhoods were not rebuilt in the same way, but the land was
46 Voigtländer & Voth, ‘How the West “Invented” Fertility Restriction.’
47 Curtis, ‘The Impact.’ 48 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 8.
49 Borsch & Sabraa, ‘Refugees of the Black Death.’
50 The ‘safe harbors’ concept is developed in Dincecco & Onorato, ‘Military Conflict’; also
Rosenthal & Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 104–105.
51 Voigtländer & Voth, ‘The Three Horsemen.’
6.1 Short-Term Effects 131
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
used for more prestigious building projects. Accordingly, the rates of
replenishment were quite different – not only across localities, but also
across neighborhoods of the same locality.52 In other cases, the rebuilding
process evolved more freely – with deliberate incentives such as the
reduction of mortgages on sold buildings and plots to entice inhabitants
back – as seen in depopulated Catania after the 1693 earthquake that hit
wide areas of eastern Sicily.53
6.1.2 Land Loss and Capital Destruction
The second-most-important measure of a disaster is capital destruction
and howmuch land is lost or affected. Images of eroding cliffs, mudslides,
and inundated coastal estates are often used to show the effects of global
warming, as are interactive maps of coastal zones that will be flooded if
there is a rise in sea level. This indicator is important not only because loss
of land is often traumatic for the affected communities, but also because
many disasters cause onlyminimal human casualties but large amounts of
physical destruction.54
A case in point is the American Dust Bowl in the 1930s. Although it
caused no direct casualties, it has been called the worst human-made
environmental disaster the United States has ever experienced. As dis-
cussed earlier, the Dust Bowl refers to a decade of extreme soil erosion on
the American Plains, stretching from Mexico across the continental
United States towards Canada. Owing to the combination of
a prolonged and severe drought and the destructive nature of monocul-
ture on the fragile plains, the vegetation cover was reduced fundamen-
tally, allowing wind to sweep away the topsoil. This phenomenon created
large dust storms that caused ‘apocalyptic’ darkness during daylight
hours and buried houses, roads, and fields with sand dunes. The worst
problem, however, was the cumulative loss of the thin layer of productive
topsoil. By the 1940s up to 75 percent of that topsoil had been lost in the
most severely affected zones, resulting in large permanent declines in land
values – somewhere between 17 and 30 percent per acre, depending on
the scale of erosion. The total agricultural loss amounted to 2.4 billion
dollars (equivalent to 30 billion in 2007 dollars). Migration was the only
option for the most affected farmers and tenants, who moved en masse
from the plains towards economically more viable states such as
California.55
52 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 487–488.
53 Condorelli, ‘The Reconstruction of Catania,’ 802. 54 See also Section 2.1.
55 Hornbeck, ‘The Enduring Impact,’ 1478. For the literature on the Dust Bowl, see also
Sections 1.2 and 4.1.
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Although a modernist approach to land exploitation had contributed to
the American Dust Bowl, this type of catastrophic land loss due to soil
erosion and sand drifts is not simply a modern phenomenon. For example,
during the ninth and tenth centuries, the village of Kootwijk in the
Netherlands was buried in a dune several meters deep, forcing the commu-
nity to abandon the site. Thismedieval dust bowl wasmost probably caused
by large-scale land clearances and the creation of open fields – in sharp
contrast to former land use – incorporating smaller dispersed farmsteads
within woodlands.56 Up to today, the active dune has not been stabilized.
Even swifter than sand drifts was land loss caused by floods. Again in the
Low Countries, river floods often caused havoc, including destruction of
mills, sluices, ovens, and other capital goods, as well as the loss of livestock,
but not permanent land loss since thewater usually receded again after a few
months.57 The fertility of the river clay soils and river valleys often made it
Figure 6.1 Dust Bowl farm in the Coldwater District, north of Dalhart, Texas,
June 1938. Dorothea Lange/Farm Security Administration via Library of
Congress.
56 Heidinga, ‘The Birth of a Desert.’
57 Van Bavel, Curtis & Soens, ‘Economic Inequality.’
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worthwhile to reclaim and embank the land again – a sharp contrast to what
could be done in less fertile sandy areas hit by sand drifts. However,
permanent land losses were more frequent in the case of sea floods caused
by storm surges, tropical hurricanes, or tsunamis. Yet, on balance, recovery
of land was still the rule, and permanent losses the exception.58
Although warfare may have been the most significant destroyer of
capital in the past,59 arguably the greatest form of capital destruction by
specifically nature-induced disasters has been caused by earthquakes –
particularly for urbanized areas. The Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923,
for example, led to an estimated 204 billion US dollars’ worth of damage
(2010 HNDECI adjusted).60 In the course of time, as societies became
wealthier and fixed capital goods costlier and more sophisticated, the
possible absolute costs of destruction increased in parallel, and in recent
decades these have risen faster than the losses of lives.61 A prime example
is the earthquake, and the ensuing tsunami, which struck Japan in 2011,
destroying or damaging almost one million buildings, and triggering
a meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear powerplant. Cost estimates vary
considerably and show a rising tendency as time progresses, but some of
the more recent calculations made by independent research institutes
suggest that the total costs may be as high as 500 to 700 billion
US dollars.62 However, as a share of GDP, it is not always the case
that the most highly developed and highly urbanized societies were
hit the hardest: the worst two cases in modern history were the 1988
Spitak Earthquake in Armenia (around 360 percent of nominal GDP)
and that of 2010 in Haiti (around 120 percent of nominal GDP),
both hitting a relatively small and poor country very hard.63 Other
disasters cost much smaller shares of GDP. This argument can also be
extended temporally: while the absolute costs for pre-twentieth-century
societies were lower, in relative shares of GDP, many earthquakes were
devastating. The 1755 Lisbon Earthquake, with the ensuing tsunami and
fire, for example, made two-thirds of the city uninhabitable, destroyed
86 percent of all church buildings, and resulted in the loss of large sums
in gold, silver, diamonds, coins, and furnishings. A recent reconstruction
suggests that the damage came to between a third and a half of total
Portuguese GDP.64
58 Soens, ‘Resilient Societies,’ 154.
59 Piketty, Capital, 106–109, 146–149; Scheidel, The Great Leveler, 146–148.
60 Daniell, Wenzel & Khazai, ‘The Cost of Historic Earthquakes Today.’
61 Alexander, ‘The Study of Natural Disasters,’ 285. See also Section 2.2.
62 Behling et al., ‘Aftermath of Fukushima,’ 414.
63 Daniell, Wenzel & Khazai, ‘The Cost of Historic Earthquakes Today.’
64 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 473–477.
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6.1.3 Economic Crisis
A final measure of the short-run material effect of disasters is the eco-
nomic impact. Disasters can trigger a temporary decline in GDP levels
leading to economic crisis: HurricaneMaria reduced Puerto Rico’s econ-
omy by 3 percent in 2018.65 The pleas to invest more resources to halt
climate change are often based on predictions of dropping economic
performance levels and high social and economic costs. Impact on GDP,
however, is not always straightforward to measure or analyze. If the
destruction is followed by (international) relief, the rebuilding of houses,
and the repair and possibly improvement of the damaged infrastructure,
the effectmay be positive rather than negative. For contemporary disasters,
the literature is inconclusive: while some have argued that only disasters
followed by political unrest or instability have a negative impact on GDP
per capita,66 others argue that major nature-induced disasters in low- and
middle-income countries unleash significant economic setbacks – up to
6.83 percent of per capita GDP for the top 1 percent of disasters in the
period 1979–2010.67
The nature and intensity of the disaster, but also its preconditions (see
Chapter 3) and the immediate reaction to the disaster, all influence the way
it may lead to economic crisis. The historical evidence on this is rather
meager, not least because historical GDP data are either absent or available
only at aggregate national levels, whereas most disasters affect only parts of
countries. The 1755 earthquake, fire, and tsunami in Portugal not only
destroyed large numbers of buildings and large amounts of capital, but also
caused food prices to surge (by 83 percent for wheat and by 171 percent for
barley in 1756–57, compared with pre-earthquake average levels) while
wages remained stable, except for those of skilled laborers in the building
industry, who for some years received an extra premium due to the extraor-
dinary demand for reconstruction work. In the years following the disaster,
the already substantial trade deficit of the country, financed by Brazilian
gold, widened, as massive amounts of construction materials such as
Swedish iron had to be imported.68 At the same time, however, the eco-
nomic misery forced the Portuguese to reduce their imports of British
textiles and other consumables, which in the longer termmay have helped,
together with the institutional reforms of Pombal, to gain economic inde-
pendence from Britain and to promote renewed economic growth.69
65 Source: World Bank data, https://data.worldbank.org/country/puerto-rico?view=chart.
66 Cavallo et al., ‘Catastrophic Natural Disasters.’
67 Felbermayr & Gröschl, ‘Naturally Negative,’ 104.
68 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 478–481.
69 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 491–495. See also Section 6.3.3.
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While the 1755 earthquake triggered economic disruption through its
destruction of capital (including human capital),70 other disasters provoked
economic crisis because they affected specific economic sectors, especially
in so-called ‘mono-product’ economies highly dependent on a limited range
of activities. The 1279–80 sheep scab epizootic in England illustrates this.
Sheep scab is an acute and contagious form of dermatitis caused by sheep
mites and it often occurs during damp and cold winters. At that time in
England, sheep were kept in folds, and the survival rate of the mites and
their offspring was higher because of the colder conditions. Accordingly, in
eight months almost 50 percent of the total sheep population in England
and Wales were killed by the disease.71 Even sheep that remained fit to be
shorn provided fleeces of far inferior quality and the unit sale prices dropped
significantly. This had economic repercussions, since fine English wool was
one of the most sought-after commodities in Northwest Europe: clips of
wool could be sold years in advance, despite the risk of murrain or sheep
scab. When the disaster struck, many Cistercian abbeys could not provide
the wool they were committed to supplying, and were forced into bank-
ruptcy. The epizootic, however, had even more far-reaching economic
effects. The 1280s was the single worst decade of the thirteenth century
because the implosion of wool production affected wool prices, textile
production, and international trade. In the second half of the thirteenth
century,GDPper head inEngland is estimated to have shrunk from$828 to
$679 because of the sheep scab episode. Between 1277 and 1285 national
income contracted by a quarter, showing how crucial the production of
wool was for the value of the national economic output.72 After 1285 wool
production and the English economy as a whole recovered.73
The economic crises resulting respectively from the 1755 Lisbon
Earthquake and the 1279–80 sheep scab epizootic were followed by
renewed economic growth in subsequent years. But sometimes the impact
of a disaster was more lasting, resulting in a full-blown economic depres-
sion lasting for decades or even a century. On a regional scale, we could
point to the impact of the Dust Bowl in the United States in the 1930s.
Because of the loss of up to 70 percent of the productive topsoil, the
affected states that were predominantly agricultural producers took a big
hit. Even within the time frame of the Great Depression, the Dust Bowl
seriously affected the economy, and population and land values took
70 Argument for effects on human capital also made for the 1629–30 North/Central Italian
plague: Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics,’ 335.
71 Slavin, ‘Epizootic Landscapes.’
72 Campbell, The Great Transition, 167. The dollar values are 1990 dollars, commonly used
in GDP per capita reconstructions.
73 Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 206–207.
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decades to recover (see Section 6.1.2). Some scholars have even argued
that terrible disasters in the past have led to lasting economic divergences
between regions. For example, the severity and spread of the 1629–30 and
1656–58 plagues in Italy causedmajor economic setbacks through declines
in internal demand and destruction of human capital, and according to
Guido Alfani may have been responsible for the shift in economic center of
gravity away from the Mediterranean to Northwest Europe.74
Of course, explaining economic crisis as well as growth requires us to
take into account a whole range of variables, and the examples above
merely illustrate that nature-induced disasters can play a role in this
process – widening an economic crisis which was already unfolding,
temporarily damaging vital industries, and paving theway for competitors
to enter the market, or triggering institutional responses which in turn
have either a beneficial or a damaging impact on economic growth. In
history as well as today, the link between disaster and economic crisis
tends to be complex and multi-directional.
6.1.4 Scapegoating, Blame, and Social Unrest
Of all types of hazard and shock, epidemics have had the longest tradition
of being associated with blame, scapegoating, and even extreme social
responses such as violence.75 Scholars have claimed that “blaming has
always been a means to make mysterious and devastating diseases com-
prehensible and therefore possibly controllable,”76 and an ‘inevitable’
component of a pre-modern mentalité with poorly formed understanding
of causes and cures. This narrative was well entrenched in the 1980s, at
a time when societies themselves became preoccupied with HIV/AIDS,
leading in turn to widespread concern about the activities of prostitutes,
homosexuals, drug dealers, and a general economic ‘underclass.’ In the
1990s this was further fueled by the ‘cultural turn’ within the field of
history, where fascination with the persecution and burning of witches,
for example, sparked interest in researching the role of ‘plague poisoners’
or ‘syphilis spreaders.’77
A persistent feature associated with the above-mentioned view is the
focus on the capacity of epidemic diseases to loosen the bonds of society,
74 Alfani, ‘Plague in Seventeenth-Century Europe.’ Similar shocks to demand and long-
distance trade via epidemics and famines have been argued for fifteenth-century Europe,
ushering in a new age of insular economic practices: Campbell, The Great Transition,
17–19.
75 See the early literature of Baehrel, ‘La haine de classe’; Baehrel, ‘Epidémie et terreur.’
76 Nelkin & Gilman, ‘Placing Blame,’ 362.
77 Naphy, Plagues, Poisons, and Potions; Sidky,Witchcraft, 90–91; Bever, ‘Witchcraft,’ 573;
Ross, ‘Syphilis.’
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disrupt communities from their ‘normal’ patterns of life, and create
unrest.78 For the Black Death of 1347–52, scholars have focused on the
amplification of social tensions, where lawlessness, thefts, and violence
were on the up.79 This is often presented as a ‘Boccaccian’ breakdown in
morals and values – priests, medics, and law-enforcement officials refus-
ing to interact with the afflicted, familymembers abandoned to their fates,
and unscrupulous types waiting around like vultures to appropriate the
goods of those who have passed away.80 Accordingly, it is also unsurpris-
ing that a ‘Foucauldian’ narrative became dominant – epidemics were
seen as a ‘tool’ for powerful elites and authorities to repress and persecute
weaker or disenfranchised members of society.81 Urban governments
often used the plague as an opportunity to crack down on those viewed
with suspicion, such as vagrants, beggars, and prostitutes,82 while church
authorities used epidemics – but also floods and harvest failures – as a sign
of divine retribution for ostentation, greed, and display, legitimizing calls
for frugality, piety, or general adaptations of societal behavior.83 Some of
these aspects of disease psychology are still discernible today, with fears
perhaps in some regards even heightened through globalization and the
notion that ‘exotic’ diseases can be transported into ‘modern’ urban
environments.84 In recent times we have seen Muslims blamed for poi-
soning water systems during the 1994 Surat plague in India,85 and wit-
nessed the victimization of Asian populations in Chinatowns of various
Western cities in the wake of SARS.86
Aside from epidemics, a cultural turn within the general field of disaster
history also led to increased interest in scapegoating and blame.
A notorious example is the wave of witch hunts which appear to coincide
with some of the coldest decades of the Little Ice Age: between 1570 and
1650 a remarkable peak in witch trials and convictions occurred in large
parts of Europe.87 While most cultural historians have pointed to jurid-
ical, gender, political, and confessional reasons for this period of mass
convictions, Behringer and Pfister proposed a causal link between
extreme weather – leading to repeated harvest failures and floods – and
witch hunts.88 In this period of climatic extremes, cool and wet summers
78 Delumeau, La peur en Occident, 145–165.
79 Shirk, ‘Violence and the Plague’; Bowsky, ‘The Impact of the Black Death’; and for other
plagues: Pastore, Crimine e giustizia; Rose, ‘Plague and Violence.’
80 Biraben, Les hommes et la peste, I, 117. 81 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 195–200.
82 Lis & Soly, Poverty and Capitalism, 79.
83 Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches, 46–48; Akasoy, ‘Islamic Attitudes.’
84 Covello, von Winterfeldt & Slovic, ‘Risk Communication.’
85 Barrett, ‘The 1994 Plague.’ 86 Eichelberger, ‘SARS and New York’s Chinatown.’
87 Briggs, “Many Reasons Why.”
88 Behringer, ‘Climatic Change and Witch-Hunting’; Pfister, ‘Climatic Extremes.’
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were commonplace, sometimes with snowstorms, floods caused by glacial
melt, and hailstorms destroying entire harvests. Although Le Roy Ladurie
claimed that climatic changes had only minor effects on society, Pfister
argues that recurring events of this nature have a fundamental impact on
the mentality of a society. While urging caution against a deterministic
link between the weather events of the Little Ice Age and witch hunts,
Pfister makes the point that cross-regional surges in witch hunts cannot
be explained simply by confessional issues and juridical laxity in the
regions affected.89 The causal links between climate and witchcraft can
be found in court records and ego-documents, where accusations of
‘weather magic’ were common and included charges such as destroying
growing crops, causing harvested crops to rot, and spreading diseases
among animals. Before 1570, extreme weather events had urged commu-
nities to take juridical action, but most cases were dismissed. After 1589,
however, large-scale witch hunts were organized. Local communities –
collectives, for example – demanded juridical action against unidentified
groups of witches blamed for causing the hazards.90 In the famine year of
1649–50 in Scotland, large witch trials were held; the Scottish parliament
claimed that the sin of witchcraft had increased daily and issued 500
commissions to try suspected witches.91
Comparable forms of scapegoating associated with extreme weather
events can be found in sub-Saharan Africa, linking up with the practice of
rainmaking discussed earlier. In the nineteenth-century Zulu kingdom, for
example, severe and protracted drought events were often linked with
different forms of social unrest by way of the apportionment of blame by
the Zulu leadership.92 In the early nineteenth century, rainmakers – special
doctors who attempted to influence supernatural forces through the
manipulation of rain medicines – were called upon to bring rain in times
of drought; however, when this failed during a protracted drought in the
1820s, rainmakers across the region were killed and Shaka, the Zulu ruler,
appropriated control of rainmaking rituals to strengthen his position as
a link to ancestral spirits. This position was nevertheless a perilous one, as
the ruler risked rebellion if he did not deliver rain. Thus, when severe,multi-
year drought struck the region again in 1861–63, further forms of social
unrest become widespread in the documentary and oral record. In particu-
lar, accounts are replete with reports of ‘outsiders’ accused of ‘nailing the
ground’ by driving wooden pegs or metal nails into hilltops, apparently to
prevent rain.While the origin of this practice is unclear, what is noticeable is
89 Le Roy Ladurie, Times of Feast, 119; Pfister, ‘Climatic Extremes.’
90 Behringer, ‘Climatic Change and Witch-Hunting.’
91 Parker, ‘Crisis and Catastrophe.’ 92 Klein et al., ‘Climate, Conflict and Society.’
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that it was used to transfer blame from the leadership to outsiders or
minority groups. This gave the Zulu ruler an explanation as to why he no
longer controlled the skies to the benefit of his people, while the violent
response to these minority groups also generated fear of questioning the
authority of the kingdom.
Fear, blame, and scapegoating – perhaps even leading to violence –
have, then, been for a long time closely associated with historical disaster
outcomes in the short term. However, in recent years, research has also
started to slowly revise some of these established views – particularly with
regard to epidemics. Some have gone as far as to say that epidemic disease
outbreaks could also lead to greater bonds of cohesion and compassion.93
So, while the BlackDeath of 1347–52 did indeed lead to themost extreme
persecution of Jewish families, who were rounded up and burnt to death
in the worst cases,94 this experience was not necessarily replicated in later
recurring plagues of the Second Pandemic. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century commentators in Europe often displayed pride in the funds they
raised in cities to aid the afflicted poor, and festivities and ceremonies
developed in some regions as a celebration of solidarity.95 Even for the
Black Death itself, recent literature has shown examples of continued
compassion and professionalism during epidemics,96 and quantifiable
evidence disputes that there was an increase in criminal activity or
a breakdown in legislative institutions.97 The same has been said of
leprosy: while a long-held view is that this disease brought exceptional
stigmatization in the medieval and early-modern periods, recent revision
suggests this has been exaggerated and may perhaps derive from nine-
teenth-century politicians’ attempts to justify their own cruel treatment
plans.98
Furthermore, even when epidemics did draw societies out of their
‘normal’ patterns, it does not appear inevitable that this manifested itself
in targeting of the weak or attempts at social control from above by elites.
Some of the literature has instead shown a moderate and negotiated
balance between isolation, quarantine, and medical concerns, on the
one hand, and the need for maintaining economic and commercial life,
and the continuance of ritual engagements, civic freedoms, and custom-
ary community ties on the other.99 When there was a breakdown in social
93 Cohn, Epidemics, 68–92.
94 Cohn, ‘The Black Death and the Burning of Jews’; Colet et al., ‘The Black Death and Its
Consequences.’
95 Cohn, Epidemics, 87–92. In Naples in 1658 there was even an insinuation that collective
celebratory festivities had perpetuated the disease: Guarino, ‘Spanish Celebrations,’ 30.
96 Wray, Communities and Crisis, Chapters 3 and 5; Wray, ‘Boccaccio and the Doctors.’
97 Dean, ‘Plague and Crime,’ 385. 98 Rawcliffe, Leprosy, 43.
99 Wilson Bowers, Plague and Public Health; Murphy, ‘Plague Ordinances,’ 144.
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order, generally it went in the opposite direction to the ‘Foucauldian’
narrative, as lower orders used the epidemic as an opportunity to offer
either passive or active resistance against visible representatives of elites
and authorities – often city officials, medics, or ‘plague workers.’100 Even
more famously, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, cholera
became associatedwithmass uprisings and violence from below – elements
of which have been mirrored in the twenty-first century.101 A paradox in
this context was that disruption from below – although itself constituting
a breakdown in social order – originated in an intention to preserve tightly
held customs and norms, especially with regard to burial practices.
Therefore, it is important to note something persistently linking pre-
industrial, modern, and contemporary responses: communal suspicions
and distrust of the decisions and actions of ‘elites’, ‘authorities’, ‘experts,’
or ‘outsiders’ are seen even today in the wake of serious epidemics – the
case of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa is an obvious example,
leading to violent resistance and outcry at the local level.102 The need to
engage local communities and be respectful of their cultural contexts when
developing disaster response strategies (such as quarantine) is something
that not only runs very deep across different societies, but also goes far back
in time.
6.2 Societal Collapse
As mentioned already in this book,103 disaster research in recent years has
tended to place more emphasis on the resilience of societies, communities,
and individuals in overcoming the challenges presented by hazards and
shocks. Societal resilience and adaptation – to differing degrees – have
become the ‘norm’; even if at the same time certain groups of people within
those societies were also differentially vulnerable. Indeed, prolonged crises
leading to total societal collapses – with systemic dysfunction – have been
shown to have been rare in historical perspective. Nevertheless, these
extreme occurrences did happen. Although a commonly accepted defin-
ition of societal collapse is hard to come by, many scholars agree that it
represents a rapid, fundamental transformation of the social, political, and
100 Curtis, ‘Preserving the Ordinary.’ A broader thesis on plague as a catalyst for popular
social unrest is presented in Cohn, Lust for Liberty, Chapters 9 and 10.
101 Snowden, ‘Cholera’; Briggs, ‘Cholera and Society’; also for Third Pandemic plague
outbreaks: Lynteris, ‘Suspicious Corpses.’ For the recent social unrest in the wake of
post-earthquake cholera in Haiti, which was seen as brought to the country by ‘out-
siders’ (the UN): Farmer, Haiti, Chapter 7.
102 Kutalek et al., ‘Ebola Interventions’; Pellecchia et al., ‘Social Consequences of Ebola’;
Calain & Poncin, ‘Reaching Out to Ebola Victims.’
103 See Section 2.3.4.
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economic structures of a complex society for multiple generations.104
Often these transformations have fundamental effects on the environment,
on the population, and on ideology, values, and belief systems.
Although we view societal collapse as being historically rare, older his-
torical literature tended to see the process as something that was almost
inevitable: all ‘great’ societies and civilizations rise but eventually fall. This
paradigm arguably began with Edward Gibbon and The History of the
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), connecting this fall with the
idea of ‘moral decay.’105 According to the narrative, republican spirit,
modesty, and militarism gave way to a decadent society focused on luxury
and pacifism, creating fundamental vulnerabilities towards invasions and,
in turn, collapse. This belief in moral decay as intrinsic to societal collapse
had already been proclaimed by Ibn Khaldun, writing in the fourteenth
century, when he described the rise and fall of the Islamic Empire. In the
nineteenth century, archaeological discoveries of past civilizations that had
collapsed served to enhance these views. ‘Egyptmania’ and explorations of
ancient Babylon and Assyria, and the rediscovery of the Mayan and Inca
capitals, showed that historical societies that had blossomed for centuries
all ultimately reached a peak and then seemingly abruptly collapsed. The
cyclical nature also corresponded to Darwinian insights that all organisms
and species go through the stages of growth, maturity, and decline.
Recent literature still discusses societal collapses, but they are no longer
explained by moral standards – referred to by Tainter as ‘empirically
unknowable’ or ‘unobservable’ factors – and instead are commonly linked
to environmental hazards, including resource depletion as well as climatic
changes and tectonic hazards, and the disasters that can ensue.106 For
example, weather extremes or larger-scale climatic shifts have been cen-
tral in explaining the multiple ‘disappearances’ of ancient societies. The
sudden and simultaneous collapses of the Ancient Egyptian, Indian, and
Mesopotamian societies have been linked with climatic anomalies and
extreme drought around 4000 years ago,107 while a similar occurrence of
drought has been linked with the Maya Terminal Classic collapse in 900
CE, and the decline of the states centered around Mapungubwe and
Great Zimbabwe during the early to middle part of the second millen-
nium CE in Southern Africa.108 The collapse of the Western Roman
104 Definition based on Butzer &Endfield, ‘Critical Perspectives’; Luzzadder-Beach, Beach
& Dunning, ‘Wetland Fields,’ 3646; Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies.
105 Gibbon, The History. 106 Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies.
107 Dalfes, Kukla & Weiss (eds.), Third Millennium BC Climate Change.
108 The classical perspective is described and revised in Luzzadder-Beach, Beach &
Dunning, ‘Wetland Fields’; Holmgren & Öberg, ‘Climate Change,’ 185–195;
Huffman, ‘Climate Change during the Iron Age.’
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Empire is nowadays presented as an outcome of climatic instability and
the detrimental effects of terrible epidemics such as the Antonine and
Cyprianic Plagues.109 Particular episodes such as the Little Ice Age have
also been posited as the explanation for societal collapses – most notably
the demise of the Norse society in Greenland, which has been in part
attributed to the general cooling and therefore inhospitable conditions of
the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.110
Nevertheless, environmental explanations of societal collapse have
attracted some serious critiques. First, many of these studies have been
labeled environmentally deterministic, because of the mono-causal
nature of explanations and the simplistic image that is often painted –
one that is often driven by the signals of paleoclimate data, the dating of
which is often uncertain.111 Increasingly, however, emphasis has been
placed on the co-agency between weather extremes and societal trans-
formations rather than on direct causality.112 Second, the causal relation-
ship between environmental hazards and eventual collapse is not easily
established. Several societies in decline, such as the Ancient Egyptian,
Mesopotamian, and Indian civilizations, did not actually collapse simul-
taneously during a single drought event, but declined over the course of
more than two centuries – requiring amore nuanced understanding of the
temporal dynamics.113 This point also relates back to issues with the
definition of collapse itself. For some scholars, population numbers and
societal complexity outweigh forms of cultural survival such as language
and religion, while others may hold art styles and literary traditions as
counter-evidence for collapse. Thus identifying cases of ‘collapse’ is as
much a value judgement over what one considers as success and failure as
an empirical one.114
Equally fundamental is the point raised by Tainter – writing three
decades ago – that attempts at explaining collapse have often descended
into primarily factual contests around whether particular pieces of histor-
ical or archaeological evidence either support or contradict a certain
position. In his view, and this is arguably still the case in some of the
literature on this topic, this has been at the expense of more careful
consideration of the logic of the original proposition around collapse.
This involves more basic questions such as “how can environmental or
109 Harper, The Fate of Rome.
110 The classical perspective is described and revised in Dugmore et al., ‘Cultural
Adaptation.’
111 Middleton, ‘Nothing Lasts Forever.’
112 Warde, ‘Global Crisis’; Degroot, The Frigid Golden Age.
113 Luzzadder-Beach, Beach & Dunning, ‘Wetland Fields.’
114 See arguments in McNeill, ‘Sustainable Survival.’
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climatic factors lead to collapse?” and “can these variables really account
for the eventual outcome?” If these questions cannot be answered con-
vincingly, then any discussion of evidence becomes a distraction.
Evidence also suggests that decline usually does not result in complete
collapse, but rather in the eventual transformation into a fundamentally
new type of society. Total abandonment such as that experienced by the
Norse society of Greenland is extremely rare and represents an anomaly
in the course of history. Although climate and disease have been linked
with the decline of the Western Roman Empire by some authors, others
have tried to point to elements of adaptation, transition, and continuity
instead.115 In the case of Ancient Egypt, the two intermediate periods
were not sudden collapses between periods of grandeur, but were pre-
ceded by significant societal transformations, political problems, and
social unrest that eventually led to a period of turmoil and a new societal
state. This can hardly be called a societal collapse, since some social
groups or parts of society showed signs of resilience and adaptation that
are masked by the often grand-scale political changes.116 Overall, then,
we should make it clear that societal collapse was the exception rather
Figure 6.2 Painting by Thomas Cole, The Course of Empire – Destruction
(1833–36). Gift of The New York Gallery of the Fine Arts.
115 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome; Haldon et al., ‘Plagues.’
116 Butzer, ‘Collapse, Environment, and Society.’
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than the rule throughout history – and even some of the so-called ‘classic’
collapses may be conceived of more as transitions and adaptations rather
than as the destruction of all social, economic, and political structures.
That is not to say, however, that we should downplay the severity and
trauma of these reconfigurations – indeed, even though we regard them as
transformations rather than collapses, these processes still went hand in
hand with large social costs, especially for the most vulnerable segments
of those societies.
6.3 Long-Term Effects
Until now we have zoomed in on mitigation strategies and short-term
effects and recovery, but as historians we also need to draw attention to
long-term effects that are either frequently overlooked or impossible to
foresee or measure for very recent disasters. The immediate link is not
always that clear, and other societal factors can interfere as well.
Nevertheless, these slower processes and long-term effects are critical,
especially in cases of recurrent or repetitive shocks. In general three
outcomes are possible: recovery, stagnation, or decline. Currently much
of the focus lies on societies that adapt after a hazard or shock and
therefore are able to recover in the long run, but alternative scenarios
are possible too. These different paths are discussed over the course of
this section.
6.3.1 Disasters as a Force for Good? Economic Effects
In some cases, disasters have been seen as ‘positive shocks’ that stimulate
economic changes. Although, as iterated above, adaptation was never
inevitable in the aftermath of a disaster, sometimes these events did
become a force for good. Earthquakes that destroyed large parts of cities
caused significant damage to people and capital, but other, ‘positive’
consequences could be the complete re-planning of the city, making it
safer and healthier,117 or the increased demand for employment in the
building and laboring industries – also a feature of flooding. Some
scholars have pointed to new property reforms, adaptation of antiquated
inheritance laws, and modernization of land markets as some of the
economic ‘benefits’ to come out of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake.118 As
mentioned already, people could learn from disasters, developing new
117 Condorelli, “U tirrimotu ranni,” 331–353; Andreau, ‘Histoire des séismes.’
118 Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster,’ 467; with a response in Aguirre, ‘Better
Disaster Statistics’; and some disagreement in Serrão & Santos, ‘Land Policies.’
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policies, institutions, and infrastructures that not only protected societies
more securely from future hazards or shocks, but also entailed more
widespread gains for overall welfare and development.
What we need to ask, however, is whether short-term reconstruction
always equates to long-term economic recovery. Evidence tends to sug-
gest that long-term aggregate economic developments after disasters were
quite diverse. In his latest book The Great Transition, Bruce Campbell
elaborates on the distinct paths that Western Europe and Asia took from
the second half of the thirteenth century onwards, as the then known
world came to be hit by a series of epizootics, harvest failures, epidemics,
and weather extremes within the broad framework of cooler and unstable
global climatic conditions. This occurred simultaneously – perhaps caus-
ally – with a series of revolts, wars, and mass migrations, one of the most
famous being the Mongol invasion of Genghis Khan, which affected
different empires and societies all along the network of the Silk Road.
While many parts of China were far superior to Europe in technological
and economic development before this Great Transition, the aftermath
sawChina’s star wane through repeated wars and environmental distress.
According to Campbell, this outcome could not possibly be explained by
the economic, political, or social trends that manifested themselves at the
start of the fourteenth century. Only by looking at the combined effects of
war, disease, and environmental change and the coordinated responses
that were taken by the different societies can this divergence be explained.
The calamitous fourteenth century, therefore, was pivotal in shaping the
long-term economic divergences of East and West.119
With specific regard to the long-term economic impact of epidemic
diseases, there has been a lengthy debate – still going on today – as to
whether they produced ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ development outcomes.
For example, a large body of literature has tended to suggest that the
Black Death of 1347–52 had positive economic effects, mainly through
channels of redistribution described below: a destruction of labor, but
keeping capital intact, and therefore improving the lives of the survivors
who saw real wages rise and elements of extra-economic coercion
subside.120 Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the places where
the mortality effect of the Black Death was harshest eventually experi-
enced the most favorable long-term economic trajectories.121 Yet we also
have to ask ourselves to what extent these ‘favorable’ redistributive out-
comes were negated by elements of aggregate contraction: smaller
119 Campbell, The Great Transition, 19–30. 120 Pamuk, ‘The Black Death.’
121 Voigtländer & Voth, ‘The Three Horsemen.’
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economies with fewer vacancies andmore insular and contracted patterns
of trade.122
The problem with coming to a coherent answer on the long-term
economic effects of epidemics is that, quite simply, these diseases often
meant different things to different people. For many city dwellers in
Western Europe after the Black Death, credit became easier to obtain
and interest rates dropped, yet for many rural people life became more
expensive, with only a few exceptions.123 Real wages may have increased
after the Black Death in many places, but was it the case that everyone
benefited from this? Recent research suggests that women did not do so to
the same degree as men.124 A further potential limitation is that the
economic effects of historical epidemic diseases have tended to be very
rigidly measured with ‘traditional’ economic indicators such as GDP,
urbanization, wages, property distribution, fertility, and population
recovery. Yet many of these indicators are still based on low-resolution
macro-level data, sometimes with large chronological gaps between epi-
demics and economic/demographic markers, and often available only for
restricted segments of society – for example, adult males of a certain skill
level in an urban environment. The economics and development studies
literature also uses these same indicators for contemporary societies, but
integrated within a much broader set of economic markers after epidem-
ics that include care, protection, knowledge and skills, health, social
networks, and isolation. This is a recognition that epidemics did not
just kill people, but killed people of different statuses and skills, and
they offered new opportunities and put new pressures on those that
survived.125 Some of the most vulnerable became more exposed, some
workers and care-givers becamemore burdened, and new responsibilities
were sometimes thrust upon those lacking skills and experience.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that, while the historical literature still
tends to frame disease–economy interactions in a positive light,126 almost
all of the literature in economics and development studies suggests that
disease outbreaks affect economies negatively – particularly with regard to
the impact of malaria and HIV/AIDS on productivity and human capital
formation.127
122 Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics’; Campbell, The Great Transition,
355–373; Álvarez-Nogal & Prados de la Escosura, ‘The Rise and Fall of Spain.’
123 Van Bavel, The Invisible Hand?, 109.
124 Humphries & Weisdorf, ‘The Wages of Women.’ 125 Madhav et al., ‘Pandemics.’
126 Acemoglu, Robinson & Johnson, ‘Disease and Development.’
127 Bloom, Canning & Fink, ‘Disease and Development Revisited’; Sachs &Malaney, ‘The
Economic and Social Burden of Malaria’; Bell & Lewis, ‘Economic Implications of
Epidemics.’
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Nevertheless, for many other types of disasters, even if the long-term
economic impact was negative, the scale was generally local or at best
regional. The farm land lost when in the tenth century the village of
Kootwijk (the Netherlands) was buried by sand was never recovered. In
fact, in the twelfth century changed climatic conditions led to the enlarge-
ment of the ‘sand desert’ that now came to encompass a number of pre-
existing drift sand nuclei. Still, the economic effects remained restricted
to the area directly affected by the drift sand.128 Moreover, there is often
a lack of clarity over exact causal links between disaster and economic
outcome. One of the most significant economic downturns was con-
nected to the collapse of the water management systems around the
Nile in Mamluk Egypt, though at the same time, even the roots of this
breakdown were connected in the first place to epidemic mortality.129
Similarly, significant floods of the Yellow, Yangtze, and Huai Rivers
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been established
as integral facets to the narrative of environmental pressures and Chinese
economic difficulties after 1800,130 though again it is difficult to separate
the economic effects of floods from the famine conditions that also often
followed.131
6.3.2 Long-Term Demographic Changes
As well as varying in terms of their economic recoveries, disasters also
showed very different degrees of population recovery. We have seen that
the mortality effects of famines could diverge sharply, not only from region
to region, but also between localities within regions – according to whether
or not famine-related diseases such as dysentery, tuberculosis, or typhus
emerged. In fact, long-term recovery after famines was dictated by trends
influencing nuptiality and fertility.132 In pre-modern times, during the
course of the famine people actually tended to delay their marriage, and
fertility conditions were understandably sub-optimal. In the aftermath of
famines, however, just like with other mortality shocks, there were often
spikes in marriages – or rather remarriages. This was a tendency – not
a hard-and-fast rule – and so it was neither inevitable nor predictable across
pre-modern societies. In some places, remarriage after widowhood was
culturally restricted – especially for women, as in the Kingdom of Naples,
for example.133 The rates of remarriage also depended on pre-existing
128 Heidinga, ‘The Birth of a Desert’; see also Section 6.1.2.
129 Borsch, ‘Plague Depopulation’; Borsch, ‘Environment and Population.’
130 Elvin, The Retreat of the Elephants. 131 Li, ‘Life and Death.’
132 Galloway, ‘Basic Patterns.’
133 Curtis, ‘An Agro-town Bias?’; see also Section 6.1.1.
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institutional configurations – inheritance practices, dowry demands, and
access to and control of property.134 Many families did not want to risk
fragmentation of their estates, and thus newly widowed adults, often
women, were urged to remain single. Arguments have also been made
around the importance of ‘cultural flexibility’ for recovery from demo-
graphic disaster – with particular reference to indigenous societies in the
Americas following substantial population losses during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. The Tapirapé in Brazil, for example, experienced
protracted population decline following European contact, partly as they
continued to observe marriage rules that acted to control population
growth, whereas the more flexible marriage rules of the Tenetehara,
which promoted population increase, enabled recovery.135 Accordingly,
these differential pressures on the rates of nuptiality after famines and
epidemics led to differential fertility responses too. This was particularly
the case when a large degree of famine migration had taken place, by those
in search of resources, food, and work, and especially if this was sex-
selective migration. In some rural areas men left women and children
behind, and did not return – creating sex-skewed habitation in their places
of origin and impacting upon marriage opportunities.
One of the most significant debates on the population effects of disas-
ters remains connected to the Black Death and recurring plagues. Of
course, there is no debate that the Black Death killed many people –
numbers that have been revised upward in recent years.136 However,
there were great discrepancies between different regions as to the demo-
graphic recovery rates. It is widely accepted in the literature that, in this
context, the Low Countries (for example) recovered very quickly and
some areas there had already reached pre-Black Death levels at some
point in the fifteenth century. Iberia and Italy did not achieve this position
until the sixteenth century, and in England the balancing point came as
late as the seventeenth century.137 A further complication is that recent
literature has also questioned some of the empirical evidence for these
population recoveries – for example, in the case of the Low Countries,
assertions have been made that are based on a paucity of quantifiable
information, and often rely on sources that cannot distinguish between
population trends and rural–urban migration trends.138
134 Guinnane & Ogilvie, ‘A Two-Tiered Demographic System.’
135 Newson, ‘The Demographic Collapse.’
136 Benedictow, The Black Death, 383; Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics’;
Lewis, ‘Disaster Recovery’; Campbell, The Great Transition, 306–319.
137 Van Bavel & van Zanden, ‘The Jump-Start’; Malanima, ‘The Economic Consequences’;
Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 20, 29.
138 Roosen & Curtis, ‘The “Light Touch.”’
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Setting aside concerns over the empirics, however, scholars have
debated the actual causes of the differential rates of recovery. Some
have emphasized mortality: that is to say, the late-medieval demographic
context was a high-mortality regime dictated by severe repeat epidemics,
and this contrasted with a more favorable lighter-mortality regime in the
early-modern period.139 Unfortunately, there are three problems with
this scenario. First, our empirical evidence to compare mortality regimes
between late-medieval and early-modern periods is scarce. Second, it
goes against other literature emphasizing the insalubrious nature of the
early-modern cities as ‘urban graveyards.’ Finally, it does not explain
geographical divergences in recovery rates, unless we suggest that mortal-
ity regimes were differential across areas – something difficult to do given
the point made above about lack of quantifiable evidence. It has been
suggested that the major change was, in actual fact, mortality driven by
urban-based diseases, in contrast to the Middle Ages, when epidemics
spread more widely: however, again, there is little systematic evidence for
this, and recent work has shown territorially pervasive epidemic outbreaks
in both late-medieval and early-modern environments.140
6.3.3 Reconstruction, Reform, and Societal Change
As we have seen, the effects of a hazard or shock can differ significantly,
depending on the societal response both in the immediate aftermath as
well as in the long run. One of the options is not to act at all, because of
either the impossibility of responding or an unwillingness to respond.
Another option is a societal adaptation that is ill-suited to the type of
hazard or to the society itself, which might lead to a societal collapse or
prolonged crisis. In this section, however, we focus on types of long-term
effects and strategies that often follow after a large-scale disaster: recon-
struction and reform, and pushing for societal change.
Reconstruction and Reform One of the ways in which disasters
lead to long-term changes is via their capacity to stimulate new forms of
reconstruction and reform – either of physical environments or of societal
institutions. For example, societies responded in a very structural way to
outbreaks of diseases, and this changed over time. Recent literature has
shown how medieval societies in Europe were already implementing
forms of environmental control in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries –
139 Hatcher, ‘Mortality’; Hatcher, Plague, 64; Benedictow, ‘NewPerspectives’; Cipolla,The
Economic History, 77; Flinn, ‘The Stabilisation,’ 286.
140 Roosen & Curtis, ‘The “Light Touch”’; Curtis, ‘Was Plague an Exclusively Urban
Phenomenon?’
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especially regulating and sanctioning practices seen to be unhygienic or in
contravention of what was seen to be in the interest of public health, or to
prevent environmental pollution.141 Still, of course, much of this was
based around societies’ view that diseases spread through ‘miasma’ and
were linked to bad ‘auras,’ dampness, or smells.When these environmen-
tal controls combined with other public health interventions such as
effective quarantine systems, the number of future epidemics could be
reduced: Ragusa (Dubrovnik), for example, experienced its very last
‘domestic’ plague in 1533,142 comparing favorably with parts of
Western Europe which continued to experience Second Pandemic
plagues into the seventeenth century, and other parts of Southeast
Europe which were not plague-free until the eighteenth century.
After the demographic or epidemiologic transition, mortality rates
lowered and life expectancies increased in certain parts of Eurasia and
North America – partially testament to the waning or even disappearance
of Second Pandemic plagues – but in the nineteenth century, infectious
and contagious diseases were still present, especially cholera, smallpox,
influenza, and tuberculosis, and often linked to over-populated, industri-
alizing urban environments. As well as instigating short-term mitigation
measures such as sanitary cordons and hospitalization – clear links to
quarantines of the past – these urban-focused diseases also helped stimu-
late more fundamental long-term strategies. This went hand-in-hand
with developments in scientific and medical knowledge – the so-called
‘laboratory revolution’ – as miasma theories of contagion were replaced
by a better understanding of the role of bacteria and contamination in
what became known as ‘germ theory.’ So, for example, by the 1860s, the
link between cholera outbreaks and contaminated water had given rise to
sanitary reforms, where water pipes and sewers were replaced.143
Antiquated cesspool and privy-vault systems for waste removal were
replaced by underground gravity-flow systems – necessitating large-
scale capital investments at the same time.144
Reconstruction and reform policies were, and still are, also a common
long-term response to other types of disasters than epidemics. In earlier
chapters several examples have come up, such as the introduction of
agricultural innovations, early warning systems and food-for-work pro-
grams in Ethiopia and Sudan after the famines of the 1970s and 1980s,145
or the development in the North Sea region of economic strategies that
141 Rawcliffe, Urban Bodies, 12–15; Coomans, In Pursuit of a Healthy City, 91.
142 Blažina Tomić & Blažina, Expelling the Plague, 62–63.
143 Baldwin, Contagion and the State, 147–156.
144 Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink, 112–117. 145 See Section 5.2.1.
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allowed communities to live in a tidal landscape with frequent
inundations.146
Pushing for Societal Change Disasters both past and present have
been used to make the case for social change – even in some cases
revolution. The communist revolutions in Russia (1917) and China
(1949) took place during or after periods of serious food crises, which in
turn can be connected to the earlier establishment and subsequent growth
of new capitals – St. Petersburg and Beijing – in strategically important
but food-deficient regions. Feeding those capitals and the rapidly growing
armies amassed by both empires became increasingly difficult. In Russia,
it required regular transports of very large quantities of wheat from the
Black Earth and Volga regions to the North, first by river and later by
train. During World War I the combination of wartime requisitions, the
German occupation of Ukraine, and transport blockades gave rise to
acute food shortages in the North. In China the crisis was drawn out
over a longer period of time. The provisioning of Beijing relied on state-
organized transports of tribute rice from the South to the North. This
state grain supply system increasingly came under pressure from
the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of rebellions, wars
with the British, silting of the main waterways, and rapid population
growth. The severe famines which ensued in the North fed discontent
and contributed to the struggles that ultimately led to the communist
take-over. Both in Russia and in China the newly established communist
regimes considered an escape from the food supply problems in the
preceding ‘times of troubles’ as one of their main challenges.147
In The Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein argues that modern Western soci-
eties, and especially capitalistic ones, have used disasters of all kinds, such
as war, terror attacks, hurricanes, or tsunamis, to push through funda-
mental societal changes that could not happen in a ‘normal’ or non-crisis
situation. She attributes this way of thinking to one school of thought and
especially to one man, Milton Friedman, spokesman of the Chicago
School of economics, who stated that “Only a crisis – actual or perceived –
produces real change.” According to this theory, the sudden, unexpected
nature of a crisis creates a numbness, anxiety, and compliance within the
general public that are ideal conditions for the authorities to implement
policies that fit their agenda. A case in point is the development of charter
schools in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Friedman used
the opportunity of the destruction of most New Orleans schools not only
to rebuild the physical infrastructure, but also to change the education
146 See Section 4.2.1. 147 Wheatcroft, ‘Societal Responses.’
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system at the same time. Referring to a ‘clean slate,’ Friedman proposed
changes from a public-school-dominated policy towards charter schools
and individual household education vouchers that could be spent in
privately owned and managed schools.148
While Klein focuses on the contemporary period and neoliberal states,
this principle has much deeper historical precedents. After the 1755
Lisbon Earthquake, the Marquis de Pombal took the opportunity to
revolutionize the Portuguese economy and policies. Besides clearing the
rubble and reconstructing buildings, de Pombal also rearranged property
structures, reformed the tax system, and attacked the power of the
Church and nobility, in order to modernize the feudal and rural state. It
was the shock of the unforeseen earthquake that provided the unlimited
power and the ability to break through former resistance both from the
nobility and from the rural population.149 Going further back in time to
the early-modern period, it has been suggested that epidemics provided
the ideal social circumstances for authorities not only to impose restric-
tions such as quarantines – but to go much further and extend their
influence into the lives of ordinary citizens, urging, for example, other
forms of social control around gatherings, meetings, and public spaces,
and even criminalizing certain forms of behavior.150
These shock-induced societal shifts were not uniformly so well planned
and organized, however. After the calamitous fourteenth century in
Northwest Europe the mortality crisis made labor-extensive policies
more favorable than labor-intensive grain production. As a result, in
large parts of Europe manorial lords and yeoman farmers switched over
to cattle and sheep breeding on extensive pastures, thereby fundamentally
altering themedieval economy. Common land was enclosed or redefined,
rent systems were altered, and labor conditions were revised. In this case,
there was no single identifiable figure – no Friedman or de Pombal –
leading the policy shift. The long-term effects and changes were imple-
mented more gradually and were created because of a shift in relative
prices.
Shocks did not always lead to significant societal change, however: even
in the case of major disasters, resistance might well be too strong to be
overcome. In the years before the disaster at the nuclear plant of
Fukushima, little weight had been given to the risks connected to the
possible occurrence of a tsunami. A number of factors contributed to this
culture in which risks were downplayed. They included a perceived lack
148 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 3–24.
149 Araújo, ‘The Lisbon Earthquake’; Pereira, ‘The Opportunity of a Disaster.’
150 Curtis, ‘Preserving the Ordinary.’
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of alternatives to nuclear energy, the desire to preserve public acceptance
by presenting nuclear energy as inherently safe, and close relations
between officials at the Nuclear and Industry Safety Authority (NISA)
and the industry – including the amakudari system (the custom whereby
retired NISA officials took up advisory positions in industries they had
supervised during their careers). Research only a few years before the
disaster took place had pointed out the need for a higher seawall in this
earthquake-prone region – yet was ignored.151 The Fukushima disaster
sent shock waves through Japanese society, giving rise to a call for strict
safety regulation of the nuclear industry and, in fact, for a complete
overhaul of energy policy. But, although new safety legislation has been
passed and NISA has made way for the new, independently operating
Nuclear Regulation Authority, drastic strategy reforms did not take place.
Almost all nuclear plants were temporarily shut down shortly after the
disaster, but pressure to restart some of them was, and still is, strong. The
‘Innovative Strategy for Energy and Environment’ formulated shortly
after the disaster, aimed at substantially reducing dependency on nuclear
energy, met with fierce opposition from businesses and the nuclear indus-
try: the high costs, it was argued, would erode Japan’s competitive pos-
ition on international markets and its eminence in nuclear technology.
New plans formulated afterwards were much more ambivalent about the
future of nuclear energy, and Japanese society is still deeply divided over
the issue.152
6.3.4 Economic Redistribution
Hazards and shocks can lead to redistribution of economic resources.
This view has recently been supported in grand theses by World Bank
economist Branko Milanovic, who suggests that “epidemics and war
alone can explain most of the swings in [pre-modern] inequality.”153
Elsewhere, in a best-seller in its field, Walter Scheidel has argued that
throughout history socio-economic inequalities have leveled themselves
out only during episodes of either mass mortality or intense violence and
accompanying mass mobilization.154 These views are important because
they downplay the egalitarian effects of active societal intervention and
progressive welfare. Reducing inequality by peaceful means appears
harder than ever,155 and is left to the vagaries of sudden events often
outside our control.
151 Kingston, ‘Mismanaging Risk.’ 152 Duffield, ‘Japanese Energy Policy.’
153 Milanovic, ‘Income Inequality,’ 480. 154 Scheidel, The Great Leveler.
155 Scheffer et al., ‘Inequality.’
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Whilemajorwars are said to reduce inequality through the destruction of
capital or the implementation of welfare policies, the logic behind a more
‘equitable’ redistribution for epidemics tends to be the obliteration of
people while keeping capital intact, thereby realigning the economic bal-
ance back in favor of labor.156 So, according to this line of reasoning, in the
aftermath of the Black Death, the gap between ‘elites’ such as lords and
aristocrats and the ‘lower orders’ such as peasants and laborers was nar-
rowed through higher wages, easier mobility, reduced extra-economic
impositions, and greater opportunity to purchase property. Another element
of this logic, with specific regard to property redistribution after epidemics,
is that sudden mass mortality could have some equitable effects, at least
in the short or medium term, because in certain conditions of partible
inheritance, property was more likely to be divided up and fragmented
between different heirs. Furthermore, high epidemic mortality led to cases
where elderly adults had nobody to pass their property on to, creating
families unable to maintain or consolidate estates for more than one
generation.157 In turn, many post-Black Death societies became less
‘unequal’ with improved living standards for ‘ordinary’ survivors.158
Although these hypotheses are highly stimulating, we should still
approach them with a level of caution. First, it might be said that,
although the ‘leveling’ thesis connecting shocks to capital and labor has
popular fascination, it also diverts our attention from general long-term
inequality trends. That is, despite the almost constant sequence of epi-
demics and wars across history, the general rule that wealth is almost
always accumulating in the hands of elites has become more and more
confirmed. Recent research into pre-industrial inequality levels in the
Low Countries, Italy, and Spain has demonstrated that, regardless of
the short-term redistributive effects of disasters, the long-term trend of
inequality from the fifteenth century onwards was rising.159 Even the
Black Death, proclaimed as one of the most redistributive shocks, only
led to heightened equality for less than a century, which was quickly
reversed thereafter,160 and many other severe epidemics had egalitarian
effects only for a number of years rather than decades.
156 Milanovic, ‘Income Inequality’; Scheidel, The Great Leveler, 304–305; Pamuk, ‘The
Black Death.’
157 Razi, ‘The Myth,’ 30.
158 Dyer,AnAge of Transition?, 128–139;Cohn, ‘Rich and Poor.’Bioarcheological evidence
suggests people were healthier after the Black Death: DeWitte, ‘Health in Post-Black
Death London.’
159 Alfani & Ryckbosch, ‘Was There a “Little Convergence” in Inequality?’; Furió,
‘Inequality and Economic Development.’ Such a continuous rise in inequality was not
matched in Portugal: Reis, ‘Deviant Behaviour?’
160 Alfani & Ammannati, ‘Long-Term Trends in Economic Inequality.’
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Second, it might also be said that much of this focus on the redistribu-
tion of wealth, property, and income after epidemics and wars has tended
to obscure other elements of (in)equality. For example, the old view that
the Black Death led to a ‘golden age for women’ in Northwest Europe has
been contradicted by new evidence: whatever long-term benefits
occurred in the form of rising real wages for men after the Black Death,
women did not share in these benefits.161 Bioarcheological evidence,
furthermore, supports the contention that women did not share in post-
Black Death health benefits in the same way as men.162 Put simply, then,
to what extent can we describe a redistributive effect of mortality shocks
as ‘equitable,’ when half the population never shares in the benefits of
such redistribution? This argument can be extended to other dimensions
outside of gender: for example, regardless of the effects of the BlackDeath
and recurring epidemics in the Kingdom of Valencia, it is clear that
Muslims could not scale the feudal hierarchy of the Christian Kingdom,
despite comprising a third of the population and exhibiting their own
internal social stratification.163
Third, there are some issues with the causal mechanisms often invoked.
The Black Death is a well-cited example, but also potentially an anomaly
in its redistributive effects, or at the very least an extreme case. We should
not just assume that all socio-economic responses to shocks mirrored
those of the Black Death in a universally applicable model.164 There
was a broad spectrum behind the ratio of capital to labor damage, and
this diverged from historical case to historical case. In fact, rather than an
‘inevitable’ form of redistribution after hazards and shocks, what we tend
to see in the pre-industrial period are redistributive outcomes that are not
uni-linear, vary in intensity, and do not always last the same amount of
time – that is to say, are not always structural changes.
While shocks did, of course, produce some equitable outcomes, this
was not always the case – sometimes certain groups were better able than
others to buffer these events,165 testament to their pre-existing resource
and power advantages, instrumentalizing the shock to their benefit and in
161 For an outline of the debate on the ‘golden age of women’ see Rigby, ‘Gendering the
Black Death,’ 745–754; with updated historiographical references also in Kowaleski,
‘Gendering Demographic Change.’ New male–female disaggregated wage data can be
found in Humphries & Weisdorf, ‘The Wages of Women.’
162 DeWitte, ‘Stress, Sex, and Plague’; Lewis, ‘Work and the Adolescent.’
163 Baydal Sala & Esquilache Martí, ‘Exploitation and Differentiation,’ 61, 64.
164 Alfani & Murphy, ‘Plague and Lethal Epidemics.’
165 For floods: Curtis, ‘Danger andDisplacement’; For wars and famines: Alfani,Calamities
and the Economy, 76; Galloway, ‘Basic Patterns,’ 288; Campbell, ‘The Agrarian
Problem,’ 43.
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the process exacerbating inequalities.166 For example, recent research has
shown that an epidemic in 1570s Mexico, which reduced the indigenous
population by 70–90 percent, facilitated a process of elite concentration
and increased the amount of land farmed through large estates. Where
collapse was less severe, indigenous villages were better able to maintain
control of communal lands, hindering colonist encroachments.167 This is
yet another important point to make, because the wealth of pre-industrial
communities was not always tied up in what the individual or the house-
hold owned, but could also be located in collective or common-pool
institutions.168
The role of taxation is a case in point, and may reveal some key
differences between the redistributive effects of modern disasters and
those of the pre-industrial period. Discussing the effects of the two
World Wars, Piketty has pointed out the significance of the policy shifts
immediately afterwards. Thanks to progressive taxation, the accumulated
wealth of the elites, that had been steadily growing until the nineteenth
century, was redistributed fundamentally during the 1940s and 1950s. At
the same time, the poorer classes could climb the social ladder because of
rising wages, public services, and new social security systems.169 This
redistributive effect of taxes is, however, a contemporary phenomenon. In
pre-industrial societies, taxes were not designed to finance public services
and redistribute wealth to provide for the poorer social classes in society.170
A continuous and recurrent tax regime developed only from the sixteenth
century inmost centralized states of Europe, and prior to this, governments
could levy a tax only in case of war or other extraordinary circumstances.171
These taxes were then re-used for making war, rather than to provide
welfare systems or protect people. Perhaps the only exceptions were poor
relief, alms, or specific taxes such as for the repair of the dikes. Many of
these special taxes and funds were indirect, however, such as excises on
beer, peat, grain, and wine, with fixed sums on consumption. Accordingly,
these taxes became a much larger burden on the less fortunate members
of society and did not function as a redistribution of wealth from
the elites to the poor – actually on the contrary.172 Similarly, although
the ‘disaster’ tax of the water boards did tax landownership and there-
fore excluded the poor and landless, it was still felt very unequally. Since
166 Conceded by Scheidel, The Great Leveler, 313.
167 Sellars & Alix-Garcia, ‘Labor Scarcity.’
168 Di Tullio, ‘Cooperating in Time of Crisis.’ 169 Piketty, Capital, 368–375.
170 Alfani & Di Tullio, The Lion’s Share, 165–169.
171 Thoen & Soens, ‘The Social and Economic Impact’; Dyer, ‘Taxation and
Communities.’
172 Haemers & Ryckbosch, ‘A Targeted Public.’
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the money had to be paid in a very short time span in cash, it hit the
lower-to-middling groups hard, while large landowners could easily
oblige.173
The same diversity of redistributive outcomes during environmental
hazards can be seen during other types of disasters such as famines. On
the surface at least, it would appear that famines had the capacity to
heighten inequalities more often than to reduce them. Financial buffers
ensured that the wealthy could ride out periods when food prices went
high, and thus were not forced to sell goods or even land like the poor.174
However, socio-institutional factors could also conspire to limit this move
towards social polarization in times of food crises. Scholars have shown
that, rather than complete societal collapse, peasants relied on
a combination of reciprocal networks and relationships between individ-
uals and groups at a local level – being offered credit, insurance, charitable
sustenance, and capital to ease the burden and avoid having to alienate
property as an act of last resort.175 During some medieval famines,
scholars have even suggested a heightened communal sociability – trade
switching to restricted local groups based on personal networks of trust
and reputation.176 Sometimes thewealthiest andmost powerful segments
of pre-modern society had no desire to exploit those further down the
social hierarchy because their actual wealth and power was entirely predi-
cated on the maintenance and continued perpetuation of the community
as a status quo, thereby satisfying the principles of conservation, defense,
and reproduction.177
To conclude then, although the views of scholars such as Scheidel and
Milanovic about the largely egalitarian effects of terrible shocks such as
epidemics appear logical – and are supported in some cases – we still lack
a real quantity of empirical examples to fully prove this for the pre-
industrial period, or at least to offer this as a definitive universal principle
characterizing much of human history. This is not down to a basic lack of
interest or material on pre-industrial inequality – a field which has taken
off in recent years – but more down to (a) the difficulties of finding source
material that can systematically show redistribution outcomes directly
connected to a hazard closely before and closely after the shock, (b) the
restricted nature of redistributive outcome indicators that are currently
used, and (c) the fact that the social groups capable of instrumentalizing
the hazard for their own ends were extremely diverse across historical
contexts.
173 Soens, ‘Explaining Deficiencies.’ 174 Galloway, ‘Basic Patterns,’ 277.
175 Vanhaute & Lambrecht, ‘Famine.’ 176 Slavin, ‘Market Failure.’
177 Di Tullio, The Wealth of Communities, 152.
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7 Past and Present
Until now, this book has traversed what may be seen as more natural
terrain for the historian. To end at this point, however, would be to
overlook a crucial component of historical research, especially on
a topic like disasters, which is the theoretical and practical contribution
to current challenges. This final section therefore poses three questions.
Starting from the concept of the Anthropocene, it first of all asks whether
the modern period is fundamentally different from the past, and if so,
why? Second, it maps the potential of historical research for better under-
standing vulnerability and resilience to disasters, and equally, the poten-
tial of disasters for the study of history. Finally, it outlines some pathways
for the future elaboration of disaster history.
7.1 Disaster History and/in the Anthropocene
The profoundly reconditioned interactions between humans and nature
in the present age are increasingly perceived as so fundamental as to
justify speaking of a new geological epoch – the Anthropocene – in
which humankind is fundamentally altering the basic geophysical and
biological conditions of life on Earth. The concept of the Anthropocene
does away with the modernist distinction between Nature and Society,
questions the limits of human agency, and forces us to link the most
recent period in the Anthropocene – the postwar period, in which
human impact has increased enormously – with the ‘deep history’ of
humankind as predatory species.1 While there is still discussion on the
precise starting point of the Anthropocene on the geological time-scale –
the beginnings of agriculture, the Industrial Revolution, the impact of the
latter on atmospheric CO2 via the burning of fossil fuels? – it is clear that
the scale of human interactions with the global environment changed
dramatically from the 1950s onwards, when almost every indicator of
1 Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History.’
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human enterprise – population, resource use, species extinction, connect-
ivity, etc. – showed an exponential increase.2
This Great Acceleration, as it is often called, profoundly altered not
only the scale but also the nature and perception of disasters. When Japan
was struck on 3 November 2011 by the most powerful earthquake in its
recorded history, the country faced a real conundrum of disaster, with
670 kilometers of coast directly affected by a tsunami wave 40meters high
which, apart from destroying or damaging almost one million buildings,
also triggered ameltdown of the Fukushima nuclear powerplant.3 As Sara
Pritchard has argued, Fukushima is the ultimate example of the “com-
plex, dynamic, porous and inextricable configuration of nature, technol-
ogy and politics” in modern disasters.4 In the “new planetscape of
impossibly intertwined entanglings of earthly biorhythms and colossal
human engineering projects,” John David Ebert argues, the distinction
between ‘natural’ and ‘human-made’ disasters can no longer be made.5
Furthermore, a disaster like Fukushima is fundamentally a global one,
not only through the evident global media coverage and international
solidarity, but also through its impact on nuclear policies, opening
a window of opportunity for countries like Germany to shut down their
nuclear power plants. The changing attitude towards the potential of
technology to prevent disasters is also reflected in the reconstruction
policies after the disaster: instead of rebuilding the destroyed houses as
soon as possible, Japanese coastal communities hit by the tsunami were
resettled on high ground, often invoking a lot of resistance on behalf of
villagers that for economic (fishermen) or moral (connection to the
ancestral ground) reasons wanted to rebuild their homes in the traditional
location near the sea.6
There still is debate on whether the Anthropocene itself should be
considered as a ‘disaster’ in its own right – one which probably can only
be equaled to the asteroid which about 66 million years ago killed
about 70 percent of the species on Earth, including most dinosaurs –
or whether there could be such a thing as a ‘good Anthropocene,’ in
which humans and nature will co-evolve into some mutually beneficial
‘better’ state.7 More important for our purpose is the question whether
disasters in the Anthropocene are indeed profoundly different from
any disaster which preceded the Anthropocene, and if so, why exactly?
Are the essential changes, if any, situated in the production of disas-
ters, or rather in new types of social vulnerabilities, or shifts in coping
2 Crutzen, ‘Geology of Mankind’; Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill, ‘The Anthropocene,’ 617.
3 Gill, Steger, & Slater, Japan Copes with Calamity.
4 Pritchard, ‘An Envirotechnical Disaster,’ 219. 5 Ebert, ‘The Age of Catastrophe,’ 4.
6 Delaney, ‘Taking the High Ground,’ 63–65. 7 Ellis, Anthropocene, 4.
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mechanisms, for instance from risk reduction to resilience? In what
follows we consider three features which might set apart the disasters
of the Anthropocene: climate change, capitalism, and risk culture.
7.1.1 Climate Change
One debate that has characterized the climate change and disasters
literature in recent years is the extent to which climate change – that is,
changes in climate resulting from anthropogenic influence – is itself
a direct driver of disaster risk. Evidence for the influence of humans on
climate has become ever more voluminous. The IPCC currently puts
global mean surface temperature in the period 2006–15 at 0.87°C above
that of 1850–1900,8 while model projections suggest that temperatures
are locked into a further increase even without continued growth in green-
house gas emissions. Importantly, this shifting baseline also translates into
an increased risk of extreme weather events through changes in their
frequency and/or intensity. This can alter the exposure of a society to events
such as heat waves, precipitation extremes, and coastal flooding, and
consequent overall levels of risk.
Some have argued that climate change has already made an impact
on the nature of hazards and disasters. The occurrence of floods and
windstorms within the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) of
international disasters,9 for example, exhibits a pronounced upward
trend over the final decades of the twentieth century, which has led
some to argue that we have entered a new age of climate-related disas-
ter. This must be treated with caution, however; data coverage within
EM-DAT is poor prior to 1970, and growth since then may be as much
a factor of better recording practices as it is a factor of changes in the
occurrence or return periods of extreme weather. While this uncer-
tainty is often concluded to be a combination of changes in hazard
occurrence, recording, and greater numbers of people and amounts of
capital exposed to harm, the relative importance of these factors in
producing the apparent increase in disaster occurrence remains
unclear.10
Similarly, although it has long been recognized that risk and vulner-
ability to hazards is a “construct of the physical and social worlds,”11
analyses of the relative roles of the physical and social in producing risk
8 www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/ (last accessed on 26 September 2019).
9 Hosted by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université
Catholique de Louvain.
10 Adger & Brooks, ‘Does Global Environmental Change Cause Vulnerability?’
11 Adger & Brooks, ‘Does Global Environmental Change Cause Vulnerability?,’ 21.
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and vulnerability are not consistent across the literature. In mainstream
climate change research (i.e. that included within the IPCC Working
Group II – Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability), ‘risk’ – defined as
the combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – remains pri-
marily a physical construct, with the degree of environmental exposure
and the nature of hazard often overshadowing social vulnerability
(Figure 7.1). Furthermore, although the most recent IPCC report
notes that vulnerability is multidimensional, it still tends to be concep-
tualized as a ‘second-order’ factor; in other words as something that is
impacted on by hazards, rather than something that, by way of human
agency and deep-rooted social factors, actively shapes the nature of this
impact.
These critiques have been most prominent within some quarters of the
disaster studies literature and have been brought into focus by the recent
media coverage of the contribution of climate change to hurricane
CLIMATE
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Figure 7.1 Illustration of the core concepts of the WGII AR5. Risk of climate-
related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including
hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and
natural systems. Changes in both the climate system (left) and socio-economic
processes including adaptation and mitigation (right) are drivers of hazards,
exposure, and vulnerability. Courtesy of the IPCC. IPCC, ‘Summary for
Policymakers.’
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disasters.12 Although climate change is thought to influence hurricane
intensity through warmer ocean temperatures, Ilan Kelman has argued
powerfully that this is largely irrelevant in explaining why the hurricanes
of the 2017 season had such significant impact, the issue being rather that
a disaster involving a hurricane can happen only if people and infrastruc-
ture are vulnerable to it.13 This vulnerability may arise from a lack of
capability or financial capacity to respond effectively to a hurricane,
brought about by, for example, lack of stringent building regulations or
access to insurance – factors completely independent of climate change.
In this view, the debate over whether climate change itself is a driver of
disaster therefore represents a return to older arguments concerning the
nature of hazard and disaster. More practically, the resultant focus on
large-scale efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions may present
a ‘dangerous distraction’ from the more local-level responsibility to
implement effective measures to reduce vulnerability.
The longer view nevertheless tells us that both of these perspectives
have validity. History is littered with examples of societies in ‘marginal’
environments where the local-level implications of global temperature
change may have pushed the continued viability of human activities in
particular environments beyond a certain threshold. It would therefore
be unwise to discount the potential for similar changes in the future.
On the other hand, what may be perceived as ‘unfavorable’ longer-term
changes in historical climatic conditions did not necessarily lead to
economic decline or political instability. On the contrary, historians
have argued that Northwest European societies thrived during the
cooler climatic conditions of the Little Ice Age, while drier overall
Little Ice Age conditions in seventeenth-century Southern Africa
appear to have been accompanied by a reduction – rather than an
increase – in drought impacts on society.14 Each of these processes
was rooted in levels of social vulnerability rather than in environmental
risk.
One can argue, then, that climate change contributes to, and, in many
places, increases overall levels of risk by modifying environmental expos-
ure and the nature of hazards. Yet whether this risk translates into disaster
is, in the vast majority of cases, determined by society itself. This has two
implications for climate change debates. First, reducing underlying vul-
nerability to present climate variability may not represent a mere ‘first
12 This was particularly notable during the 2017 hurricane season, where hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria all had significant impacts on the Caribbean islands and
Southern United States.
13 Kelman et al., ‘Learning from the History.’
14 Degroot, The Frigid Golden Age; Hannaford & Nash, ‘Climate, History, Society.’
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step’ towards future climate change adaptation,15 but may instead hold
the key, at least insofar as extreme weather is concerned. In this sense it is
unhelpful to cast aside the past as something fundamentally different
from the “nonlinear and stepped” changes associated with future climate
change,16 although clearly in areas highly exposed to rises in sea-level, for
example, these differences will be felt to a far greater extent. Second, the
continued hegemony of research into future physical changes in hazard
and exposure at the expense of research into what drives vulnerabilitymay
promote a reductionist approach that obscures the critical role of the
underlying patterns of vulnerability in producing disasters. Despite
many calls for research into such underlying patterns, which may be
historically determined, these remain poorly understood in many areas.
This represents a major challenge for social scientists and historians to
confront.
7.1.2 Capitalism
Underlying the concept of the Anthropocene is the idea that humans or
humanity have started to change the physical conditions of the global
environment.17 This might suggest that humanity as a whole can be held
responsible for the planetary changes associated with the Anthropocene
and the disasters resulting from these changes. But probably, it is more
accurate – and fair – to argue that specific humans in specific economic
and social configurations were responsible for these changes, while others
were forced to cope with the consequences, including increased numbers
of extreme meteorological events or technological catastrophes.18 The
best-known spokesman of this position is JasonMoore, who argues that it
is not humanity that is responsible for climate change, but capitalism:
hence he argues in favor of replacing the concept Anthropocene by
Capitalocene: the Age of Capital.19
The Industrial Revolution is usually portrayed as the main turning
point in the relation between humanity and nature. In The Great
Transformation (1944) Karl Polanyi already meticulously depicted indus-
trial capitalism as a gigantic process of reducing and simplifying land –
just like labor – to its mere economic functionality, instead of a vital part
of human life, which provided habitation, physical safety, the landscape,
and the seasons.20 Moore, however, retraces the origins of the
15 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers.’
16 As noted by Adger et al., ‘Resilience Implications,’ 764.
17 Crutzen, ‘Geology of Mankind’; Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill, ‘The Anthropocene.’
18 See for example Ribot, ‘Cause and Response.’
19 Moore, Anthoprocene or Capitalocene? 20 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 187.
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Capitalocene to the long sixteenth century, when the European-centered
modern world economy – as devised by Wallerstein – was taking shape.
Around 1450 a turning point was reached, through which humanity’s
relation with the rest of nature underwent a fundamental change. For
Moore, capitalism changed humans’ interaction with nature in three
ways.21 First of all, humans and nature were commodified, meaning
they could be exchanged and accumulated as labor, food, energy,
and raw materials – the ‘Four Cheaps’ as Moore has labeled them,
because of the inherent drive in capitalism of acquiring them as cheaply
as possible. By doing so, nature is constantly reworked into a partly
human, partly non-human, ‘bundle’ – a process political ecologists call
‘hybridization.’22 In hybrid form, nature could be mobilized and accu-
mulated. This mobilization over ever longer distances widened the
so-called ‘Metabolic Rift’ between production and consumption –
a metaphor of the human body introduced by Karl Marx to analyze the
progressive rupture in the nutrient cycle between town and countryside,
and later between different parts of the world. Nutrients were extracted in
one place, consumed in another, and dumped in a third, hence causing
a fundamental socio-environmental disequilibrium and a harbinger of
ecological crisis.23 Abstraction and accumulation are facilitated by
a third feature of Capitalism: the ‘Cartesian’ drive of surveying, identify-
ing, quantifying, classifying, controlling, and sometimes ‘protecting’
Nature – a logic which, according to Alfred W. Crosby, had already
developed into a distinctive feature of European culture and society by
the twelfth–thirteenth centuries.24
Using a world systemic perspective, Moore argues that the environ-
mental vulnerabilities produced by the Capitalocene aremost visible at its
margins: the ‘frontier’ zones of the capitalist system, where cheap
resources, labor, energy, and food are found, which can be processed
and transferred to the system’s core. The ‘commodity frontiers’ of sugar,
cotton, or beef have been mapped as spaces where the new order of the
Capitalocene subordinates and in the end erases the old order, but not
without exploiting the latter to yield cheap production and unprece-
dented profits. This is also because the rise of capitalism, in Moore’s
view, was inextricably linkedwith colonialism and violentWestern expan-
sion, slowly leading to the whole world being incorporated into the
capitalist regime.25
21 Moore, ‘The Capitalocene.’ 22 Swyngedouw, ‘Circulations and Metabolisms.’
23 Moore, ‘Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift.’
24 Crosby, The Measure of Reality.
25 For a history of cotton from this perspective, see Beckert, Empire of Cotton.
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In the process, ‘frontier’ societies often became extremely sensitive to
nature-induced as well as technological disasters. The plantation econ-
omies that were established in the colonies, based on the Four Cheaps,
transformed existing ecosystems and societies, producing not only
a different landscape but also new vulnerabilities. In the early-modern
Caribbean, for example, the new plantation landscape provided ideal
conditions for specific species of mosquitoes, carrying two lethal diseases,
yellow fever and malaria, resulting in disease and death among native and
slave populations.26 Something similar happened in the early-modern
Southeast of the current-day United States, where the native population
was hit not only by continuous slave raids – looking for cheap labor – but
also by a transforming disease ecology, as smallpox wreaked havoc among
the native population.27 Colonialism and capitalism not only created new
disease ecologies, but according to Davis’ well-known work they also
turned droughts into famines, causing ‘Late Victorian holocausts’ from
India and China to Brazil. A colonial government unwilling to control the
market and focused upon transporting cheap commodities to the home-
land did not intervene when harvests failed.28
Moore, like Polanyi, in his analysis maintains a rather linear perspective
on the development of capitalism – from itsmedieval localized roots to the
world-encompassing system of the present. Scholars like van Bavel, how-
ever, recently argued for the existence of capitalist configurations in other
contexts as well: for instance in Iraq in the eighth century or China in the
Sung period. In each of these contexts, land, labor, and capital became
primarily ‘processed’ and allocated through the market, and in each of
these contexts, a dynamic period of economic growth was followed by
a period of instability, characterized by rising inequality, collusion
between political and economic interests, and mounting environmental
problems. From this perspective, capitalism is not the distinctive feature
which sets ‘modern’ history apart from a ‘pre-modern past.’Moreover, in
each of these contexts, capitalism would itself decline, giving way to
a different organization of the economy and the environment, no longer
exclusively based upon commodification of production factors.29 In the
future, historical approaches to capitalism combining this idea of cycli-
cality and a world system analysis might push the analysis one step
further.
26 McNeill,Mosquito Empires. 27 Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement.
28 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts. In a much less controversial way, this of course also links
up with the famous work of Amartya Sen, on the Bengal Famine in 1943. Sen, however,
sees ‘democracy’ as the main solution for defying hunger and does not question the
foundations of global capitalism.
29 Van Bavel, The Invisible Hand?
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7.1.3 The Risk Society
Writing in the 1980s, Ulrich Beck formulated the idea of the present age
as a ‘Risk Society,’ a society in which disasters stopped being exceptions,
a break from daily routines, and had become part of everyday life. For
individuals, for communities, and for states, dealing with the risk of
hazards and disasters became a central preoccupation. In other words,
people started to live in constant fear.30 In the wake of Chernobyl and
Bhopal, the disasters Beck had inmind were predominantly technological
or, more precisely, they were hybrid configurations of nature and tech-
nology. As hazards and disasters could no longer be avoided, resilience –
bouncing back and adapting – gradually replaced vulnerability as the
dominant framework in disaster analysis and policy.31
In the Risk Society, natural disaster is increasingly framed as inevitable.
Quite paradoxically, however, much of the present-day vulnerability to
natural disaster resulted from the ambition to control nature, using
technology, creativity, and capital. In this respect the antecedents of the
modern Age of Risk can be situated much earlier. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the Enlightened naturalization of the world defin-
itely set society and nature at different poles: nature became something
‘out there,’ waiting to be understood, controlled, and conquered.
Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution greatly expanded the technological
possibilities allowing one to succeed in this conquest of nature. As
a result, nature-induced disasters were increasingly presented as failures
of control, calling for greater human endeavors to avoid their repetition.
In this respect, the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 is often considered
a turning point in (Western) dealings with risk, for a number of reasons.
Among the reasons are the degree of central coordination by the state
shown in the recovery from the earthquake, the efforts of this state to
rationalize, measure, calculate, and undo its impact, and the wide range
of technological improvements deployed to make the built environment
more resilient to future earthquakes. Lisbon, however, was also one of the
first disasters which was widely discussed in an emerging public sphere of
newspaper-readers and intellectuals, all over Europe and the colonial
world.32 The earthquake made a deep impression on the intellectual
world of the Enlightenment, with its adherents such as Voltaire and
Kant publishing extensively on the subject and each in their way contrib-
uting to both the scientific study of disaster and its naturalization, with
Voltaire in both Candide and the Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne
30 See Section 2.3.6. 31 See Section 7.2.3.
32 Koopmans, ‘The 1755 Lisbon Earthquake,’ 26–29.
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vehemently attacking those who still believed that such disasters were
some form of divine punishment.33
If disasters were natural, blind, and evil, human industry should and
could be directed at preventing their occurrence and controlling their
impact. And in the two centuries following the Lisbon Earthquake, the
technological possibilities to do so expanded greatly, and huge numbers
of people started to settle in flood-prone deltas or practice irrigation-
farming in water-poor regions, as if floods and droughts did not exist.
The coming of age of the Anthropocene replaced the ideal of absolute
safety by the ideal of acceptable risk – a relative degree of safety based on
accurate calculation and assessment, permanent alert, smart use of tech-
nology, and maximal accommodation of hazards.34 The idea of ‘accept-
able risk’ is very prominent, for instance inmodern coastal engineering. On
the basis of projections of the frequency and intensity of extreme sea levels
in the future, as well as calculations of relevant uncertainties, flood protec-
tion is continuously being adapted in order to withstand ‘once-in-a-thou-
sand-years’ or even ‘once-in-ten-thousand-years’ storms.35 However, if
‘acceptable risk’ is one side of the coin, the fundamental unpredictability
of modern disasters is the other. Disasters like 9/11, Chernobyl,
or the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami by far exceeded the margins of prob-
ability of commonly available risk assessments, leading Joachim Radkau to
the suggestion that only science fiction and horror stories could provide
realistic scenarios for some of the disasters unfolding in the modern age
of risk.36
In sum, it is clear that anthropogenic climate change as well as the rise
of the capitalist world-system, or the risk society, drastically altered the
production, the impact, and the handling of disasters. At the same time,
however, the gap between Anthropocene disasters and disasters in the
more distant past is often surprisingly small, especially when discussing
vulnerability and resilience. Especially the roles of different institutional
formations and coordination systems (state, market, family) in relation to
hazards, and those of social actors and their sometimes differing interests,
can be instructive with respect to present-day situations. The many
examples and case studies discussed throughout this volume make clear
that the study of past disasters, even those which occurred in the distant
past, can offer a substantial contribution to a better understanding of
disasters today.
33 Hamblyn, ‘Notes from the Underground.’
34 Knowles, ‘Learning from Disaster?,’ 778.
35 Wahl et al., ‘Understanding Extreme Sea Levels.’
36 Radkau, Nature and Power, 265–271.
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7.2 The Potential of History for Better Understanding
Disasters
Of the many fields that contribute to mainstream disasters discourse,
history is often found towards the bottom of the list.37 In much of this
literature we might find a brief preamble on the history of a particular
disaster or policy over some decades – the so-called ‘long term’ –while the
present tends to remain rigidly detached from the past, creating an artifi-
cial divide between knowledge perceived as relevant and that seen as
irrelevant for disaster risk reduction. Equally, we might argue that much
scholarship focusing on historical disasters remains detached from the
present. Many arguments for historically informed disaster research have
come not from historians, but from geographers, sociologists, ecologists,
and paleoclimatologists – a circumstance that has shaped the ways in
which scholars have attempted to draw ‘lessons’ from the past.
One of these is known as ‘forecasting by analogy’ – an approach pion-
eered by social scientist Michael H. Glantz in the late 1980s and 1990s.
This approach views past experiences of responses to hazards as analo-
gous to future challenges, arguing that, if we can identify how past soci-
eties successfully or unsuccessfully managed risk, then we can use this
knowledge to forecast the likely impacts of future threats such as climate
change.38 Past disasters are turned into ‘completed natural experiments
of history’, which can be mobilized to forecast the range of potential
outcomes of future disasters (Figure 7.2).
In the field of disasters, analogy-based methodologies grew in popular-
ity during the 2000s as the rapid growth in paleoclimate proxy data began
to shed greater light on past climatic change, which in turn facilitated an
increasing number of studies that zoomed in on episodes of societal
‘collapse’ in past millennia that coincided with episodes of significant
climatic change.39 Yet it was largely because of an explicit focus on
discrete periods of abrupt environmental change and collapse that these
analyses have been left open to criticisms of determinism and oversimpli-
fication. In particular, analogies have been criticized for reducing the
37 We can broadly define ‘mainstream’ as that research discussed by the United Nations
International Strategy forDisaster Reduction (UNISDR), or in journals such asDisasters,
the International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, or the International Journal of
Risk Reduction. A historical perspective also remained absent from influential handbooks
of disaster research, such as Rodríguez, Quarantelli & Dynes, Handbook of Disaster
Research.
38 See Glantz, Societal Responses; Glantz, ‘Does History Have a Future?’; Glantz, ‘The Use
of Analogies.’
39 For examples, see Hodell, Curtis & Brenner, ‘Possible Role of Climate’; Dugmore et al.,
‘Cultural Adaptation’; Holmgren & Öberg, ‘Climate Change’; Riede, ‘Towards
a Science of Past Disasters.’
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societies in question to respondents to a series of exogenous threats, for
uncritically drawing lessons from societies that are markedly different
from those of today, and for the lack of a suitable analogy for contempor-
ary climate change.40 Despite such critiques, analogies retain consider-
able currency, particularly as communication tools.
It was off the back of these criticisms that the Integrated History and
Future of People on Earth (IHOPE) network emerged.41 This approach
derives from social-ecological systems analysis, which views humans and
the environment as one holistic system that is defined by its level of
resilience to disturbance.42 This school of thought rejects the notion of
past, present, and future as separate entities and instead conceptualizes
temporality as the ‘long now.’43 In doing so, it integrates historical
(largely archaeological) data into systems models to identify ‘safe and
just’ spaces and boundaries for humanity to operate within – its ultimate
aim being to provide recommendations to build sustainability.44 A focus
on systems rather than people and a reliance on archaeological rather than
historical evidence has nevertheless left IHOPE exposed to some of the
same criticisms directed at analogies, in that they tend to present histor-
ical trajectories without recourse to the human agency and uneven
Completed natural
experiments of history
Pre-existing
conditions
t
–n t0 t+1 t+2
Eruption
event
Multiple possible
outcomes
Figure 7.2 So-called ‘scenario trumpet’ projecting possible disaster scenarios,
building on experiences of the past. Riede, ‘Past-Forwarding Ancient Calamities.’
40 Adamson, Rohland & Hannaford, ‘Re-thinking the Present.’
41 IHOPEwas founded in 2003 by the ecological economist Robert Costanza, see Costanza
et al., ‘Sustainability or Collapse’; Costanza, Graumlich & Steffen (eds.), Sustainability or
Collapse?
42 Berkes & Folke (eds.), Linking Social and Ecological Systems; Holling, ‘Understanding the
Complexity’; Folke, ‘Resilience.’
43 Dearing et al., ‘Safe and Just Operating Spaces’; Redman & Kinzig, ‘Resilience of Past
Landscapes.’
44 Dearing et al., ‘Safe and Just Operating Spaces’; Rockström et al., ‘Planetary Boundaries.’
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distributions of power embedded within decision-making, and are there-
fore ultimately reductionist.45
It is all very well for historians to label these approaches as ‘determinis-
tic’ or ‘reductionist,’ but are there historical approaches that can counter-
act these criticisms? Indeed, historians have been relatively slow to make
the case for historical disaster research that moves beyond the view of the
past as an end in itself, and instead to see history as a vehicle to under-
stand how societies engender, respond to, and recover from disasters.46
This is in part due to a fear of appearing deterministic. Even historical
climatologists have largely avoided connecting their research to the pre-
sent until relatively recently, despite making use of frameworks derived
from the contemporary global climate change literature such as vulner-
ability and resilience. This is unfortunate given that the richness of the
historical record allows us to reconstruct the social, economic, and cul-
tural impact of hazards and shocks over time periods simply not possible
in contemporary disaster studies material – allowing us to better observe
structural societal changes rather than short-term immediate disruption
that may be rectified within a matter of years.47 Only recently have calls
for historically informed disasters research begun to emerge from histor-
ians themselves. We now review some of the arguments which these calls
have made.
7.2.1 The Historical Roots of Present-Day Disasters
Throughout this volume, it has been shown that contemporary disasters
sometimes had deep roots in historical processes: the impact of the
terrible earthquake in Peru in 1970, for example, has been linked to
Spanish colonial practices over 500 years ago.48 Extreme destruction
and suffering turned out to be as much products of Peru’s long history
of underdevelopment as they were of the earthquake itself. Urbanization
patterns – with their dense concentrations of humans, buildings, and
capital – were the long-term remnants of Spanish subjugation of the
indigenous population in the sixteenth century. Spanish colonizers for-
cibly moved rural peasants out of their traditional dispersed habitation
patterns, where they had found a complex socio-economic balance in this
difficult environment and were able to spread and buffer risks, into these
central agglomerations. The collective institutions (formal or informal),
redistributive systems, and personal reciprocity required to reduce the
45 Adamson, Rohland & Hannaford, ‘Re-thinking the Present.’
46 Curtis, van Bavel & Soens, ‘History and the Social Sciences.’
47 Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’
48 Oliver-Smith, ‘Peru’s Five-Hundred-Year Earthquake.’
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impact of severe shocks had long been eroded by the installation of
hacienda-based modes of exploitation worked by mass ranks of marginal-
ized Indian serfs. Similarly, the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti
in 2010, killing approximately 250,000 people, has been linked to a pre-
existing state of societal vulnerability inherited from very particular paths
taken far back at the beginning of the nineteenth century.49 A skewed
relationship between state and society, epitomized by frequent patterns of
violence and peasant resistance and revolt, led to a vicious circle of
reduced rent extraction opportunities, a weak or ‘failed’ state, and ultim-
ately a dearth of growth-enhancing and protective public and private
institutions – the absence of which was keenly felt when the earthquake
occurred in 2010.
Some would conclude that such path dependencies can render us
‘prisoners of history,’ as institutional arrangements shaping human inter-
action with hazards tend to embody past understandings and imperatives
rather than those attuned to the present.50 Institutions are deeply embed-
ded in the societal context within which they were formed, and are shaped
according to power dynamics and the memory of issues they have
addressed over the course of their existence. This historical context is
frequently hidden from view in the disasters literature, and as argued
there is an urgent need for new lines of research that trace how institutions
have functioned historically in relation to hazards, and that map out
where and how path dependencies become active over time.51 Similar
calls have been made in the climate change adaptation literature,
although these have been criticized for the relatively shallow time depth
that is often employed.52 Indeed, in path-dependent patterns, formative
moments or critical junctures drive or reinforce divergent paths. Having
crystallized into institutions – including cultural values – these paths
become difficult to shift. Increasing costs develop over time when switch-
ing from one policy alternative to another, making future change and
adaptation more difficult.53 These deep causes become especially high-
lighted when faced with new circumstances brought on by exogenous
shocks.54 In order to uncover path-dependent processes, then, one must
begin from a critical juncture that underlies subsequent events, which
necessitates historical research. The identification of path dependency
can therefore allow one to acquire better understanding of the long-term
drivers of vulnerability, and ultimately lead to better-targeted
49 Frankema & Masé, ‘An Island Drifting Apart.’
50 Dovers & Hezri, ‘Institutions and Policy Processes.’
51 For this argument, see Section 5.3.2. 52 Wise et al., ‘Reconceptualising Adaptation.’
53 Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns’; Elvin, ‘Three Thousand Years of Unsustainable Growth.’
54 Dietz, Stern & Rycroft, ‘Definitions of Conflict’; ’t Hart, ‘Symbols.’
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interventions that avoid potential unintended consequences that can arise
in the absence of sensitivity to historical and social contexts.
7.2.2 The Past as an Empirical Laboratory: Institutions and Social Context
One key argument underpinning this monograph is that ‘the past’ can be
used as a ‘laboratory’ to empirically test hypotheses of relevance to the
present, by spatially and chronologically comparing the drivers of and
constraints on societal responses to shocks – in turn enriching our under-
standing of responses to stress today. This approach sees history as
a science: it moves beyond ‘the narrative’ and ‘the particular,’ and seeks
to identify distinct or divergent patterns, constellations, and trajectories.
This can help guard against teleological forms of explanation, or explan-
ations following uni-linear forms of progression to an inevitable outcome.
Despite arguing for a focus on patterns and trajectories, we also advocate
for a focus on social context and its role in shaping responses to hazards in
particular regions and localities. First, hazards and human responses to
them have regionally and locally specific characteristics: even ‘global’
phenomena such as climate change are experienced in the form of local
processes such as coastal erosion or various forms of extreme weather, with
sometimes very differing social consequences, and therefore no singular
approach to reducing risk and vulnerability fits neatly across all contexts.
As a result, it was often the ‘export’ of institutional and technological
‘solutions’ to hazards and disasters from one region to another which
proved particularly problematic, as such solutions not only failed to do
what they were meant to do, but also created new types of problems –
sometimes directly paving the road to future disaster themselves.55
Similarly, the global climate environment may ‘drive’ epidemic disease
outbreaks, but they represent only the larger framework within which
local contextual environmental and societal conditions dictate actual epi-
demiologic outcomes – pathogens move to human hosts under context-
ually specific conditions.56 This contextualized view is nevertheless
sometimes lacking in disasters discourse. Equally, the hegemony of model-
based approaches in the IHOPE school, for example, can overlook the
social and cultural attributes of a region. The kind of ‘within region’
systematic comparative approaches that we have made the case for can
therefore be accompanied by detailed, long-term analyses of human inter-
action with the ‘inbuilt’ hazards of a particular place, which can ensure that
responses are grounded within their place-specific context.57 This can also
55 See Sections 4.2.1 and 5.2.2 for examples. 56 Brook, ‘Differential Effects.’
57 See Section 3.2.3.
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extend to an investigation of how past hazards and disasters become
inscribed in the cultural memory of a region, which has been shown in
a number of contexts to inform responses to hazards today.58
Building on this appreciation of social context, a second element
calls for a more contextualized approach to historical disaster research
that focuses on the evolution and functioning of institutions.
Responses to hazards and disasters always take place within the
broader context of institutions – be they formal or informal – which
play a crucial role in driving or constraining vulnerability. By this, we
do not mean only those institutions that are specifically set up to deal
with hazards, which much of the disasters literature focuses on exclu-
sively, but also those ‘indirect’ institutions that exist regardless of the
presence of hazards.59 While it is common in the disasters literature to
compare various institutional responses against disaster outcomes
across a diverse range of contexts, whether that be at the market,
state, communal, or household level, recent work has questioned the
validity of this exercise, instead noting that types of institutional
arrangements do not per se have an intrinsic value in reducing risk,
but only ‘make sense’ by being embedded within their social settings.60
This is significant, given that a varied array of research in the disciplines
of history, sociology, and political economics tells us that institutions
do not always evolve towards a state that promotes an optimum level of
societal resilience, but rather tend to drift towards the needs of
restricted interest groups, especially those with the most bargaining
power and access to resources.61 Institutions necessary for welfare and
protection may also have their performance and functions inadvert-
ently affected by interaction with other institutions.62 One further
process that historical research can illuminate, then, is how the deep-
rooted interests and preferences of certain social groups who control
the functioning of institutions may dictate their effectiveness in dealing
with hazards in different contexts. This can, in turn, help ensure that
responses to hazards do not simply reproduce inequitable power struc-
tures and create self-reinforcing cycles of vulnerability. In this book, we
have elucidated ways we can approach these lines of investigation most
fruitfully through systematic comparative analysis.63
58 Endfield, ‘Exploring Particularity’; Endfield & Veale (eds.), Cultural Histories. See also
Sections 4.5 and 5.2.1.
59 Van Bavel & Curtis, ‘Better Understanding Disasters.’
60 Van Bavel, Curtis & Soens, ‘Economic Inequality.’
61 Ogilvie, ‘“Whatever Is, Is Right”?’
62 Ogilvie & Carus, ‘Institutions and Economic Growth.’ 63 Especially in Section 2.3.3.
174 Past and Present
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0E0A126BFA23BFA416D8AABC75014D59
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 85.145.71.89, on 19 Oct 2020 at 16:40:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
7.2.3 The Great Escape: Can History Teach Us How to Escape from
Disaster?
Disaster history is generally considered a dark and gloomy field of history,
telling stories of suffering and despair, of vulnerable people whose liveli-
hoods were suddenly and brutally disrupted. However, history also hides
many examples of regions and societies which once have been vulnerable
to a particular threat, but where this threat has eventually been overcome,
or at least strongly contained. Careful historical analysis might reveal the
conditions and drivers that produced such an ‘escape from disaster.’
A classic, though highly disputed, example is to be found in the history
of famine. After the 1845–47 potato famine, harvest failures in Europe no
longer induced massive starvation (which became confined to contexts of
warfare and to people experiencing ‘marginal’ living conditions).64
Moreover, in some regions such as Holland, this ‘escape from famine’
may have been achieved already at a much earlier stage, in the course of
the sixteenth or seventeenth century.65 Hence it becomes tempting to
frame such a retreat of vulnerability as a by-product of ‘modern’ eco-
nomic growth, producing the technological advances necessary to remove
the Malthusian limits on food production, the economies of scale and
levels of market integration needed to overcome regional food shortages
through trade, and the gains in productivity that made it possible to
reduce the importance of food in the expenditure of the household.
If poverty was the ultimate cause of disaster vulnerability, then growth
in welfare provision might be the solution. More generally, economic
growth may be seen as the crucial factor in reducing vulnerabilities,
including those related to natural hazards. But can we indeed observe
such positive interaction between economic growth and reduced vulner-
ability throughout history, and if so, what were the underlying mechan-
isms explaining the positive impact of economic growth on disaster
vulnerability? A way of approaching this question, focusing on the rela-
tion between economic growth and environmental problems in general, is
offered by the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).66 In
parallel to the relationship between economic growth and social inequal-
ity put forward by Simon Kuznets, the EKC or ‘inverted U-curve’ pre-
dicts that economic growth will initially produce increasing
environmental problems. When the growth becomes sustainable, how-
ever, the environmental impact will stabilize and perhaps even decrease
again. Because pollution can be measured in a relatively uniform way, the
64 Ó Gráda, Famine, 36; Fogel, The Escape from Hunger.
65 Curtis & Dijkman, ‘The Escape from Famine.’
66 Grossman & Krueger, ‘Economic Growth’; Klein Goldewijk, ‘Environmental Quality.’
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model is mostly used in pollution studies, although it has been applied to
disaster impact as well.67 The basic causal mechanism behind the stabil-
ization of environmental problems where prolonged growth exists is the
demand for a ‘clean’ environment (or better protection against disasters),
which is believed to increase in parallel to income and standards of living
(and which becomes an issue once a significant proportion of the popula-
tion is no longer predominantly occupied with fulfilling needs of subsist-
ence). Meeting the requirements of a safer and cleaner environment,
while maintaining higher levels of income per capita, becomes possible
as efficiency gainsmake it possible to release capital which can be invested
in environmental protection. In the sphere of human health, the obvious
gains in life expectancy and diminished exposure to epidemic diseases
and mass mortality in developed countries might be linked to improve
standards of hygienic, better nutrition, and better health care. All of this
could be afforded by higher income. And indeed, in the twentieth cen-
tury, there was a fairly stable positive correlation between life expectancy
at birth and GDP per capita, with richer countries indeed witnessing
higher life expectancies. Interestingly, this was not yet the case in the
nineteenth century, when countries with a higher per capita incomemight
even have seen lower life expectancies, compared with ‘poorer’
countries.68 While this suggests the existence of an environmental
Kuznets curve, of course, aggregate data on life expectancy and exposure
to disease provide no information on the important social differentiations
in health care which continue to exist in developed economies, and might
even become stronger with the increase in inequality, and/or reductions in
public expenditure on health care.69
In the past, sustained economic growth provided the funding to carry
out big engineering projects, like the major improvements in flood pro-
tection in the North Sea area after the 1953 floods. These improvements
coincided with the postwar economic boom, and helped to reduce the
theoretical likelihood of major dike breaches from once in 100 years to
once in 10,000 years. We have also seen, however, that technological
solutions can create either a false sense of security or dangerous side-
effects and thus increase rather than decrease vulnerability.70 In the
history of agriculture, economic growth might enable higher capital
inputs (mechanization, fertilization) as well as investments in research
and development, all working to reduce the potential of adverse weather
to seriously disrupt the harvests. On the other hand, new ‘high-yielding’
67 Cavallo et al., ‘Catastrophic Natural Disasters’; Kellenberg & Mobarak, ‘Does Rising
Income.’
68 Zijdeman & Ribeiro da Silva, ‘Life Expectancy,’ 112. 69 See Section 4.4.
70 See Section 5.2.2.
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crop varieties are often highly demanding in technical terms, as well as
being vulnerable to distortions in both inputs and weather. In the end,
advanced agriculture remains as dependent on weather and diseases as its
‘traditional’ predecessors; only the effects of a harvest failure might be
different.71 Or, as William H. McNeill observed in 1992 in what he
termed the ‘conservation of catastrophe’: “It certainly seems as though
every gain in precision in the coordination of human activity and every
heightening of efficiency in production were matched by a new vulner-
ability to breakdown.”72 Hence, the existence of an inverted U-shape in
the relation between economic growth and the occurrence or impact of
disasters remains to be tested.
7.3 The Potential of Disasters for Historical Research
While historical research can contribute to understanding disasters, the
reverse is also true: studying past disasters can enrich historical research.
Historians are by no means unfamiliar with disasters; they have been
writing about catastrophes for a long time. In fact, few historians will
object to the observation that disasters have played a central role in many
cultures. Fear of hunger and famine often had a pervasive impact on the
organization of food production in rural communities, explaining the so-
called ‘prudence of the peasants.’73 The successful management of nat-
ural hazards often became a cornerstone of political power: the Chinese
imperial constitution, for instance, turned disasters into serious chal-
lenges for the emperors: the Mandate of Heaven saw the emperors as
the ultimate connection between Heaven and Earth, and uncontrolled
natural disasters might indicate that the emperor had forsaken this
mandate.74 Origin myths also often start from mega-disasters. The
enduring importance of Noah’s Flood for Jewish, Christian, and Islamic
cultures is probably the best-known example – it even proved very inspir-
ing for the development of geology, as the biblical catastrophe could
apparently explain the occurrence of marine sediments and fossils of sea
animals high above sea level, an interpretation known as ‘Neptunism.’75
And after all, with the idea of the Big Bang, modern science is still arguing
for a disaster as starting point – and potential end – of our universe: earth’s
origins remain rooted in catastrophe. In national histories as well,
71 Federico, Feeding the World, 12. In the United States the average variability of wheat
yields was higher in the period 1960–2000 than in the period 1860–1910.
72 McNeill,TheGlobal Condition, 148, cited byMauelshagen, ‘DefiningCatastrophes,’ 183.
73 McCloskey, ‘The Prudent Peasant,’ see above Section 5.2.2.
74 Brook, The Troubled Empire.
75 Bowler & Rhys Morus,Making Modern Science, 111–118.
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disasters frequently occupy a prominent place. Societies often developed
an obsession for particular types of disaster, and in some cases these
disasters turned into a cornerstone of national identity: as we have seen
above, this was the case for famine in Ireland, for floods in the
Netherlands, and for disasters induced by colonialism in many parts of
the Global South.76
Throughout this book we have highlighted two ways in which more
attention to disasters might benefit our understanding of history. On the
one hand, disasters sometimes turned out to be ‘historical protagonists,’77
forcing, accelerating or facilitating changes in the economic, cultural,
social, or political organization of society. On the other hand, disasters
might also reveal features of societies which remain hidden in ‘normal’
situations, but become exposed in times of crisis. These themes are now
consolidated, before exploring future pathways for disaster history.
7.3.1 Disasters as Historical Protagonists
As we have seen, historians have long been reluctant to ascribe too much
causality to disasters, in particular to nature-related disasters.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, environmental determinism
was considered outdated, a relic of the past. Because of their apparently
random and insignificant nature, nature-induced disasters were con-
sidered unlikely to cause anything like a long-term structural impact.
Back in the 1960s, even Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, the pioneer of
Climate History, considered the ‘human’ effects of climate extremes
almost irrelevant.78 As late as 1980, Jan de Vries famously argued that
“short-term climatic crises stand in relation to economic history as bank
robberies to the history of banking.”79 Opinions were about to change,
however. As early as 1989, Mark Overton challenged the claim by de
Vries, saying that bank robberies can still be proximate causes of changes
in the banking system; structural responses could outstrip the economic
effect of the individual bank robbery in question.80 But, especially since
2000, a rapidly expanding body of historical literature has argued for
a more active role for disasters, not only in the short term, but also in
the long term, as vectors of lasting, structural changes.
As we have seen in Section 6.3, shocks and disasters are increasingly
being rediscovered as the ‘missing link’ in the explanation of major
dynastic, demographic, or economic crises, or the collapse of entire
76 See above, Section 1.2. 77 Campbell, ‘Nature as Historical Protagonist.’
78 See above, Section 1.2. 79 De Vries, ‘Measuring the Impact,’ 603.
80 Overton, ‘Weather and Agricultural Change,’ 77.
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civilizations. Well-known disasters like the Lisbon Earthquake or the
fourteenth-century Black Death, but also hitherto unknown or poorly
studied ‘mega-droughts’ and pandemics, are being framed as important
drivers of change. Sometimes the disaster or shock is identified as ‘the
prime mover’ of an important transition, while on other occasions it is
seen mostly as an accelerator or catalyst for processes that were already
unfolding. In the latter case the disaster might have opened a ‘window of
opportunity’ allowing specific actors to finally impose a program of
change they already had in mind. As we have argued, history can still
gain a lot by payingmore attention to the precise nature of the interactions
between ‘exogenous’ shocks and ‘endogenous’ features of the societies
affected by the disaster, notably by developing more systematic spatial
and chronological comparisons, making it possible to disentangle the
disaster from its context as much as possible.81
7.3.2 Disasters as Tests at the Extreme Margin
There is yet another way in which disaster history can directly inspire
other fields of history. As we have seen, the significance of disasters did
not remain constant, but was profoundly different from period to period,
and from region to region. One can know a society through its disasters –
so to speak. Disasters put societies under pressure: they are tests at the
extreme margin. As such, they bring to light latent qualities and charac-
teristics of societies, features that under normal conditions do not
stand out.
Among those features, inequality is an important element. As demon-
strated in Chapters 5 and 6, the vulnerability of groups and individuals is
often closely linked to their social, economic, and political position in
society. People at the margins of society – lacking capital, political influ-
ence, or cultural status – tend to be the most exposed to the negative
impact of disasters. In turn, disasters may further erode the resources of
victims, thus reinforcing and exacerbating existing inequalities. Studying
past disasters can reveal aspects of inequality that otherwise would have
remained hidden from view. The differential impact of shocks, in particu-
lar, may showwhich groups lived closest to the edge, how precarious their
position was, and frequently also which underlying mechanisms
explained their vulnerability. That New Orleans was divided along racial
and socio-economic lines was well known even before Hurricane Katrina,
but exactly how deep the divisions were became crystal clear during and
after the storm. Low-income African-Americans in particular were hit
81 Curtis, van Bavel & Soens, ‘History and the Social Sciences,’ 761–765.
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harder than other groups: they were over-represented among the group
that did notmanage to leave the city before the storm struck and they were
far more likely to lose their job afterwards. African-Americans in general,
poor or not, reported higher levels of stress in the aftermath of Katrina
than whites.82
In the history of colonialism and imperialism as well, disasters have
often been scrutinized to reveal the underlying systems of economic
exploitation and political dominance. For Mike Davis, only the massive
starvation following El Niño-related droughts on the Indian subcontinent
from the 1870s onwards can accurately capture the economic logic of the
imperial world-system, with its forced concentration on massive exports
of grain and cotton, and destruction of the traditional resources of
resilience.83 Floods have also been studied to uncover the nature of
colonial rule. In the period 1880–1950 the British colonial government
made important efforts to regulate the rivers of Northern India, for
purposes of flood safety, transportation, and irrigation.84 The construc-
tion of large-scale embankments prevented alluvial deposit formation,
impeded drainage, fostered the spread of malaria, and in the end
increased rather than decreased the flood risk. In the analysis of Rohan
D’Souza, dam building became the ultimate instrument of colonial cap-
italism, ending centuries-old flood-dependent agrarian regimes and
installing an export-oriented agriculture based on a private property
regime.85
Social and political inequalities are not the only features of societies
exposed by disasters; the institutional framework is another. Here, per-
haps, the role of disasters as tests at the extrememargin becomes clearest.
The capacity of societies, groups, and individuals to cope with shocks
depends partly on institutions: the rules, customs, practices, and organ-
izational forms that shape the response to shocks. Studying the response
of historical societies to shocks can, first of all, reveal the robustness of
institutions under adverse circumstances. Research has, for instance,
shown that in late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century France
grain markets did not, as was previously thought, ‘balkanize’ during
famines through local imposition of restrictions on food shipments.
Regional and interregional grain trade, with its emphasis on the provi-
sioning of Paris, continued to operate largely as it did in normal years.
Thus the organization of the grain market proved highly ‘robust,’
82 Elliott & Pais, ‘Race, Class, and Hurricane Katrina’; Hartman & Squires (eds.), There Is
No Such Thing.
83 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts.
84 Hill, River of Sorrow; Singh, ‘The Colonial State.’
85 D’Souza, Drowned and Dammed. See also Section 7.1.2.
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although this also implied prioritizing the capital over provincial cities and
the countryside.86 This observation leads us to a second question: did
institutions operate in ways that allowed people to cope with shocks? Did
they, in other words, reinforce the resilience of society as a whole, and of
vulnerable groups in particular? Whether grain markets in early-modern
France had this effect is doubtful. Not only was mortality very high – the
famines of 1693–94 and 1709–10 together killed more than two million
people – but also urban demand, backed by superior urban purchasing
power, inflated prices in the production areas disproportionately: in the
Paris basin the volatility of wheat prices was higher than in the city itself.87
Through the history of these famines, a better understanding of both the
French grain market and the degree of political centralization can be
achieved.
Finally, disasters test the capacity of societies to learn and adapt in
order to prevent recurrences, or at the very least to mitigate the impact of
subsequent shocks. Returning to Hurricane Katrina, responses to the
storm were thoroughly examined afterwards in a series of official reports.
However, these reports focused largely on the actions – or absence of
actions – by various governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local
level and on the need for adjustments of communication systems and
technological infrastructure. The reports paid virtually no attention to
issues such as poverty and race, which had been identified as root causes
of vulnerability in academic research.88 The case of Katrina thus demon-
strates how the capacity of societies to learn fromdisaster can be restricted
by political and social biases. Disasters, in short, act as magnifying lenses
which expose aspects of past societies that might otherwise have escaped
the eye.
7.4 Future Pathways
It is difficult to predict what the future will hold for the field of disaster
history, but certain trends will most probably unfold in the coming years.
One of these is interdisciplinary research. The field of disaster history is by
definition crowded with natural, social, and human scientists; neverthe-
less, true interdisciplinary research is still quite rare, and the chasm
between these fields is seldom bridged. The niche of climate history
may be the exception to the rule. Here, both climatologists and historians
have created long-term climate reconstructions based on a wide range of
86 Ó Gráda & Chevet, ‘Famine and Market.’ 87 Meuvret, ‘Les oscillations des prix.’
88 A Failure of Initiative; Lessons Learned; A Nation Still Unprepared (all available from
www.disastersrus.org/katrina).
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data, archival sources, and methodologies. Most impressive, however, is
the tendency of the social, human, and exact sciences to approach these
interdisciplinary sources and datasets not from the isolated perspective of
their individual discipline, but rather bringing an open mind to tackle
questions and to perform analyses from different disciplines. Historians
have stepped outside of the realm of the human sphere and looked at
ecosystems, weather patterns, and climatic shifts in their own right, while
ecologists and climatologists have been interested in the societal impact of
climatic influences. In this way, both sides of the scientific world have
cross-fertilized one another.89
This interdisciplinary success should have a role as an exemplar for the
other sub-fields of disaster studies. Historians should embrace the meth-
odologies, data, and findings of the other social sciences as well as those of
the exact sciences to get a better understanding of disasters in the past and
present. This should not have to lead to an adaptation to or appropriation
of the perspectives and methods of these different disciplines, however.
Interdisciplinary research should be a two-way interaction whereby the
disciplines involved could work on a common set of concepts, topics, and
questions that can be approached in a truly interdisciplinary way, rather
than merely correlating or combining multiple independent datasets and
methodologies.
Importantly, and perhaps obviously, historians can convey the import-
ance of time and chronology in studying disasters. As this book has
shown, general patterns of behavior do occur in different places and in
different time frames. Some patterns have a linear temporal distribution,
while others have a cyclical or sporadic recurrence. For some types of
disasters, there are clear precedents in recent history, for others only
a perspective spanning several centuries can inform us on causes, vulner-
abilities, and impact, and yet other categories of disaster – think of
volcanic eruptions in Western Europe – require an archaeological or
geological time-scale, covering at least several millennia.90 In the analysis
of disaster responses, effects, and preconditions as well, a historical
approach problematizes a purely processual interpretation of disasters,
vulnerability, and adaptability. Context always mattered, and responses
which were successful in one context utterly failed in others. In unraveling
the intimate relationship between the disaster and its particular social,
temporal, and geographical context, historians can offer a major contri-
bution to the study of disasters.
89 Allan et al., ‘Toward Integrated Historical Climate Research.’
90 Riede, ‘Past-Forwarding Ancient Calamities’ on the Laacher See volcanic eruption in
Western Germany, about 13,000 years ago.
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This brings us to a second pathway: history as a laboratory. The past
provides us with a wide range of disasters set in different time frames, and
more especially in different types of societies, with very specific socio-
economic, political, and cultural structures. As a result, historians can test
how different social, economic, cultural, and political constellations affect
the adaptability and vulnerability of societies or social groups. By com-
paring and analyzing these differences and similarities, historians can
distinguish general patterns and trajectories that occur in distinct societal
circumstances. This book has attempted to provide such an approach. It
is, however, important to apply this approach beyond the examples that
we have considered here and increase the amount of comparative research
to broaden this perspective. A future goal should be to look for the most
basic causes of social vulnerability and adaptability. What causes soci-
eties, and especially social groups, to become vulnerable to natural haz-
ards? Which institutions, social structures, political actors, and cultural
settings provide the best options – depending on the specific context – to
respond efficiently to crisis? Only when certain patterns and trajectories
become clearer can historians move beyond the narrative and the particu-
lar and provide assessments that may even inform policy.
A third pathway for the future is to challenge the Eurocentric approach
to disaster history that has predominated, at least until relatively recently.
A first challenge is to expand the amount of research concerning non-
Western societies and their mechanisms for coping with natural hazards
and shocks in the past and present. Unfortunately, most of our current
overview is highly focused on European or Western contexts, because
these regions and societies are highly over-represented in the available
literature. As Greg Bankoff has pointed out convincingly, Western per-
spectives on risk, mitigation, danger, and vulnerability still dominate how
we look at regions and disasters.91 As a result, the Global South is often
portrayed as unsafe, highly vulnerable, and less resilient. In addition,
researchers often look for Western institutions, responses, and mitigation
measures across the globe, instead of analyzing the alternative structures
and strategies in their own right. The centralized and highly technological
prevention, response, and mitigation measures that are common in
Western countries have been set as a standard against which all other
disaster prevention and mitigation measures are tested. As our analysis
has shown, however, even within Europe a plethora of responses existed.
There never was a single set of conditions and strategies which proved
universally applicable and successful. It is therefore also time to ‘provin-
cialize Europe’92 once and for all, also in the field of disaster history. In
91 Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe.’ 92 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.
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every region, social vulnerability levels and societies’ adaptability should
be measured starting from the norms, institutions, technologies, and
discourses prevailing in that particular region.Only thenwill it be possible
to make a comparative assessment of different responses to similar pres-
sures and hazards, without using a fixed standard or idea of success.
Without retreating into relativism concerning social vulnerability and
resilience towards hazards, this approach can distinguish between pat-
terns and strategies in a non-Eurocentric way.
Our fourth suggestion is to analyze the unfolding of disasters from the
local level. This may seem to go against the grain, now that global history
figures prominently in historiography. This is not a plea to limit research
to local actors and locally specific responses, however. The locality can
andmust be used as a starting point to look for broader patterns in dealing
with hazards and disasters. Only at the local level do all types of responses,
all the different actors, and all the different scales (the global, national,
regional, and local level) come together. A top-down, centralized
approach is often the most visible reaction, but the interaction between
different actors operating at different levels is dominant through time and
space. This is especially the case for social vulnerability. We can only
grasp the impact of disasters by looking at how different social groups, or
even the household or individual level, may have been affected. Local
configurations of race, class, gender, age, profession, family, and house-
hold composition, etc., all had a tremendous impact on both the exposure
to and the recovery from disaster. Moreover, as long as disaster history
approaches disasters at the level of societies as a whole, it will almost
invariably observe high levels of resilience: as we have seen, societal
collapse and abrupt transformations are extremely rare in history. This
societal continuity nevertheless masks big impacts from the level of social
groups towards the individual onwards.93 Similarly, it is important to
move beyond large-scale or national responses, and look at how different
levels interacted and affected responses to hazards. On a more practical
level, existing localized histories and case studies, which can get lost in
regional journals, should be brought to center stage by way of their
intersection with overarching questions and bigger debates, so that com-
parative research becomes a possibility.
Finally, these pathways also require consideration and exploration of
how (and, in many cases, whether) our results can inform not only
disasters research, but also disaster management. It is clear that the
value of the cautionary tale has its limits, but how do our results move
beyond this? Does our historical laboratory offer us the basis to make
93 Soens, ‘Resilient Societies.’
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predictive assessments about future disasters? Can our research intersect
with, or feed into, agent-based modeling approaches that many
researchers in the humanities and social sciences are wary of? These are
likely to be contentious questions, but ones that an interdisciplinary field
like historical disaster research cannot avoid. Whatever the answers, it is
evident that, if historical disaster research is to speak to disaster manage-
ment, and even policy, then a more transdisciplinary approach is called
for – that is to say, research based upon co-design, co-production, and co-
dissemination beyond the humanities and beyond the academic commu-
nity as a whole.
7.5 A Final Word on Disaster Victims
Concluding a textbook on disaster history would not be possible without
briefly returning to the single most essential question in the research field:
why do people suffer from disaster, and how can such suffering be
avoided or at least mitigated? It seems evident that disaster history should
maintain a strong focus on the victims of disaster – the people struck by
natural or human-made disaster, their misfortune and suffering, the
causes of their suffering, and the efforts undertaken to alleviate or (even
better) prevent this suffering. But, surprisingly, disaster victims are sel-
dom at the heart of disaster history, in part because accurate data on
casualties are often lacking, but also because historians have been more
preoccupied by the causes of disaster, the coping mechanisms, or the
recovery.94 Historians are children of their time, and in the twenty-first-
century ‘Age of Disaster’ there is a strong tendency to scrutinize history
for examples of ‘resilience’: success and failure in adapting to hazards and
disasters which – again – seem inevitable.
However, while adaptive processes are indeed very important in disas-
ter management, they do not necessarily reduce the exposure to harm and
suffering. History demonstrates that high levels of resilience can co-exist
perfectly with high levels of vulnerability. For a number of cases – the
Lisbon Earthquake of 1755, the 1693 Etna eruption on Sicily, and of
course the fourteenth-century Black Death – historians have even argued
that high numbers of casualties had a ‘beneficial’ impact on both the post-
disaster recovery and the material welfare of the survivors, because of
redistribution of wealth, investments in reconstruction, or improvements
in policy making.95 In resilience studies, this would be framed mainly as
94 Even for the past century, data on people affected by or killed in a disaster are highly
approximative: Eshghi & Larson, ‘Disasters,’ 72. See also Soens, ‘Resilient Societies,’ as
well as Sections 2.2 and 6.1.1.
95 Branca et al., ‘Impacts,’ 38.
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an issue of scaling: the adaptive capacity of societies as a whole unfolds in
different ways from the adaptive capacity of individual households.96 In
other words, what is bad for the individual can be good for the commu-
nity. The expectation of high numbers of casualties gradually became part
of a standard disaster narrative: a substantial death-count was expected –
and was even needed in order to unleash relief and support from outside,
especially when the disaster was situated in the colonial (or post-colonial)
world and relief from the West had to be mobilized.97
Disaster history is still a very recent field of historical inquiry, gaining
significant attention only from the late 1990s onwards. As a result, the
field was not very much influenced by the older tradition of vulnerability
studies, which aimed precisely to reveal the underlying, structural, causes
of risk and harm.98 Time and again, vulnerability studies demonstrated
how exposure to risk and hazard was fueled by marginalization processes,
which played themselves out both between regions and between house-
holds within a given region. Today, as well as in the past, risk is being
‘dumped’ on poor regions and people in marginal living conditions.99
History has the unique potential to demonstrate how economic or polit-
ical marginalization eventually led to vulnerability, but also to indicate
ways in which this ‘iron law’ of vulnerability could be broken, by studying
the conditions and instruments which allowed some societies to arrive at
a more equal spread of vulnerability, or more ‘inclusive’ways of achieving
disaster resilience.
Perhaps one way forward for disaster history could be to shift attention
from societies as a whole to communities and individual households and
livelihoods, elaborating multidimensional assessments of household
vulnerability and analyzing how households were capable of preventing
disasters from happening and/or coped with their impact if they did hap-
pen. While disaster history has often questioned how regions recovered
from disasters, historical studies investigating the livelihood trajectories of
individual households struck by disaster remain rare. Moreover, in recent
years, disaster studies have developed a clear interest in so-called
‘traditional’ coping mechanisms: strongly localized ‘indigenous’ know-
ledge on disaster prevention and mitigation, which was often passed from
generation to generation, and might be ‘reactivated’ to complement
‘modern’ disaster prevention or relief mechanisms. Debates concentrate
both on the relevance of highly localized coping mechanisms when con-
fronted with increasingly globalized environmental, economic, and
96 See Section 2.3.5.
97 Bankoff, ‘Rendering the World Unsafe’; see Smith, ‘Volcanic Hazard in a Slave Society’
for an early-nineteenth-century example of this logic.
98 See Section 3.2.2. 99 Hillier & Castillo, No Accident, 4.
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political pressures and on the intimate link between such traditional coping
mechanisms and the empowerment of local populations, which might (or
might not) be capable of organizing their environment in a way that fits
their livelihood.100 Historians can offer an important contribution to this
debate, provided they reshuffle their analysis to focus on disaster victims,
the causes of their vulnerability, and their capacity to impact disaster
prevention, management, and recovery.
100 Wong & Zhao, ‘Living with Floods’; Hooli, ‘Resilience of the Poorest.’
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